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SCENARIOS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: FIVE TYPES
Developing a scenario exercise involves many design choices, of which the most important involve choosing the few key un-
certainties to represent in alternative scenarios. Five types of scenarios have been developed to address different aspects of
the climate-change issue; these are distinguished by where they fall along a simple linear causal chain extending from the 
socio-economic determinants of greenhouse-gas emissions through the impacts of climate change as shown in Figure ES-1.
(This figure does not represent the complete causal structure of the climate issue, which has many linkages and feedbacks.
Rather, this simple structure only illustrates how scenarios have been used to fit within the simplest and most prominent
causal pathway of the issue.)
Figure ES-1.
Scenarios of
anthropogenic
climate change:
simple linear causal
chain
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A scenario is a description of potential future conditions produced to in-
form decision-making under uncertainty.  Scenarios can help inform deci-
sions that involve high stakes and poorly characterized uncertainty, which
may thwart other, conventional forms of analysis or decision support.  Orig-
inally developed to study military and security problems, scenarios are now
widely used for strategic planning and assessment in businesses and other
organizations, and increasingly to inform planning, analysis, and decision-
making for environmental issues, including climate change.  
Scenarios can serve many purposes. They can help inform specific decisions, or can provide inputs to assessments, models,
or other decision-support activities when these activities need specification of potential future conditions.  They can also pro-
vide various forms of indirect decision support, such as clarifying an issue’s importance, framing a decision agenda, shaking
up habitual thinking, stimulating creativity, clarifying points of agreement and disagreement, identifying and engaging needed
participants, or providing a structure for analysis of potential future decisions.
SOCIO-
ECONOMIC
CONDITIONS
• population
• GDP
• energy system
• industry
• technology
• agriculture, 
   land-use
EMISSIONS
• greenhouse gases
• aerosols
• other drivers,
   e.g. land-cover
   change
• sea level rise
• fresh water
• ecosystems
• agriculture
• human health
• property,
   infrastructure
ATMOSPHERE
& CLIMATE
• carbon cycle
• temperature
• precipitation
• humidity
• soil moisture
• extreme events
IMPACTS
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Emissions Scenarios for Climate Simulations:
Emissions scenarios present future paths of
greenhouse-gas emissions or other climate
perturbations.  A major use of these is to
provide needed inputs to climate models.
Such scenarios may specify simple arbitrary
perturbations of emissions or concentrations
(e.g., doubling atmospheric CO2), or time-
paths reflecting specified assumptions for
evolution of socio-economic drivers such as
population, economic growth, and techno-
logical change. 
Emissions Scenarios for Exploring Alternative
Energy/Technology Futures: Another use
of emissions scenarios involves specifying
an environmental or emissions target, arbi-
trarily or based on normative or political
goals, to examine what patterns of socio-
economic change, energy resources, and
technology development are consistent with
the target and/or what interventions might
be needed to meet it.  Such scenarios have
examined conditions for stabilizing atmos-
pheric CO2 concentration at various levels
and the implications of stabilizing radiative
forcing for multi-gas reduction strategies.
Climate-Change Scenarios: Climate scenarios
specify potential future climate conditions
to inform assessments of impacts, vulnera-
bilities, and adaptation options, and inform
decision-making for adaptation or mitigation.
They can be produced by arbitrary perturba-
tion of present conditions, by using climates
from elsewhere or the past as a proxy for po-
tential future climate in a given location, or
by climate-model simulations driven by some
specified scenario of future emissions. 
Scenarios of Direct Biophysical Impacts, e.g.,
Sea Level Rise: Scenarios can specify al-
ternative trajectories for some important
form of climate impact that influences many
other impacts.  For example, scenarios of sea
level rise can capture the most important im-
pact pathways in many coastal regions, in-
cluding the large uncertainties associated
with potential loss of continental ice sheets
in Greenland and Antarctica. 
Multivariate Scenarios for Impact Assessment:
Assessing climate-change impacts requires
not just considering climate in isolation, but
other linked changes and stresses, including
both environmental and socio-economic
trends.  The factors that influence particular
impacts and vulnerabilities are likely to 
be widely variable, and may include
demographic, economic, technological, 
institutional, and cultural characteristics.
Consequently, scenarios may have to be gen-
erated in an exploratory manner in the con-
text of attempting to assess specific local
and regional impacts.
SCENARIOS 
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: 
MAJOR EXAMPLES
The report reviews four major exercises pro-
ducing or using scenarios for climate-change
applications.  The examples include national
and international activities, produced by differ-
ent sets of actors for different purposes.  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) has produced three sets of scenarios of
21st-century greenhouse-gas emissions, of which
the most ambitious and important were pro-
duced for the Special Report on Emissions Sce-
narios (SRES) between 1997 and 1999.  SRES
produced four qualitative storylines on which
six “marker” scenarios were based – one model
quantification of each storyline plus two tech-
nological variants of one storyline that stressed
fossil-intensive and low-carbon energy supply
technologies – each produced by a different 
energy-economic model.  Other models’ repli-
cations of each other’s marker scenarios plus a
few additional explorations yielded 40 scenarios
in total.  These scenarios highlighted several in-
sights, including the ability of alternative paths
with similar emissions in 2100 to differ widely
in their interim pathways and thus in atmos-
pheric concentrations; the ability of alternative
technological assumptions alone to generate as
wide a range of emissions futures as substan-
tially divergent socio-economic pathways; and
the fact that similar emissions paths can come
from widely different combinations of underly-
ing socio-economic factors and so pose distinct
mitigation problems.  A widely publicized cri-
tique of the SRES scenarios alleged over-esti-
mation of future emissions growth due to the
metric used to compare incomes in rich and
poor nations, but the overestimation was later
found to be insignificant.  More serious and il-
luminating challenges associated with these
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scenarios concerned how to balance and inte-
grate qualitative and quantitative scenarios; how
to use and how much to coordinate multiple
models to generate the most useful insights; and
whether, when, and how it is appropriate to as-
sign explicit probability judgments to alterna-
tive scenarios or associated ranges of
quantitative variables. 
The US National Assessment was a compre-
hensive assessment of potential impacts of cli-
mate change and variability on the United
States, focusing on major regions and sectors
(agriculture, water, human health, coastal areas
and marine resources, and forests).  The Na-
tional Assessment needed scenarios of 21st-cen-
tury US climate and socio-economic changes.
For climate scenarios, it relied principally on
climate-model scenarios produced by the UK
Hadley Centre and the Canadian Centre for Cli-
mate Modeling and Analysis, each driven by a
single emissions scenario, with statistical down-
scaling based on detailed local conditions and
present patterns of fine-scale climate variation.
Other proposed types of climate scenario, in-
cluding historical scenarios and inverse meth-
ods to probe for key vulnerabilities, were less
used.  For socio-economic scenarios, a novel ap-
proach was proposed that combined specified
scenarios for a few key national-level variables
such as population and economic growth, and a
common process to elaborate and document ad-
ditional socio-economic assumptions as needed
for specific regional and sector analyses.  The
National Assessment was criticized for relying
on just two climate-model runs and one emis-
sions scenario, although these choices were dic-
tated by time limits and availability of
climate-model runs.  Limited use was made of
the socio-economic approach, principally due
to time limits and communication problems.
The UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP)
provides common datasets, tools, and support,
including scenarios, for climate-impact assess-
ments for UK regions and sectors by re-
searchers and stakeholders.  The program
produced climate scenarios in 1998 and 2002,
all based on the Hadley Centre climate models,
and socio-economic scenarios in 2001.  The
program stresses building a sustained assess-
ment capability by acting as a motivator, re-
source, and light coordinator with little central
authority over separate assessments.  The re-
liance on climate scenarios from just one fam-
ily of climate models may pose risks of
incomplete representation of key uncertainties. 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA)
examined the status, present trends, and longer-
term challenges to the world’s ecosystems, in-
cluding climate change and other stresses.  One
of the assessment’s four working groups con-
structed scenarios of global ecosystems to 2050
and beyond, largely independently of the group
examining current status and trends.  All as-
sessment components used a common concep-
tual framework, which distinguished indirect
drivers of ecosystem change (e.g., population
and economic growth, technological change,
policies and lifestyles), direct drivers (e.g., cli-
mate change, air pollution, and land-use and
land-cover change), ecosystem indicators,
ecosystem services, measures of human well-
being, and response options.  The Scenarios
group applied this framework to characterizing
potential ecosystem stresses in 2050, with more
limited projections to 2100.  The four scenarios
were based on two dimensions of uncertainty:
degree of globalization, and predominance of
proactive vs. reactive response to ecosystem
stresses.  The qualitative storylines underlying
these scenarios were more richly developed than
in other climate-change scenario exercises.
Concerns with these scenarios pertained to the
degree of integration and consistency among
qualitative and quantitative scenario compo-
nents; risks of logical circularity within scenar-
ios; and unexplained similarity of projected
ecosystem effects among scenarios.
SCENARIOS 
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE:
CHALLENGES AND
CONTROVERSIES 
Scenarios and Decisions
Scenarios can inform climate-change mitigation
and adaptation decisions, but most uses so far
have had relatively indirect connections to such
decisions.  Although there is no single global
climate-change decision-maker, scenarios can
inform the many decision-makers with diverse
responsibilities that will affect and be affected
by climate change.  Three groups of decision-
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makers with distinct information needs can be
distinguished: mitigation policy-makers, who
are mostly but not exclusively national officials;
impacts and adaptation managers, including na-
tional officials and others who are responsible
for particular climate-sensitive assets, re-
sources, or interests; and energy resource and
technology managers, who include owners, de-
velopers, and investors in energy resources and en-
ergy-related capital stock and new technologies.
A key issue in creating scenarios for all 
decision-makers is how to represent decisions
within scenarios.  In general, decisions by the
scenario user should be explicitly examined rel-
ative to baseline conditions specified in scenar-
ios, while decisions by others outside their
control should be treated like any exogenous un-
certainty.  The issue is most important in the
treatment of mitigation decisions: scenarios to
inform mitigation should allow explicit exami-
nation of the entire relevant range of mitigation
decisions, while scenarios to inform impacts
and adaptation should specify the likely range
of mitigation efforts – usually yielding a nar-
rower range of emissions futures than is con-
sidered in scenarios to inform mitigation. 
Scenarios in Assessments 
and Policy Debates
In climate-change assessments, scenarios can
provide required inputs to other parts of the
analysis and help to organize multiple compo-
nents of the assessment.  When scenarios are
used in a prominent assessment, they may sub-
sequently be adopted in planning or decision-
support processes outside the original
assessment.  Scenarios can also help frame pub-
lic and policy debate, in part by providing an ag-
gregate metric of the issue’s severity.  They
consequently may gain prominence in con-
tentious policy debates, and so become subject
to political attempts to influence their content and
political criticism based on their perceived im-
plications for policy action.  The unavoidable
judgments underlying construction of scenarios
provide opportunity for partisan efforts to make
scenarios policy prescriptive, and for claims that
only certain scenarios are plausible (e.g., high-
or low-emissions scenarios, depending on the
critic’s motivation).  These claims are unavoid-
able, since scenarios represent key uncertainties
bearing on high-stakes policy decisions, but such
attempts to restrict scenarios should be resisted,
principally through prominent communication of
the reasoning, assumptions, and treatment of par-
ticular uncertainties underlying scenarios.
Scenario Development Process:
Expert-Stakeholder Interactions
Scenario developers must decide how and how
much to involve scenario users and stakeholders
in scenario development.  In other fields – where
users are clearly identified – relatively few and
homogeneous, intensive collaboration between
scenario developers and users or their represen-
tatives is desirable.  Close user involvement is
also advantageous in developing scenarios for
climate change, but potential users of these sce-
narios are more numerous and diverse, may not
be clearly identified, and may have contending
material interests in the scenarios’ content or
use. This situation calls for delicate decisions
about participation and representation to keep
scenarios tuned to practical users’ needs while
keeping the development process small enough
to be manageable.
Communication of Scenarios
Climate change scenarios must be communi-
cated to multiple audiences with diverse inter-
ests and information needs.  In addition to the
scenarios’ content, sufficient information must
be provided about the process and reasoning by
which the scenarios were developed, to allow
users to scrutinize the underlying data, models,
and reasoning; judge their confidence in the
scenarios; and have opportunities to critique the
scenarios and suggest alternative approaches.
Effective communication can help engage 
a broad user community in updating and im-
proving scenarios.  Open communication of the
decisions, assumptions, and uncertainties un-
derlying scenarios is likely to both increase
users’ confidence that the scenarios have rea-
sonably represented current knowledge and key
uncertainties, and help them develop alterna-
tives if they are unconvinced.
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Consistency and Integration 
in Scenarios
Scenario developers should strive for internal
consistency.  At one level, this means avoiding
clear contradictions with well-established
knowledge and not moving inadvertently out-
side bounds of historical experience – although
such sharp departures from experience may be
useful if pursued intentionally to examine low-
probability risks or broaden decision-makers’
perceptions.  Perceptions of internal consistency
or coherence in scenarios ultimately rest on sub-
jective judgments, which pose well-known risks
of bias if not carefully structured and controlled.
Potential inconsistencies grow when scenario
exercises use multiple models and attempt to
harmonize them, particularly when some key
quantities are externally specified for some
models and calculated within others.  Attempt-
ing to avoid such inconsistency by standardizing
model outputs, however, can carry more serious
risks by obscuring interpretation of results and
precluding use of model variation to illuminate
uncertainty.  Attempts to connect qualitative and
quantitative aspects of scenarios have been par-
ticularly challenging for pursuit of consistency.
Different narrative scenarios often reflect dif-
ferent assumptions about how the world works,
which correspond more closely to different
model structures than to parameter variation.
Better integrating the two approaches will re-
quire developing ways to connect narrative sce-
narios to model structures, rather than merely to
target values for a few variables that models are
then asked to reproduce.  
Treatment of Uncertainty 
in Scenarios
A scenario exercise can represent a few key un-
certainties by variation among scenarios.  Ex-
treme economy is required in choosing which
uncertainties to represent, what variation (in-
cluding potential extremes) to represent for each,
and how to combine them in a manageable num-
ber of scenarios.  Complex narrative scenarios
pose special problems in representing and com-
municating uncertainty, usually addressed by
seeking underlying structural uncertainties –
e.g., deep societal trends such as globalization
or values shifts – that are judged to influence
many other factors of concern.  The most promi-
nent controversy in treatment of uncertainty in
scenarios has concerned whether or not to ex-
plicitly assign probabilities to scenarios or as-
sociated ranges of quantitative outcome
variables.  The debate rests in part on different
views of the typical contents of scenarios, since
subjective probabilities can readily be assigned
to ranges of one or two quantitative variables.
Explicit probability assignment in such simple
cases offers clear benefits for assessing alterna-
tive choices and avoids the risk of users assign-
ing their own, perhaps less informed,
probability judgments.  Assigning probabilities
to rich multivariate scenarios, particularly if
these include narrative elements, is much more
problematic, since there is no clearly defined in-
terval “between” such scenarios and their
boundaries are not clearly defined.
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Use of Scenarios 
in Climate-Change Decisions 
• Scenarios can make valuable contributions
to climate-change decision-making. There
is a big gap between the use of scenarios in
current practice and their potential contri-
butions, but interest in using scenarios is in-
creasing.
• Scenarios of global emissions and resultant
climate change are required by many diverse
climate-related decision-makers, but beyond
these common requirements decision-makers’
needs from climate-change scenarios are
highly diverse.
• Impacts and adaptation managers include
both national officials and others responsible
for more specific domains of impact. They
need climate-change scenarios, driven by
specified global emissions scenarios, to rep-
resent potential climate-related stresses on
their areas of responsibility, plus other envi-
ronmental and socio-economic information
at appropriate scales.  Their combined needs
– for centrally produced climate scenario in-
formation, associated tools and support, and
a capability to develop and apply additional
scenario information related to their respon-
sibilities – suggest the need for a cross-scale
organizational structure to provide scenario
information.
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• Mitigation policy-makers, who are mainly
but not exclusively national officials, need
scenarios of global and national emissions
trends, resultant climate change, and aggre-
gate impacts.  In addition, they need scenario
information about the potential policy envi-
ronment for their choices, including alterna-
tive scenarios of other nations’ mitigation
strategies, international mitigation decisions,
and implementation and compliance.  In
some cases, they can usefully employ target-
driven scenarios for backcasting analysis.
Mitigation decisions require scenario devel-
opment capacity at the national level.
• Scenarios for mitigation decisions should in-
clude a wide range of baseline emissions as-
sumptions and should not pre-judge the
likely level of mitigation effort, while sce-
narios for impact and adaptation managers
should be based on emissions assumptions
that include the range of mitigation inter-
ventions they judge likely. 
• Energy resource and technology managers,
who are mainly private-sector actors, prima-
rily need scenarios that represent alternative
policy regimes over the 30- to 50-year time
horizons relevant for investment and tech-
nology-development decisions.  Scenarios
of emissions and climate change may pro-
vide background, but do not capture the
most important uncertainties for these 
decision-makers.
Use of Scenarios 
in Climate-Change Assessments 
• Large-scale, official assessments are cur-
rently the main users of scenarios and will
likely remain major users.  Scenarios in as-
sessments mostly support further analysis,
modeling, and assessment.  They can also
help frame the climate issue for the public
and policy-makers. Presentation of scenar-
ios in assessments leads to additional un-
foreseen uses. 
• Scenarios contain unavoidable elements of
judgment in their production and use.  This
makes them vulnerable both to attempts at
bias and to partisan attack.  The most produc-
tive response lies in transparency about the
process, reasoning, and assumptions used to
produce scenarios, which can both help limit 
bias in scenario production and focus subse-
quent argument on underlying uncertainties.
What Should Centrally Provided
Emissions and Climate Scenarios
Look Like?
• Centrally provided scenarios of emissions
and resultant climate change should be
global in scope, with major climate-relevant
emissions and other perturbations specified
at least for major world regions.  They
should have a time horizon of a century or
longer, with interim results at roughly
decadal resolution. 
• Centrally provided scenarios of global emis-
sions and climate change can help inform
mitigation and adaptation decisions at na-
tional and sub-national scales, but such de-
cisions require additional information at
these scales.   
• Emissions scenarios of several types are
needed to serve diverse uses, including al-
ternative baselines, alternative levels of in-
cremental stringency of mitigation effort,
and specified future targets to support back-
casting and feasibility analysis.  Some emis-
sions scenarios should be coupled to explicit
scenarios of wide-ranging alternative socio-
economic futures, but this is not necessary
for all uses.  Scenarios should reflect vari-
ous explicit degrees of coordination, includ-
ing simple fully standardized scenarios for
evaluating and comparing downstream mod-
els, multi-model scenarios using common
input assumptions, and non-standardized
scenarios to explore alternative assumptions
or meet specific user needs.
• Some scenarios of socio-economic condi-
tions should include qualitative and quanti-
tative elements and sustained analytic efforts
to link the two.  These elements can provide
a vehicle to explore major historical uncer-
tainties with large implications for climate
change and vulnerability; provide a logical
structure to connect assumed trajectories for
multiple variables; and provide guidance to
other analysts or users to extend scenarios by
elaborating additional detail.  Alternative qual-
itative and narrative elements should be linked
not just to alternative parameter values in
quantitative models, but also to alternative
forms of causal relations and model struc-
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tures.
Scenario Process: 
Developer-User Interactions
• There is value in close collaboration be-
tween scenario developers and users, partic-
ularly at the beginning and ending stages of
a scenario exercise.  
• The ease of achieving such collaboration
and its value are likely to be greater when
scenario users are clearly identified, few in
number, and similar in their interests 
and perspectives.  
Communication of Scenarios
• Effective communication of scenarios is es-
sential, in forms useful to audiences of di-
verse interests and technical skills.  In
addition to scenario contents, communica-
tion should include associated documenta-
tion, tools, and support. 
• Transparency of underlying reasoning, as-
sumptions, and major uncertainties is cru-
cial.  Such transparency is necessary to
support the credibility of scenarios, to alert
potential users to conditions under which
they might wish to use or modify them, and
to inform criticism and improvement 
of scenarios.  
Consistency and Integration 
in Scenarios
• Any scenario should be internally consistent
in its assumptions and reasoning, to the ex-
tent this can be established. 
• In scenario exercises that use multiple mod-
els to explore potential uncertainties in fu-
ture conditions, consistency among models
should be pursued primarily through coor-
dination of inputs, not outputs, except when
coordinated outputs represent common
goals for policy evaluation. 
• Transparency in reporting scenario and
model differences as well as underlying as-
sumptions and reasoning can help mitigate
the effects of inconsistencies among scenarios. 
Treatment of Uncertainty 
in Scenarios
• More explicit characterization of probabil-
ity judgments should be included in some
future scenario exercises than has been prac-
ticed so far.  Means available to express
these judgments are of widely varying speci-
ficity, ranging from agreed terminology to
explicitly quantified probability distribu-
tions.  All such judgments should include
explicit acknowledgement of their inevitable
subjective elements and appropriate caveats.
• Explicit probability judgments are easiest to
produce and least controversial in scenarios
generated using quantitative models of cli-
mate change or specific impact domains.
These can be conditioned on specific as-
sumptions for socio-economic inputs such as
emissions, and can represent explicitly and
quantitatively the effects of specified varia-
tion in initial conditions or unknown param-
eter values.  These devices are also available,
although in less widespread use, in economic
models used to project emissions.
• Including explicit probability judgments is
likely to be most useful when key variables
are few, quantitative outcomes are needed,
and potential users are numerous and di-
verse.  It is likely to be least useful when sce-
narios specify multiple characteristics,
including prominent qualitative elements;
when the purpose is sensitivity analysis or
heuristic exploration; and when potential
users are few, similar, and known.  
• Because of their large and diverse set of po-
tential users, centrally provided scenarios of
global emissions and climate change should
attempt to include some explicit probability
judgments for ranges of key quantitative
outputs, including global emissions and
global-average temperature change.  These
should span a wide range of judged uncer-
tainty on these variables, e.g., 95 to 99 per-
cent.  Providing such explicit likelihood
statements lets users choose whether to use
them or not.  
• Scenario exercises should give more atten-
tion to low-probability, high-consequence
extreme cases, such as loss of a major con-
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tinental ice sheet or changes in meridional
ocean circulation.  With these, it is especially
crucial to be explicit and transparent about
the reasoning and assumptions underlying
each scenario, including developers’ judg-
ments of relative likelihoods.
Expanding and Sustaining Capacity
for Production and Use of Scenarios
•   Present scenario capacity is inadequate.  To
help fulfill these presently unmet needs, the
CCSP should establish a program to: 
• Commission scenarios for use in assess-
ments and decision-support activities.  
• Disseminate scenarios with associated
documentation, tools, and guidance
materials.
• Commission various groups to evaluate
scenarios and their applications, and to
develop improved methods.  
• Archive results and documentation 
related to all these tasks, to provide
historical perspective and institutional
memory for future scenario-related ac-
tivities.  
•   Design and management conditions of this
new program should include six elements. 
• The program should build and maintain
strong connections with outside relevant
expertise, and analytic and modeling ca-
pability.
• The program should integrate and bal-
ance goals and criteria related to scien-
tific and technical quality, and those
related to utility and relevance to users.  
• The program should be insulated from
political control.  
• The program should strive for maximum
transparency in its own activities, in ad-
dition to demanding it from activities it
supports.  
• The program will require the authority
and resources necessary to articulate and
promulgate standards for transparency,
consistency, and quality control.   
• The program will require adequate sus-
tained resources level of effort.
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This report examines the development and use of scenarios in global climate change applications.
It considers scenarios of various types – including but not limited to emissions scenarios – and
reviews how they have been developed, what uses they have served, what consistent challenges
they have faced, what controversies they have raised, and how their development and use might
be made more effective.  The report is Synthesis & Assessment Product 2.1b of the US Climate
Change Science Program.  By synthesizing available literature and critically reviewing past experi-
ence, the report seeks to assist those who may be conducting, using, or commissioning scenar-
ios related to global climate change.
Scenarios are used to support planning and decision-making when issues have deep or poorly
characterized uncertainty and high stakes, often accompanied by long time horizons.  These con-
ditions apply to the major decisions about how to respond to global climate change.  As scientific
research advances our knowledge of the climate’s present state and trends, its patterns of vari-
ability, and its responses to external forcings, we are gaining an increasingly clear view of risks that
may be realized late this century or beyond.  These future risks are linked to near-term socio-eco-
nomic trends and decisions in both public and private sectors.  Some near-term decisions – such
as investment in long-lived capital equipment, new resources, or new technologies in the energy
sector – can influence long-term trends in the emissions contributing to climate change.  Other
near-term decisions – such as investment in water resources infrastructure or coastal develop-
ment – can influence how adaptable and how vulnerable future society will be to the impacts of
climate change.
2 Morgan et al. 1998. 
3 Lempert et al. 2006.
4 See, e.g., Lomborg 2001; Michaels 2003b; Castles
and Henderson 2003a, b; UK House of Lords 2005.
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Although such decisions are being made now,
making them responsibly requires considering
their potential consequences over the longer
term, including associated uncertainties.  This
requires thinking about the future conditions
that will shape their consequences, not just next
month or next year but 10, 30, 50, or 100 years
in the future – longer periods than the horizon of
conventional methods of planning or analysis.2
Attempting to describe potential future condi-
tions over this long time horizon presents a
seeming paradox.  On the one hand, conditions
this far in the future, and the factors and actors
that may influence them, are deeply uncertain.3
On the other hand, we have a great deal of
knowledge that can help make informed as-
sumptions about future conditions, even over
such long horizons. This includes well-established
scientific knowledge about physical, chemical,
and biological processes; more weakly, rela-
tively well-established causal mechanisms in
economics, sociology, and politics; and more
weakly still, certain seemingly robust empirical
patterns of historical change in population, eco-
nomics, and technology.  All of these give some
guidance to support judgments about future
conditions that are more or less likely, virtually
certain, or virtually impossible.  In some ways
we might be highly confident that the future will
resemble the present, e.g., in the radiative prop-
erties of atmospheric trace gases.  In others, we
might judge it likely that future conditions will
lie within some envelope extrapolated from
present and past trends, e.g., in projecting rates
of change in fertility, mortality, or labor pro-
ductivity.  Still other areas, such as the develop-
ment and social consequences of major
technological advances, or large-scale political
events such as wars, political realignments, or
epidemics, may hold more fundamental uncer-
tainties. In some cases, such uncertainties may
be adequately represented as wider distributions
of recognized uncertain quantities. In others,
they may represent events whose character or
even possibility we have not yet imagined.
Despite pervasive uncertainties, people must
make near-term decisions related to climate
change that have long-term consequences, in-
cluding potential irreversibilities.  Scenarios are
tools to help inform these decisions by gathering
and organizing relevant knowledge, organizing
associated uncertainties, and structuring and dis-
ciplining associated speculation.  This report as-
sesses experience to date in developing and using
scenarios for global climate change. 
Early climate-change debates mainly concerned
scientific questions such as whether and how
the climate is changing, how much change is
caused by human activities, and how sensitive
the climate system is.  Scenarios did not figure
prominently in these debates.  But as advancing
climate science has increasingly shifted the de-
bate from confirming and describing the cli-
mate-change problem toward deciding what to
do about it, the need for long-term decision-sup-
port tools like scenarios has increased, as have
the scrutiny and criticism these have attracted.4
In a contentious public-policy area like climate
change, controversy over scenarios is to be ex-
pected: scenarios are a method to structure and
communicate the most important uncertainties,
and conflicting judgments about uncertainties
are a major source of disagreements over what
to do.  Consequently, we expect the trend of sce-
narios’ increasing prominence and contentious-
ness to continue – particularly for emissions
scenarios, since these are the relevant metric of
human environmental burden and the point of
most contested proposed intervention.
Despite pervasive
uncertainties, people
must make near-term
decisions related to
climate change that
have long-term
consequences,
including potential
irreversibilities.
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In this report, we try to cast some light on cur-
rent and coming debates over climate-change
scenarios.  These debates presently exhibit basic
confusion about the definition, purposes, and
potential uses of scenarios.  We aim to provide
clarification and practical advice to two related
audiences: those conducting assessments or
analyses that develop or use scenarios; and
those commissioning, using, and interpreting
such assessments or analyses.  For the first
group, we seek to provide an organized sum-
mary of relevant experience in similar efforts,
discussion and clarification of key choices and
challenges, and – to the extent present knowl-
edge allows – practical guidance about pitfalls,
challenges, and opportunities in particular ap-
proaches.  For the second group, we seek to pro-
vide guidance on what to ask for, how and how
much to participate in its production, how to in-
terpret the results, and what questions to ask.
Because the charge of this report is unlike those
of other Synthesis and Assessment products, the
approach we have taken to producing it is nec-
essarily different as well.  We were tasked with
reviewing, interpreting, and evaluating experi-
ence with scenario methods in global climate
change applications.  This is not a narrowly fo-
cused question, and there is not a well-devel-
oped scientific literature on which we can draw
for answers.  While we have reviewed the exist-
ing literature on scenarios, most of it concerns
scenarios in other decision domains than global
climate change. In addition, we have examined
several major scenario exercises in global-change
applications.  In this, we have drawn on published
materials, both from the exercises themselves and
from commentary and criticism, as well as doc-
umentary materials and records, interviews with
participants and users, and the experience and
judgments of team members.
Our review of this experience has not been en-
tirely independent, since members of this writ-
ing team were involved as participants,
reviewers, and critics in two of the scenario ex-
ercises we review, the IPCC SRES process and
the US National Assessment.  While we have
drawn on the experience of these team mem-
bers, we have attempted to limit the risk of idio-
syncratic interpretations and bias by drawing on
other sources as well and by engaging all team
members in developing our summary and dis-
cussions of these exercises.  Moreover, our pur-
pose is not to either attack or defend these past
exercises, but to seek to understand the deci-
sions made in conducting them, the factors that
influenced them, and the constraints under
which they operated, in order to assess their ex-
perience, identify successes and pitfalls, and to
the extent possible, provide guidance to advance
scenario methods for climate change and other
similar environmental issues.  Because the expe-
rience we review does not provide a sufficiently
large or random sample to support strong scien-
tific inference, the diagnoses, interpretations, and
recommendations we present rely on our collec-
tive judgment.  We have endeavored to follow our
own advice, and be as transparent as possible
about the foundation and reasoning underlying
our conclusions and recommendations.
The report is organized as follows.  Drawing on
the broader literature on scenarios – most of
which concerns domains other than climate
change – Section 1 introduces scenarios, sharp-
ens their definition, and outlines a few major di-
mensions of variation and decisions that must
be made in developing a scenario exercise.  Sec-
tion 2 focuses specifically on scenarios for
global climate change, and outlines the types of
decisions that could use scenarios and the main
types of scenarios that have been developed for
this issue.  Section 3 reviews four major expe-
We aim to provide
clarification and
practical advice to two
related audiences:
those conducting
assessments or
analyses that use
scenarios; and those
commissioning, using,
and interpreting such
assessments or
analyses.
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riences in developing and using global-change
scenarios.  Section 4 discusses several issues that
have posed key challenges in climate-change sce-
narios and that are likely to require particular at-
tention in designing new scenario exercises.  In
addition to drawing on Section 3, this discussion
also makes use of briefer discussions of eight
other examples of global-change scenarios that
illustrate particular issues or challenges; these ex-
amples are presented as short boxes in Section 4.
Section 5 provides our conclusions and recom-
mendations for future development and use of
global climate-change scenarios.
5 IPCC 2001b:149.
6 Shell International 2003. 
7 Nakicenovic and Swart 2000:62.
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1.1   DEFINING SCENARIOS
A scenario is a description of potential future conditions, developed to inform decision-making
under uncertainty.  The decisions in question can be faced by individuals, groups, organizations, or
governments, and may pertain to any subject matter.  While many writers on scenarios give no ex-
plicit definition, others have offered a wide range of definitions, often substantially more complex and
restrictive than this one.  The published definitions gathered in Box 1.1 give a sense of both the
broad commonalities among many analysts’ conceptions and the significant differences among them.
A scenario is a coherent, internally consistent, and plausible description of a possible future state
of the world.5
A scenario is a story that describes a possible future.  It identifies some significant events, the main
actors and their motivations, and it conveys how the world functions.  Building and using scenarios
can help people explore what the future might look like and the likely challenges of living in it.6
Scenarios are images of the future, or alternative futures. They are neither predictions nor forecasts.
Rather, each scenario is one alternative image of how the future might unfold. A set of scenarios as-
sists in the understanding of possible future developments of complex systems. Some systems, those
that are well understood and for which complete information is available, can be modeled with
some certainty, as is frequently the case in the physical sciences, and their future states predicted.
However, many physical and social systems are poorly understood, and information on the relevant
variables is so incomplete that they can be appreciated only through intuition and are best com-
municated by images and stories. Prediction is not possible in such cases.7
BOX 1.1  Scenarios: a Sampling of Published Definitions.
continued on next page
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The historical uses of scenarios for planning and
analysis lie in war games, exercises of simulated
conflict used for military training, planning, and
operational decision-making.  The roots of war
games extend to antiquity, although the first for-
malized war games were developed for officer
training in 19th-century Prussia.12 In the 1940s
and 1950s, exercises resembling war games
began to be applied outside the purely military
domain, to study potential international crises
that included both high-level political decision-
making and the potential for military conflict.
These exercises were informed by the then-new
field of game theory, which promised new for-
mal insights into situations of conflict and
strategic decision-making,13 motivated by the
recognition that the new nuclear age had both
raised the stakes of international diplomacy and
created profound new uncertainties over how to
proceed.  In these exercises, principally devel-
oped at the Rand Corporation, scenarios were
sketches of challenging but plausible situations
to which participants had to respond, allowing
exploration of associated threats and opportu-
nities.  They adopted the term “scenario” from
film and theatre, where it denotes a brief sketch
of a story that includes only enough detail to
convey broad points of plot and character.  As in
classic war games, scenarios in these exercises
served to help organizations and their leaders
prepare for novel, complex challenges that they
might not anticipate, and which – if they did
arise – would likely develop too fast to allow ad-
equate reflection or analysis in real time.14
Over the past few decades, the use of scenarios
has moved outside the realm of military and
diplomatic activity.  Beginning with strategic
planning at the Royal Dutch/Shell oil com-
pany,15 scenarios are now widely used for strate-
gic planning, analysis, and assessment by
A climate scenario is a plausible representation of future climate that has been constructed for ex-
plicit use in investigating the potential impacts of anthropogenic climate change.  Climate scenarios
often make use of climate projections (descriptions of the modeled response of the climate system
to scenarios of greenhouse gas and aerosol concentrations), by manipulating model outputs and
combining them with observed climate data.8
[Scenarios] are created as internally consistent and challenging descriptions of possible futures.
They are intended to be representative of the ranges of possible future developments and out-
comes in the external world.  What happens in them is essentially outside our own control.9
Scenarios are coherent, internally consistent and plausible descriptions of possible future states of
the world, used to inform future trends, potential decisions, or consequences. They can be consid-
ered as a convenient way of visioning a range of possible futures, constructing worlds outside the
normal timespans and processes covering the public policy environment.10
Scenarios are plausible, challenging, and relevant sets of stories about how the future might unfold.
They are generally developed to help decision-makers understand the wide range of potential fu-
tures, confront critical uncertainties, and understand how decisions made now may play out in the
future. They are intended to widen perspectives and illuminate key issues that might otherwise be
missed or dismissed. The goal of developing scenarios is often to support more informed and 
rational decision-making that takes both the known and the unknown into account.11
BOX 1.1, continued from previous page.
8 IPCC 2001a:741.
9 van der Heijden 1996:5.
10 Berkhout et al. 2001:i.
11 MEA 2006:xvii.
12 Brewer and Shubik 1979.
13 Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, Nash 1950.
14 Levine 1964a,b; Schelling 1964; DeWeerd 1967,
1975; Brewer and Shubik 1979.
15 For relevant history, see Hausrath 1971, Shubik 1975,
Greenberger et al. 1983, Huss 1988, Schoemaker 1995,
Schultz and Sullivan 1972, Schwartz 1991, Shell In-
ternational 2003.
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businesses and other organizations.  They have
also figured increasingly prominently in plan-
ning, analysis, and policy debate for long-term
environmental issues, in particular global cli-
mate change.  Because the total body of experi-
ence with scenarios provides useful insights into
their use in any particular domain, this section
elaborates the meaning, characteristics, and po-
tential uses of scenarios in general.  The next
section turns to their specific use for global en-
vironmental issues.
1.1.1 Distinguishing scenarios from
assessments, models, and analyses
Confusion is widespread in discussions of sce-
narios, because their form and usage are highly
diverse, and because writers’ uses of the term
are often imprecise and occasionally contradic-
tory.  Scenarios must be distinguished, on the
one hand, from assessments and various types
of decision support activity that often use sce-
narios; and, on the other hand, from other types
of statements about future conditions, such as
predictions, projections, or forecasts.
An assessment is any process that reviews and
synthesizes scientific or other expert knowledge
to provide information of relevance to policy-
or decision-makers.16 The most common meth-
ods of assessment are deliberations of expert
panels and formal models, but other methods
combine human deliberations with formal
analysis or modeling, including war games or
other simulation games, policy exercises, 
political-military exercises, constructing future
histories, backcasting, and others.17 These meth-
ods may use specifications of potential future
conditions – i.e., scenarios – as inputs to or
components of their work.  Scenarios may even
be essential for some of these methods.  For ex-
ample, a war or crisis gaming exercise needs a
scenario to specify the nature of the threat or cri-
sis, while a formal model used to represent fu-
ture development of some issue of concern needs
a scenario to specify future values of those inputs
not explicitly calculated within the model.  But
these methods are broader than and distinct from
scenarios.  For example, models do not need sce-
nario-based inputs when used to reconstruct past
conditions or study causal processes.  
The distinction between assessments and sce-
narios is perhaps clearest in conventional as-
sessments based on deliberations of expert
panels, such as the IPCC, US National Assess-
ment, or Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
(MEA).  Such assessments often construct rep-
resentations of future development of an issue,
usually based on formal models.  These repre-
sentations require scenario-based inputs and
may produce outputs that are themselves used
as scenarios in other activities.  But the sce-
nario-related activities are frequently not the
central focus of the overall assessment, which
may examine many additional things, e.g., the
state of knowledge in particular scientific areas,
the status of and trends in particular environ-
mental conditions, the evidence attributing par-
ticular environmental changes to human inputs,
or particular policy-relevant scientific ques-
tions.  Assessments may also include evalua-
tions of proposed actions or proposed criteria
for conducting such evaluations.  Scenarios thus
may provide required inputs to assessments, but
are distinct from them.
1.1.2 Distinguishing scenarios from
projections, predictions, and
forecasts
Scenarios must also be distinguished from other
types of statements about the future, such as
predictions, projections, and forecasts.  All of
these satisfy the basic definition above:  they
are descriptions of potential future conditions
whose primary purpose in most cases is to sup-
port decisions.  How can scenarios be distin-
guished?  Examining the ways scenarios are
used and discussed by practitioners and re-
searchers suggests four characteristics that dis-
tinguish them from other types of future
statements.  Although these characteristics are
not essential, they are all more likely to be pres-
ent in scenarios than in other types of future
statement, so they help to sharpen and delimit
the definition of a scenario.
First, scenarios are multi-dimensional: they de-
scribe multiple characteristics that collectively
make up a coherent representation of future
16 Parson 2003:9; Mitchell et al. 2006.
17 NRC 1996; Hausrath 1971; Brewer 1986; Shubik
1975; Svedin and Aniansson 1987; Schultz and Sulli-
van 1972; Jones 1985; Parson 1996, 1997. 
Scenarios have figured
increasingly prominently
in planning, analysis, and
policy debate for long-
term environmental
issues, in particular
global climate change.
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conditions.  To achieve this, scenarios assemble
and organize available knowledge, information,
and assumptions from diverse bodies of 
research and expert judgment.  The elements of
a scenario can be of diverse types: quantitative
or qualitative, precise or fuzzy, based on
well-established research or informed specula-
tion.  Effective scenarios integrate their diverse
elements in a way that is coherent, communi-
cates a clear theme or organizing principle, and
avoids internal contradiction.
Second, scenarios are schematic: that is, they
are multidimensional but not without limit.
Scenarios do not seek to describe potential 
future conditions with complete precision or de-
tail.  Rather, they highlight essential character-
istics and processes with enough detail that
knowledgeable observers perceive them as re-
alistic and relevant, but not so much as to dis-
tract from large-scale patterns.  Indeed, one
potential use of scenarios is to stimulate creative
thinking and insights, for which they must leave
something to the imagination.  How much detail
and precision is appropriate is a judgment that
depends on the particular application.
Third, scenarios usually come in groups.  To be
a useful tool to inform decision-making under
uncertainty, scenarios must represent uncer-
tainty.  This is most often done by providing
multiple scenarios, each presenting an alterna-
tive realization of uncertain future conditions.18
The number of scenarios depends on the appli-
cation.  Scenario exercises usually use between
two and seven, depending on the stakes of the
issue, the resources invested in the exercise, and
the depth of analysis devoted to each scenario.
The most frequently proposed numbers are
three or four.
Finally, scenarios tend to claim less confidence
than other types of future statements.  Although
different authors’ usage is not consistent, “pre-
diction” and “forecast” usually denote state-
ments for which the highest confidence is
claimed.  “Projection” denotes a less confident
statement, which may have some specified con-
fidence level and may be explicitly contingent
on specified assumptions about other future
conditions.  Calling a future statement a “sce-
nario” usually implies still less confidence and
more associated contingencies.  Any use of a
scenario for serious planning or analysis does,
however, presume some minimal threshold of
likelihood.  The situation described must be
judged likely enough to merit attention, and to
justify expending resources and effort to study
its implications and potential responses to it.
There may also be a time ordering among these
three types of statements – predictions or fore-
casts tend to describe nearer-term futures and
scenarios longer-term futures – but there are ex-
ceptions, and the meaning of near term and long
term depend on the particular context.
1.2. CREATING A 
SCENARIO EXERCISE: 
KEY CHARACTERISTICS 
AND CHOICES
Beyond these general characteristics, scenarios
vary greatly in their use, production, and con-
tents.  Extensive scholarly effort has gone into
providing alternative scenario taxonomies.19
Scenarios can be distinguished, for example, by
whether they present a snapshot of a future state
or a dynamic account of changes over time to
reach that state; by their degree of complexity;
by the relative balance of deliberation and intu-
ition versus formal analysis used in producing
them; or by their temporal and spatial scale.
The set of characteristics on which scenarios
could be sorted is long and open-ended, so we
make no attempt to provide an exhaustive list.
Instead, we summarize the main dimensions of
scenario variation in the form of a list of poten-
tially open-ended design choices. 
1.2.1 Variation among scenarios: 
three basic dimensions 
Three dimensions of variation, concerned with
the purpose of a scenario exercise, have far-
reaching implications for its design and use and
so merit separate discussion.  First, the intended
use of a scenario exercise can vary from the
more predictive to the more exploratory or
18 Crisis-response exercises are often an exception, pre-
senting one scenario at a time showing a novel chal-
lenge, to which participants must respond and which
is implicitly contrasted to the status quo.
19 See, e.g., Duncan and Wack 1994, Godet and Roube-
lat 1996, van Notten et al. 2003.
Effective scenarios
integrate their diverse
elements in a way that
is coherent,
communicates a clear
theme or organizing
principle, and avoids
internal contradiction.
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heuristic.  It is of course a fundamental error to
take a scenario’s illustrative description of po-
tential future conditions as a confident predic-
tion of what will actually happen – in our
terminology, to take a scenario as a projection or
even a prediction.20 Still, a scenario must be
judged likely enough to merit the attention of
busy people.  Exploratory uses of scenarios may
presume only this low threshold, yet have great
value.  For example, scenarios can be used to
probe and challenge the mental models, thought
habits, and unrecognized assumptions of 
decision-makers; to clarify points of agreement
and disagreement; to identify and engage
needed participants; to provide a preliminary
structure for advance analysis of potential fu-
ture decisions; or to seek insights into unrecog-
nized opportunities, risks, causal linkages, or
uncertainties.21 Such insights can arise not just
from examination of uncertainties, but also
from meticulous critical examination of future
factors that are essentially certain (e.g., strongly
determined demographic trends such as the
aging of industrialized-country populations) or
even of present conditions whose significance
has been overlooked.22 Still, the predictive con-
fidence accorded to scenarios is a matter of de-
gree: carefully developed scenarios that are
judged to have captured the most important un-
certainties may claim some moderate degree of
confidence, and reasonable distinctions may be
drawn between scenarios that represent conven-
tional versus surprising futures, best and worst
cases, etc.
A related dimension of variation among sce-
nario exercises is their proximity to decision-
making.23 Scenario exercises may involve
actual decision-makers and seek to directly ad-
vise a specific, identified, near-term decision,
but more frequently their relationship to con-
crete decisions and decision-makers is indirect.
Scenarios may be used for risk assessment, con-
tingency planning, identification of potential
threats or actions to be considered, or early char-
acterization of a poorly understood issue.  In
such applications, exploratory uses dominate.
Scenario exercises that are closer to decisions
with significant stakes operate under very dif-
ferent requirements, usually driven by specific
user needs.  Their uses tend to be more predic-
tive – constrained by limits of available knowl-
edge – so they might be expected, for example,
to provide more explicit and complete charac-
terization of major uncertainties.  They are also
likely to be more integrated with methods to
evaluate alternative choices and identify pre-
ferred ones.
A third basic dimension of variation concerns
whether scenarios are defined primarily norma-
tively, on the basis of their perceived desirabil-
ity or undesirability, or primarily on the basis of
their perceived plausibility or likelihood.  Al-
though all scenarios include both positive and
normative elements, it is important to keep as
clear as possible which elements are included
based on perceived likelihood or plausibility
and which because of perceived desirability or
undesirability.  The most frequent use of ex-
plicitly normative scenarios involves construct-
ing some hypothetical future state primarily on
the basis of its desirability.  Such a future might
be constructed to embody participants’ general
intuitions about desirable social trends, or to
achieve specific environmental, development,
or other goals.24 The scenario exercise then con-
sists primarily of backcasting – attempting to
construct paths that connect present conditions
to the specified future conditions, to examine
the feasibility of the target, and identify costs,
tradeoffs, and conditions associated with meet-
ing it.25 Similarly, one can posit an undesirable
future state and then reason through conditions
associated with avoiding it.  This approach is20 Several such errors are collected and discussed in
Bracken 1977, 1990; and Brewer 1990. 
21 Brewer 1990. 
22 Shell International 2001, 2003.  For example, in a
1960s crisis exercise on a Soviet invasion of Iran, one
participant realized the local supply of jet fuel avail-
able to support a rapid US response was ten times
larger than had been thought, because kerosene – an
acceptable substitute – was used for domestic cooking
and heating (Schelling 1994).
23 This dimension is presented by Van Notten et al. 2003
as “exploration” versus “decision support.”
24 See, for example, the simple scenario exercise in
NRC (1999:161-176) that posited specific targets to re-
duce world hunger and greenhouse-gas emissions by
year 2050, or the scenarios of the Global Scenario
Group, which included some defined by specified
trends and others back-cast from normatively specified
targets for 2050 (Kemp-Benedict et al. 2002, Raskin et
al. 2002).
25 Robinson 1982, 2003.
Scenarios can be used
to probe and
challenge the mental
models, thought
habits, and
unrecognized
assumptions of
decision-makers; to
clarify points of
agreement and
disagreement; to
identify and engage
needed participants;
to provide a
preliminary structure
for advanced analysis
of potential future
decisions; or to seek
insights into
unrecognized
opportunities, risks,
causal linkages, or
uncertainties.
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sometimes proposed to reduce the risks of hid-
den bias in construction of scenarios which, like
any decision support tool, can be misused to
provide support for a decision already made for
other reasons, rather than to inform a decision
not yet made.  By bundling normative assump-
tions into the future target state or boundary
conditions, analysts hope to reduce their pene-
tration into the subsequent instrumental reason-
ing about actions and conditions to reach the
target.26 
1.2.2 Developing scenarios: 
main dimensions of choice
Table 1.1 extends the preceding discussion,
summarizing the main areas of variation and
choice involved in constructing a scenario ex-
ercise.  This is a highly simplified representa-
tion of a complex set of choices.  In any
particular scenario exercise some of these
choices may be made by default, without ex-
plicit consideration, perhaps because the pre-
ferred choice is obvious in context.  Although
we present these choices in simple sequential
order, this is not necessary: choices might be
made in some other order, or iteratively ad-
justed.  But while the process and sequence of
choices may be idealized, the set of choices is
not: creating a scenario requires explicit or im-
plicit choices on all these dimensions.
The most basic choices in developing scenarios,
which include the three dimensions of variation
called out above, involve identifying the main
focus of the exercise: what issues are to be ad-
dressed or what decisions informed, for whom?
The decision to conduct a scenario-based exer-
cise does not necessarily imply that these mat-
ters are clearly understood.  The closer a
scenario exercise is to concrete decisions, the
more likely it is that these definitional issues
will be understood clearly, in part through dis-
cipline on the process imposed by the involve-
ment of decision-makers.  But most often, the
coupling of scenarios to decisions is relatively
weak.27 In some applications (e.g., corporate
strategic planning, responding to a novel mili-
tary threat) the relevant decision-makers may be
clearly identified at the outset, but the issues to
be addressed and relevant choices may not be.
In other applications, scenarios may be devel-
oped to address some broad issue or concern
(e.g., climate change, emerging infectious dis-
eases, or terrorism), but the potential users and
decisions to be informed might both be unspec-
ified.  But whether the relationship of a scenario
exercise to decisions is near or far, direct or in-
direct, clear understanding of its focus and pur-
pose is important, and infrequently achieved:
many scenario exercises muddle through with
vagueness, confusion, or disagreement regard-
ing the focus, purpose, and intended user of the
exercise.  Clarifying the overall focus of a sce-
nario exercise may require broad consultations
or scoping workshops involving many poten-
tially interested decision-makers, other stake-
holders, and analysts and researchers.  
A second basic set of decisions concerns the
process by which scenarios are developed.  Like
the focus of the exercise, decisions about the
process of developing scenarios often receive
little thought, or are not even explicitly recog-
nized as choices, but are nonetheless highly
consequential.  What expertise must be included
to ensure the scenarios adequately reflect the
best available scientific knowledge, data, and
models?  What decision-makers, stakeholders,
or their surrogates must be involved to keep the
scenarios relevant, plausible, and credible?  For
Table 1.1.   Idealized Sequence of Major Choices 
in Scenario Development.
Main focus, framing, users, question(s) to be addressed
Process and participation
Key uncertainties to explore: how many, over what range 
Narrative, quantitative, or both
Level of complexity (number of quantitative variables, detail of narrative)
Specific variables and factors to specify
Time horizon and spatial extent
Temporal and spatial resolution
26 This approach does not preclude such misuse: if a
goal is strongly desired, scenarios are at risk of con-
scious or unconscious bias to make it look easy.  Japan-
ese war-games of the Battle of Midway provide striking
examples (Bracken 1977).
27 E.g., note the predominance of scenarios on the “ex-
ploration,” rather than the “decision support” side in
the survey of Van Notten et al. 2003.
But whether the
relationship of a
scenario exercise to
decisions is near or far,
direct or indirect, clear
understanding of its
focus and purpose is
important, and
infrequently achieved. 
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scenario exercises that must integrate knowl-
edge from diverse domains, individual partici-
pants’ knowledge, flexibility, and imagination
can be as important as the disciplines or stake-
holder groups they represent.  How intensively,
for how long, and by what means will partici-
pants interact?  Will the process be open to out-
side observers or participants?  How and when
will feedback on the scenarios be sought, and
how will it be used?  How and to whom will re-
sults be communicated?  And crucially, how
will the be process be led, and how will dis-
agreements be resolved?  With good leadership,
resolving differences in a scenario exercise can
be less arbitrary and more illuminating than in
other group tasks; when disagreements persist
after careful examination, they can be treated as
important uncertainties to be retained as alter-
native scenarios, not suppressed by picking a
winner, splitting the difference, or retreating to
vague language.  
Whatever process is chosen, a series of substan-
tive choices must be made about what goes into
the scenarios.  The most important of these con-
cern what key uncertainties will be explored, and
how much richness and detail should be included
in scenarios to illuminate these.
What uncertainties are to be explored, and how?
Many dimensions of uncertainty may be rele-
vant to the issue being examined, but only a few
can be examined explicitly in any scenario ex-
ercise.  Defining these is a crucial choice that
shapes much of what follows in a scenario ex-
ercise.  For those uncertainties judged most im-
portant, alternative outcomes are usually
represented in alternative scenarios.  For exam-
ple, scenarios might present high- and low-
growth futures, or alternative forms that a
competitive threat might take.  Other uncertain-
ties judged less crucial are usually suppressed
by presenting a single “best guess” or “refer-
ence case.”  The few key uncertainties chosen
can be represented in the number and character
of scenarios, depending on the intended use.  A
particular uncertainty might be represented by
high and low values of some quantity, or by a
reference case supplemented with high and/or
low variants.  If two or more uncertainties in-
teract, they can be represented by scenarios that
combine different outcomes of each:  in the sim-
plest form, two interacting uncertainties can be
represented by four scenarios, often illustrated
by a two-by-two matrix.28 Several alternative
scenarios might seek to span a plausible range
for some key quantitative variable, or present
distinct qualitative outcomes for a single uncer-
tainty, e.g., three types of competitive threat, or
three political futures for a region in turmoil.
Alternatively, scenarios can represent plausible
extreme or “worst-case” scenarios, to assess the
robustness of decisions or strategies.
How rich and complex should each scenario be?
Defining scenarios as we have, as multivariate
but synoptic, still leaves a wide range of levels
of complexity to choose from.  At one extreme,
scenarios may specify time-paths for just a few
quantitative variables, or even just one.  Such
scenarios are common, e.g., in applications such
as analyzing a firm’s profitability under alter-
native scenarios for oil prices, or projecting tax
revenues under alternative scenarios of produc-
tivity growth and inflation, often in a standard
“high, middle, low” format.  A scenario can ac-
commodate more complexity by projecting ad-
ditional quantitative variables, but as the
number of variables increases, so also does the
need for an organizing principle or gestalt to tie
them together in a non-arbitrary way.
At the other extreme, the core of a set of sce-
narios can be a set of rich, coherent narratives,
an approach frequently called the Shell ap-
proach.29 Each narrative, described principally
in text, reflects a distinct conception of how the
world might develop with a persuasive underly-
ing causal logic.  A narrative scenario can stand
alone but may also include specifications of im-
portant quantitative variables, e.g., of popula-
tion or economic growth, consistent with the
broad causal logic underlying the scenario.  The
narrative provides the context and explanatory
logic that tie together the time-paths of quanti-
tative variables, although particular time-paths
are regarded as illustrating, not defining, the
scenario – i.e., a different scenario would pres-
ent substantially different time-paths or rela-
tionships among them.
28 Alternative interpretations of this matrix structure are
discussed in van’t Klooster and van Asselt 2006.
29 Van der Heijden 1996; Wack 1985a,b; Schwartz
1991; Shell International 2003.
Many dimensions of
uncertainty may be
relevant to the issue
being examined, but only
a few can be examined
explicitly in any 
scenario exercise.
30 Wack 1985a:74.
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The choice of how rich and complex to make
scenarios has far-reaching implications for the
process of developing the scenarios, what can
be done with them, and the uses they can serve.
The two extreme approaches imply large differ-
ences in how uncertainty is treated, what aspects
of the problem receive attention, and the rela-
tionship between scenarios and their users,
which we discuss for climate-change scenarios
in Section 4.  Richer and more complex scenar-
ios require more time and effort to develop,
whether based on quantitative models, narra-
tives, or both.  Complex, narrative-based sce-
narios may require many person-months of
development to become realistic, relevant, and
persuasive, with consistent relationships among
scenario elements.  In return for the extra effort,
this approach allows great flexibility in the way
potential futures are described.  Narratives can
convey different aspects of a future situation
with varying degrees of salience or specificity,
and they can compactly convey the tone or char-
acter of a future situation by allusion, where a
precise specification would appear arbitrary or
labored.  The narrative approach avoids limit-
ing the defining characteristics of a scenario to
any particular set of pre-specified variables, but
attempts to be alert to a wide range of poten-
tially important characteristics and mechanisms
of causal influence.  Proponents of this ap-
proach argue that a coherent narrative at the
core of a scenario is necessary to avoid arbi-
trariness in specifying multiple variables, and to
make the exercise useful to decision-makers:
“Most scenarios merely quantify alternative
outcomes of obvious uncertainties (for exam-
ple, the price of oil may be $20 or $40 a barrel
in 1995).  Such scenarios are not helpful to de-
cision-makers”.30
The remaining substantive choices in specify-
ing a scenario follow from the preceding large-
scale choices.  They include specifying the time
horizon and spatial extent of the scenarios, de-
ciding the particular elements to include, and
the temporal and spatial resolution at which sce-
nario outputs are stated.  Decisions about tem-
poral resolution (e.g., hourly to multi-decadal)
and spatial resolution (e.g., regional, national,
continental scales) are particularly important
when – as is often the case in global-change ap-
plications – scenarios are produced or used by
quantitative models.  Such models may have very
precise requirements for the specification and
resolution of inputs and outputs, creating the pos-
sibility for serious mismatches between what
users need or expect, and what scenario develop-
ers feel comfortable and competent providing. 
This section has discussed the uses, types, and
characteristics of scenarios broadly, in any ap-
plication area.  The next section narrows the
focus to climate change and related areas of
global environmental change, summarizing the
types of scenarios that have been used and pro-
posed, and that might be required, to explore
and inform decision-making in this area.
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Analysts have tried to develop scenarios to support understanding of and decision-making for
global environmental issues, beginning with the global models of the mid-1970s and early assess-
ment of acid rain and stratospheric ozone in the late 1970s to early 1980s.31 The reasons for using
scenarios in global change are similar to those that apply in other decision domains:  high-stakes
decisions that must be made under deep uncertainty about the conditions that will determine
their consequences, the values at stake, or the relevant set of choices and actors.  As in other do-
mains, well-designed scenario exercises can provide a structure for assessing alternative choices
and help focus on the nature of the issue, the relevant choices and actors, the values that might
be at stake, and the types of research or analysis that might help clarify preferred choices.
For climate-change applications, scenario exercises have been conducted and sponsored by gov-
ernments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and collaborative groups.
While these have been diverse in form, details, and purposes, they have tended to focus more on
heuristic and exploratory uses than on supporting specific decisions.  The boundaries of the cli-
mate-change issue are not sharply defined, however:  climate change implicates and connects to
many other areas of policy, including energy, agriculture, hazard protection, and broad questions
of economic development.  Consequently, there is substantial uncertainty about what all the rel-
evant decisions, decision-makers, and potentially affected values are.  While some decisions are
clearly of primary relevance to climate change, many other decisions that appear to be connected
have not yet incorporated consideration of climate change or even recognized the connection.
Reflecting these fuzzy boundaries of the issue, scenario exercises developed for climate change
have overlapped with other exercises primarily focused on ecosystems, energy, and broad issues
of world development.  The fuzziness of the climate issue’s definition increases the challenge of
developing useful scenarios, but also increases the potential value of well-crafted and executed sce-
nario exercises.
31 See, e.g., Meadows et al. 1972, Barney 1981; sum-
mary of early ozone assessments in Parson 2003; and
summary history of scenarios in global-change appli-
cations in Swart et al. 2004.  What was the earliest sce-
nario work in global change depends, of course, on how
the boundaries of global change are defined.  Kahn and
Wiener 1967 might be considered an early example. 
33 Weyant et al. 1996, Parson and Fisher-Vanden 1997.
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The decisions most directly related to climate
change are conventionally sorted into two cate-
gories, mitigation and adaptation.32 Mitigation
consists of actions that reduce the human per-
turbations of the climate system, by reducing
net anthropogenic greenhouse-gas emissions.
Adaptation consists of actions to reduce the
harm or increase the benefit from climate
change and its impacts.  Despite uncertainty
about the precise decision agenda, we can iden-
tify in general terms the type of information sce-
narios might provide that would be useful to each
type of decision.  
Scenarios can help inform adaptation decisions
by characterizing the nature and severity of rel-
evant potential impacts; identifying key vulner-
abilities, particularly those that might not
otherwise have been recognized; identifying re-
search or monitoring priorities that might give
advance warning about impacts, particularly
acute vulnerabilities; expanding the perceived
set of potential responses; and providing a
framework for evaluating alternative adaptation
measures.  They may also help to clarify the
time structure of relevant decisions, identifying
those near-term decisions that might have im-
portant but under-recognized connections to fu-
ture impacts and vulnerability.
Similarly, scenarios can help inform mitigation
decisions by characterizing the potential im-
pacts of climate change and their severity, since
these provide the motivation for mitigation.
But, in addition, mitigation decisions can bene-
fit from information about potential emissions
trends, which determine the nature of the chal-
lenge of limiting emissions; about potential
pathways of the extraction and depletion of cur-
rent energy resources and development of new
ones; and about potential pathways of techno-
logical development.  Mitigation decisions may
also benefit from scenarios representing the po-
tential policy context in which they are made.
To date, most climate-related uses of scenar-
ios have not examined decisions directly, but
have been embedded in larger exercises of 
assessment, modeling, or characterization of 
the issue. These uses have included formal 
integrated-assessment models,33 comprehensive
assessments conducted by multi-disciplinary ex-
pert bodies (e.g., IPCC), and more narrowly fo-
cused assessment exercises targeting specific
aspects of the climate-change issue.  In these
uses, scenarios represent components of the 
climate-change issue that are required inputs to
an assessment or model.  
The causal logic of the climate-change issue is
complex, including multiple two-way causal
links and feedbacks among socio-economic,
geophysical, and ecological systems.
Integrated-assessment models seek to represent
many of these linkages and feedbacks explic-
itly; Figure 2.1 shows a typical example of the
“wiring diagrams” that illustrate the increas-
ingly dense linkages and feedbacks represented
in these models.  But while such diagrams
might be taken to indicate that all relationships
are represented explicitly within the model – en-
dogenously – this is not the case.  All models of
the climate-change issue rely on scenarios to
specify some future quantities exogenously, and
in virtually all cases, scenario-specified inputs
are not modified to account for results of the
subsequent analysis: i.e., they are truly exoge-
nous, and the causal logic does not close.
When scenarios are used to specify exogenous
inputs to a model of some aspect of the climate-
change issue, the causal logic of the analysis can
be greatly simplified from that shown in Figure
2.1.  Instead, the logic can be represented by a
simple linear structure that extends from human
activities to emissions to climate change to im-
pacts.  Figure 2.2 shows this highly simplified
structure.  This representation is even more suit-
able for the uses of scenarios in other types of
global-change assessments, which have been or-
ganized around much simpler causal structures
than those that integrated-assessment models
seek to represent.  Note that we are not claiming
this simple logical structure adequately repre-
sents the true structure of the climate-change
issue: only that it illustrates the ways that scenar-
ios have been used to provide exogenous inputs
to global-change models and assessments.
32 While this categorization has frequently been criti-
cized for neglecting actions with overlapping effects
and the third category of direct interventions in the cli-
mate system (Schelling 1983, Keith 2000, Keith et al.
2006, Parson 2006), it remains a useful approximation
for most currently proposed responses. 
To date, most climate-
related uses of
scenarios have not
examined decisions
directly, but have been
embedded in larger
exercises of
assessment, modeling,
or characterization of
the issue.
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This linear logical structure allows a simple,
practical categorization of five types of scenar-
ios that have been developed for the climate-
change issue.  These types are defined by what
quantities they specify and what primary area
of analysis they provide input to.  Their differ-
ences can be represented by where they cut the
causal chain in Figure 2.2, with the scenario
specifying quantities lying on one side of the
cut, and the assessment or other activity using
the scenario lying on the other side.  The next
five subsections discuss these five types of cli-
mate-change-related scenarios in turn.
2.1. EMISSIONS SCENARIOS 
FOR FUTURE CLIMATE
SIMULATIONS
Scenarios of greenhouse-gas emissions, some-
times including other human perturbations such
as land-use change, are the best known type of
climate-change related scenario.  Emissions
scenarios provide required inputs to model cal-
culations of future climate change, as shown in
Figure 2.3.  As the focus and intended use of cli-
mate-model studies have shifted over time, so
has the role of emissions scenarios.  Early re-
search studies examined the climate system’s re-
sponse to potential (rather than projected)
emissions inputs in individual model studies or
standardized model comparisons.  In such exer-
cises, the purpose of a scenario is to provide a
known, consistent perturbation big enough to
generate an informative model response.  Such
scenarios must be standardized, so differences
between model runs can be traced to scientific
uncertainties and model differences, but they
can be simple and arbitrary, making no claim to
being realistic.  The earliest such scenarios
showed a “step-change” increase in atmospheric
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concentration of CO2 from its pre-industrial
value, to either two or four times that value.34
Models’ equilibrium responses to doubled CO2
provided a standard benchmark of model re-
sponsiveness, which has remained around the
range of 1.5 to 4.5°C for more than 20 years.
This range of modeled equilibrium responses to
a standardized perturbation does not predict ac-
tual climate changes under human perturba-
tions, although it has often mistakenly been
taken as such. 
The next generation of climate-model studies,
beginning in the early 1990s, specified a time-
path of atmospheric concentrations rather than
a one-time perturbation.  These studies for the
first time allowed comparison of models’ tran-
sient responses, by examining not just how much
the cimate changes, but how fast it changes. They
still used a simple, highly idealized standard sce-
nario, most frequently a 1 percent per year in-
crease in atmospheric concentration, expressed
as CO2-equivalent.  Only two such transient
simulations had been conducted by the first
IPCC assessment (1990), but by the time of the
second assessment (1996), most modeling
groups had produced at least one.35
Since the mid-1990s, climate modelers have in-
creasingly sought to produce realistic pictures
of how the climate may actually change, requir-
ing a new approach to emissions scenarios.
Scenarios must now present well-founded judg-
ments or guesses of actual future emissions
trends and their consequences for atmospheric
concentrations.  The required emissions scenar-
ios have been constructed either by extrapolat-
ing recent emissions trends, or, particularly for
energy-related CO2, representing emissions in
terms of underlying drivers such as population,
economic growth, and technological change and
projecting these drivers using some combina-
tion of modeling and trend extrapolation.
Driven by such scenarios, climate models for
the first time can claim to be reasonable esti-
mates of how the climate might actually change.
In addition, comparisons using multiple models
and emissions scenarios have allowed partition-
ing of uncertainty in future climate change into
roughly equal shares attributed to uncertainty in
climate science and models, and in emissions
trends.36 These comparisons have also allowed
estimation of the climate-change benefits from
specified emissions reductions. 
As this shift occurred, advances in climate mod-
els – e.g., improved representations of atmos-
pheric aerosols, tropospheric ozone, and
atmosphere-surface interactions – produced
mismatches between emissions scenarios and
the input needs of climate models.  For example,
climate models now require emissions of sev-
eral types of aerosols and reactive gases (prin-
cipally the ozone precursors, hydrocarbons, CO
and NOx), explicit estimates of black carbon and
organic carbon, and some disaggregation of dif-
ferent types of volatile organic compound
(VOC) emissions.  Moreover, because these
emissions act locally and regionally rather than
globally, they must be specified at the spatial
scale of a model grid-cell, about 150 sq. km.
Models of atmospheric chemistry and transport
then use these emissions to generate the con-
centrations and radiative forcings used by the
climate model.  Since emissions scenarios often
do not provide the required detail, climate mod-
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34 e.g., Manabe and Wetherald 1967, Manabe and
Stouffer 1979.
35 Washington and Meehl 1989, Manabe et al. 1991,
IPCC 1996a.
36 Cubash et al. 2001.
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elers meet these input needs through various ad
hoc approaches.
Changes in standard emissions scenarios pose
challenges for maintaining comparability with
past model results.  For example, the IPCC’s
IS92 scenarios projected that future SO2 emis-
sions would roughly double, then stabilize,
while the later SRES scenarios projected sharp
decreases, giving 2100 emissions about 
one-quarter the IS92 value.  This change caused
significant increases in projected warming that
were not due to any changed scientific under-
standing.  To help maintain backward compara-
bility, many climate-model groups have
continued to run simulations using older stan-
dardized scenarios, to provide benchmarks for
comparisons both among current models and
between current and previous-generation models.
2.2. EMISSIONS SCENARIOS 
FOR EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE
ENERGY AND TECHNOLOGY
FUTURES
In addition to providing needed inputs to cli-
mate models, emissions scenarios have also
been produced to examine alternative 
socio-economic, energy, and technological fu-
tures, as shown in Figure 2.4.  As in Figure 2.3
the content of the scenario is emissions, but the
scenario is now used to examine the socio-eco-
nomic implications of alternative emission
paths, which lie upstream or to the left in the
causal chain.  A scenario specifying a particular
emissions time-path can be used to explore what
patterns of demographic and economic change,
energy resource availability, and technology de-
velopment are consistent with that trajectory.
Alternatively, scenarios can be used to examine
what changes in policies, technologies, or other
factors would be required to shift emissions
from some assumed baseline onto a specified
lower path, and to estimate the cost of such a
shift.  To be used in this way, an emissions sce-
nario might be specified arbitrarily, or might
specify some environmental target based on
normative criteria as discussed in Section 1.2.
Such scenarios have been most frequently used
to examine emissions trajectories that stabilize
atmospheric CO2 concentrations at specified
levels.  More recent exercises have instead taken
stabilization of radiative forcing as the target, to
examine the role of non-CO2 greenhouse gases in
meeting stabilization goals.37
An important early example is the Wigley,
Richels, Edmonds (WRE) scenarios, which pre-
sented emissions pathways that stabilized at-
mospheric CO2 concentration at five levels,
ranging from 450 to 1000 ppm.38 Developed
heuristically from a simple model of the global
carbon cycle and two energy-economic models,
these scenarios illustrated the large cost savings
attainable by approaching stable concentrations
through emission paths that initially rise and
then decline steeply, rather than by beginning a
more gradual decline immediately.
Several other sets of stabilization scenarios have
been proposed and used for similar explo-
rations.  For example, the Energy Modeling
Forum (EMF) has convened several multi-
model scenario exercises focusing on emissions,
emissions constraints, and their socio-economic
effects.  These have studied decision-making
under uncertainty, international distribution of
costs and benefits, the costs and benefits of the
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26
The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Section 2 - Scenarios in Global-Change Analysis and Decision Support
Kyoto Protocol, the implications of potential fu-
ture energy technologies and technological
change for emissions, and the implications of in-
cluding non-CO2 gases and carbon sequestration
in mitigation targets and policies.39
In a recent scenario exercise of this type spon-
sored by the CCSP, three modeling teams con-
structed separate reference-case scenarios to
examine the implications of stabilizing radiative
forcing at levels roughly corresponding to CO2
concentrations of 450, 550, 650, and 750 ppm.
They examined the energy system, land-use,
and economic implications of moving to stabi-
lization.  This project explored the role of mul-
tiple gases and alternative multi-gas control
strategies in pursuing atmospheric stabilization.
These scenarios may also provide a basis for fu-
ture analyses by the CCSP, the Climate Change
Technology Program (CCTP), or others.40
2.3. CLIMATE CHANGE
SCENARIOS
Climate scenarios describe potential future cli-
mate conditions (Figure 2.5).  They are used to
provide inputs to assessments of climate-change
impacts, vulnerabilities, and associated options
for adaptation, and to inform decision-making
related to either adaptation or mitigation.  De-
pending on their specific use, climate scenarios
may include multiple variables, such as temper-
ature, precipitation, cloudiness, humidity, and
winds.  They may describe these at spatial scales
ranging from the entire globe, through broad
latitude bands, large continental and sub-conti-
nental regions, to climate model grid-cells or
finer scales.  They may project these at time res-
olutions ranging from annual or seasonal aver-
ages to daily or even finer-scale weather.41
Three major types of climate scenarios are dis-
tinguished by how they are produced: incre-
mental scenarios, analog scenarios, and
climate-model scenarios.42 Incremental scenar-
ios change current conditions by plausible but
arbitrary amounts.  For example, a region’s tem-
perature might be warmed by 2, 3, or 4°C from
present conditions, or its precipitation increased
or decreased by 5, 10, or 20 percent.  Such ad-
justments can be made to annual or seasonal av-
erages, to finer-period measurements of current
conditions, or to the variability of temperature
or precipitation over days, months, or years.43
Like the simple emissions scenarios used for
climate-model comparisons, incremental cli-
mate scenarios are simple to produce but make
no claim to represent actual future conditions.
They are used for initial exploratory studies of
climate impacts and to test the sensitivity of im-
pact models.
Analog climate scenarios represent potential fu-
ture climates by the observed climate regime at
another place or time.  A spatial analog imposes
the climate of one location on another, e.g., rep-
resenting the potential climate of New York in
the 2050s by that of Atlanta today or that of Illi-
nois in the 2050s by that of Kansas today.44 A
temporal analog imposes climate conditions ob-
served in the past, in the historical record or ear-
lier paleoclimatic observations, e.g., using the
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39 See, e.g., Weyant and Hill 1999; Weyant 2004; de la
Chesnaye and Weyant 2006; EMF 2006. 
40 CCSP 2007.
41 IPCC – TGCIA 1999, Barrow et al. 2004.
42 Mearns et al. 2001.
43 e.g., Mearns et al. 1992, 1996; Semenov and Porter 1995.
44 E.g., Kalkstein and Greene 1997.
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hot, dry period of the 1930s to study impacts of
potential future hot, dry climates.45 Like incre-
mental scenarios, analog climate scenarios are
more useful for exploratory studies of the cli-
mate sensitivity of particular resources or sys-
tems than for projecting likely impacts.  While
they represent climate states that are known to
be physically possible, they are limited as rep-
resentations of potential future states since they
do not consider the changes in greenhouse-gas
concentrations that are the principal driver of
climate change.  
Climate-model scenarios use computers to pro-
duce a physically consistent representation of
the movement of air, water, energy, and radia-
tion through the atmosphere.  Climate models,
also called General Circulation Models or
GCMs, approximate this calculation by divid-
ing the atmosphere into thousands of grid-cells,
roughly 150 km. square in today’s models, with
a dozen vertical layers, treating conditions as uni-
form within each cell and representing finer-
scale processes by numerical relationships, called
“parameterizations,” that are defined at the scale
of a grid cell.  Climate models are used to study
the present climate and its responses to past per-
turbations like variation in the sun’s output or vol-
canic eruptions, and to construct scenarios of
future climate change under any specified sce-
nario of emissions and other disturbances. 
Unlike incremental and analog scenarios, 
climate-model scenarios use emissions scenar-
ios as inputs.  Model-based scenarios have a
greater claim than the other types to being real-
istic descriptions of how the climate might ac-
tually change, because they are based on
specified assumptions of future emissions
trends acting on modeled representations of
known physical processes.  Even with a given
emissions scenario, model-based climate sce-
narios are uncertain.  Since climate models are
driven by the radiative effects of atmospheric con-
centrations of relevant species, some of this un-
certainty comes from the carbon-cycle and
chemical processes by which specified emission
paths determine concentrations and radiative forc-
ings.  Some of the uncertainty can be seen in the
slight differences among different runs of the same
climate model, because the models are sensitive
to small differences in starting conditions.  And
some of the uncertainty can be seen in differences
between calculations by different models, mainly
caused by differences in the computational meth-
ods they use to handle errors introduced by finite
grid-cells, and the parameterizations they use to
represent small-scale processes. 
Just as modeling future climate change requires
specification of future emissions trends, assess-
ments of future climate-change impacts require
specification of future climate change.  Data
from a climate-change scenario might be used
as input to impact assessments of freshwater
systems, agriculture, forests, or any other 
climate-sensitive system or activity.  Impact
studies can use various methods, including
quantitative models such as hydrologic and crop
models, threshold analyses that examine quali-
tative disruptions in the behavior of climate-sen-
sitive systems, or expert judgments that
integrate various pieces of scientific knowledge.
As with all scenarios, the usefulness of climate
scenarios depends on how well they meet users’
information needs.  The highly specific climate-
data needs of impact analyses may not readily
be provided by climate-model outputs, or may
include results of whose validity climate mod-
elers are not confident.  For example, a com-
mon need of impact analyses is for data at
substantially finer scales than the relative coarse
grid of a climate model, which might have only
60 to 100 cells over the continental United
States.  One advantage of incremental and ana-
log scenarios is that they can typically provide
data at substantially finer scales.  “Downscal-
ing” techniques seek to combine the benefits of
model-based scenarios – physical realism and
explicit emissions-scenario drivers – and data at
finer scales.  The two major approaches are
statistical downscaling and nested regional
modeling.46 Statistical downscaling involves es-
timating statistical relationships between
large-scale variables of observed climate, such
as regional-average temperature, and local vari-
ables such as site-specific temperature and 
precipitation.47 These relationships are then as-
sumed to remain constant under global climate
45 E.g., Rosenberg et al. 1993.
46 Giorgi et al. 2001.
47 Wilby and Wigley 1997.
Just as modeling future
climate change
requires specification
of future emissions
trends, assessment of
future climate-change
impacts requires
specification of future
climate change.
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change.  A nested regional climate model pro-
vides an explicit physical representation of cli-
mate for a specific region, including local
factors such as mountain ranges, complex coast-
lines, and surface vegetation patterns, with ini-
tial and boundary conditions provided by a
GCM.  Regional climate models can provide
projections at scales as small as 10 to 20 km.
Although downscaled results are anchored to
local features with well-understood climatic ef-
fects, downscaling introduces uncertainties beyond
those already present in GSM results.48
2.4. SCENARIOS OF DIRECT
BIOPHYSICAL IMPACTS: 
SEA LEVEL RISE
Although climate-change scenarios can provide
inputs to studies of any impact, scenarios can
also be constructed of particularly important
forms of impact, such as sea level rise – one of
the more costly and certain consequences of cli-
mate warming (Figure 2.6).49 Changes in global
mean sea level as the climate warms can be cal-
culated using a GCM with a coupled ocean and
atmosphere, which can simulate the transfer of
heat to the ocean and the variation of ocean tem-
perature with depth.  To construct sea level rise
scenarios for particular coastal locations,
model-derived projections of global mean sea
level rise must be combined with projections of
local subsidence or uplift of coastal lands, as
well as local tidal variations derived from his-
torical tide-gauge data.
Sea level rise will increase circulation and
change salinity regimes in estuaries, threaten
coastal wetlands, alter shorelines through in-
creased erosion, and increase the intensity of
coastal flooding associated with normal tides
and storm surge.  Scenarios of sea level rise are
consequently needed to assess multiple linked
impacts on coastal ecosystems and settlements.
In specific locations, these impacts will depend
on many characteristics of coastal topography,
ecosystems, and land use – e.g., coastal eleva-
tion and slope, rate of shoreline erosion or ac-
cretion, tide range, wave height, local land use
and coastal protection, salinity tolerance of
coastal plant communities, etc. – in addition to
local sea level rise.50
In addition to its gradual impacts, sea level rise
is subject to large uncertainties from the poten-
tial loss of continental ice sheets in Greenland
and West Antarctica.  The consequences of these
events for global sea level rise are well known
because they can be calculated quite precisely
from the volume of the ice sheets – roughly 7
meters rise from complete loss of the West
Antarctic Ice Sheet and 5 meters from Green-
land – but the probabilities of these events and
their likely speed of occurrence are both highly
uncertain.  One recent study has suggested a
probability of a few per cent that the West
Antarctic Ice Sheet will contribute an additional
one meter per century beyond that calculated
from gradual warming.51
There are several reasons to call out sea level
rise from other climate-change impacts to be
represented in separate scenarios.  First, sea
level rise is a powerful driver of other forms of
climate-change impact, probably the most im-
portant driver of impacts in coastal regions.
Since it is a direct physical impact of climate
change that can be described precisely and com-
pactly, a sea level rise scenario is an efficient
way to transmit the most important information
about climate change to coastal impact assess-
ments.  Moreover, since sea level rise does not
depend on socio-economic processes and can-
not be significantly influenced by human ac-
tions (other than by limiting climate change
itself), it may be reasonably treated as exoge-
nous for purposes of impact assessment.  For all
these reasons, sea level rise is a good proxy for
the most important causal routes by which climate
change will affect coastal regions.  
Finally, because sea level rise is subject to large
uncertainties with known consequences but un-
known probabilities, it is a useful variable for
exploratory analysis of worst-case scenarios in
long-range planning.  Other forms of climate
impact might also merit being called out in sep-
arate scenarios: changes in snowpack in moun-
tain regions, seasonal flow regimes in major
river basins, or the structure and function of
major ecosystem types.  Based on present
48 Mearns et al. 2001, Giorgi et al. 2001.
49 IPCC 2001a.
50 Burkett et al. 2005.
51 Vaughan and Spouge 2002.
52 MEA 2005.
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knowledge, however, only sea level rise has
shown these characteristics strongly enough to
motivate construction of separate scenarios.
2.5. MULTIVARIATE SCENARIOS
FOR ASSESSING IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION, AND
VULNERABILITY
Many potentially important impacts of climate
change cannot be adequately assessed by con-
sidering only how the climate might change.
These impacts require multivariate scenarios
that include climate change and other charac-
teristics likely to influence impacts.  This is the
case, for different reasons, for both ecosystems
and socio-economic systems, although the na-
ture of the multivariate scenarios that are re-
quired – i.e., the number and identity of the
characteristics that must be specified – will vary
widely among particular impacts.  
Ecosystems are affected by climate change, but
also by many other changes in environmental
conditions that are influenced by human activi-
ties, such as nitrogen and sulfur deposition, tro-
pospheric ozone and smog, and changes in
erosion, runoff, loadings of other pollutants,
land use, land cover, and coastal-zone charac-
teristics.  Consequently, realistic assessments of
potential future impacts on ecosystems require
specifying the most important forms of human-
driven stresses jointly, not just climate.52
In addition, many important forms of climate-
change impact depend not just on climate
change, its direct biophysical impacts such as
sea level rise, and perhaps other forms of envi-
ronmental stress, but also on the nature of the
society on which these climate and other envi-
ronmental changes are imposed – e.g., how
many people there are; where and how they live;
how wealthy they are; how they gain their liveli-
hoods; and what types of infrastructure, institu-
tions, and policies they have in place.53
Assessment of climate impact on ecosystems
that are intensively managed for human use,
such as agriculture, managed forests, range-
lands, and hydrologic systems, must consider
human management as a factor in impacts.  The
non-climatic factors that influence these man-
agement decisions – e.g., changes in market
conditions, technologies, or cultural practices –
must be considered for inclusion in scenarios if
they are sufficiently important in mediating cli-
mate impacts.
In other domains, socio-economic factors can
mediate climate impacts by influencing vulner-
ability and adaptive capacity.  No general model
of the socio-economic determinants of adaptive
capacity exists.  Important factors are likely to
vary across specific types of impact, locations,
and cultures, and may include many demo-
graphic, economic, technological, institutional,
and cultural characteristics.
Some socio-economic characteristics that are
likely to be relevant for many impact assess-
ments – e.g., the size and sometimes the age
structure of population, the size and sometimes
the sectoral mix of GDP – are normally gener-
ated in the course of producing emissions sce-
narios.  Consequently, when current emissions
scenarios exist for the region for which an im-
pact assessment is being conducted, it makes
sense to strive for consistency with them.54
Even for these variables, however, there may be
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53 Parson et al. 2001, 2003; Arnell et al. 2004.
54 Berkhout et al. 2001, citing UNEP 1994 guidelines.
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significant problems of incompatible spatial
scale.  Impact assessments often examine
smaller spatial scales than emissions projec-
tions, so they may need these socio-economic
data at finer scale than is available.  Downscal-
ing future socio-economic projections has
proved challenging thus far.  There is no gener-
ally accepted method for doing so, and several
research groups are exploring development of
alternative methods.55
In contrast to the few clearly identified aggre-
gate characteristics needed to construct emis-
sions scenarios, the socio-economic factors that
most strongly shape adaptive capacity and vul-
nerability for particular impacts may be de-
tailed, subtle, and location-specific.  It may not
even be clear what characteristics are most im-
portant before doing a comprehensive analysis
of potential causal pathways shaping impacts.
The most important characteristics may interact
strongly with each other or with other economic
or social trends, or may not be readily quantifi-
able.  All these factors make the development
of socio-economic scenarios for impact assess-
ment a much more difficult endeavor than con-
structing emissions scenarios.
Because scenarios are schematic, not all factors
that might be important for impacts can be in-
cluded.  Details are typically not included or
treated as merely illustrative.  But particular de-
tails, which cannot be identified in advance,
may be crucial determinants of vulnerability to
climate impacts.56 Impact assessments have re-
sponded to this dilemma in two broad ways.57
First, constructing scenarios of relevant socio-
economic conditions has been delegated to local
or regional teams with expertise in the impacts
being assessed, subject to constraints to main-
tain consistency with other assessments.  Sec-
ond, since local or regional scenario groups may
not have access to all knowledge relevant to un-
derstanding the main determinants of impacts,
more open-ended approaches have been em-
ployed – e.g., exploratory analyses that iterate
between considering particular characteristics
that might be important, examining their impli-
cations for impacts using the data and models
available, then re-assessing what variables are
most important.
This section has sketched a typology of global-
change scenarios and identified major types of
decision-makers who might use global-change
scenario-based information.  The next section
turns to current experience with global-change
scenarios, summarizing the development, con-
tents, and uses of four major exercises.  In-
formed by these cases plus additional short
scenario examples presented in text boxes, Sec-
tion 4 will summarize and discuss the major
challenges for making and using scenarios that
are raised by this experience, providing the basis
for the conclusions and recommendations pre-
sented in Section 5.
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In this section, we review experience to date developing and using scenarios for global climate
change applications.  Because little literature on these activities yet exists, our selection of cases
has inevitably been both limited by time and resources at our disposal and reliant in part on the
knowledge and experience of team members.  We discuss four exercises in detail, in an attempt
to cover the largest-scale and most important activities.  Section 3.1 reviews the IPCC emission
scenarios, with particular detail on the most recent and important exercise, the Special Report
on Emissions Scenarios (SRES).  Section 3.2 considers the US National Assessment, which devel-
oped and used scenarios of both climate and socio-economic conditions.  Section 3.3 considers
the UK Climate Impacts Programme, which has also both developed and used scenarios, follow-
ing a different approach from the US National Assessment.  Section 3.4 reviews the ambitious
scenario-generating exercise conducted as part of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA),
in which climate change was one of several dimensions of stress considered on global ecosystems.
For each exercise, we consider only the development and use of scenarios, rather than examin-
ing the larger assessment processes of which the scenarios were part.  We consider how the sce-
narios were developed, including both methods of reasoning and managerial process; how and by
whom they were used; and subsequent evaluations, when these are available.  General issues and
challenges that emerge from these experiences are discussed in Section 4.
To provide more illustrative variation, we also provide shorter summaries of eight additional sce-
nario activities, some of them related to the four we consider in detail.  Presented in text boxes
throughout Section 4, these are intended to provide additional information to highlight particu-
lar issues.  We have particularly sought experiences that illuminate potential relationships between
scenarios and decision-making. 
All these scenario exercises represent early work in an immature field.  Our aim is not to criti-
cize particular exercises, but to seek insights from their experience into the general problems of
making useful global-change scenarios.
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3.1. IPCC EMISSIONS SCENARIOS 
Since its establishment in 1989, the IPCC has
organized three exercises to develop scenarios
of greenhouse-gas emissions, of increasing
scale and complexity.  For its first report,
IPCC’s Working Group 3 on “Response Strate-
gies” included a sub-group on emissions sce-
narios.  Four scenarios were produced but little
used in this assessment because of time limits
and because, with one exception, only doubled-
CO2 equilibrium climate-model runs were avail-
able at the time.58 The next exercise produced
six new scenarios, called IS92a through IS92f.59
These were the first global emissions scenarios
with a full suite of greenhouse gases and at least
some explicit calculation underlying each.  The
IS92a scenario, one of the central scenarios in
this group, was used in climate-model compar-
isons conducted for the 1996 IPCC assessment,
along with the simpler transient scenario of 1
percent annual increase in equivalent-CO2 con-
centration and further equilibrium runs.60
The third and most ambitious IPCC scenario
process was established in 1997 and worked for
two years to produce the Special Report on
Emissions Scenarios (SRES).61 In part, this
process was established in response to two
widely circulated criticisms of the IS92 scenar-
ios.  The first of these criticized the 1992 sce-
narios for inconsistency with other published
scenarios of energy and carbon intensity for
major world regions; failing to reflect important
recent trends, including the collapse of the So-
viet Union and increasing restrictions on sulfur
emissions worldwide; relying inappropriately
on a single model; and only being useful as cli-
mate-model inputs, not for other purposes such
as mitigation studies or supporting climate-
change negotiations.62 The second criticized the
IS92a scenario for assuming increasing diver-
gence in the per capita emissions of industrial-
ized and developing regions, arguing that this
represented a strong bias in favor of already de-
veloped regions.63
In response, the 1996 plenary session of the
IPCC requested a new set of emissions scenar-
ios.  These new scenarios were to improve treat-
ment of sulfur aerosols and emissions from
land-use change, and were not to rely on a sin-
gle model or expert team, but instead to draw
on the existing literature and invite any group
with relevant expertise to participate in an
“open process.”64 They were also charged to
serve more uses than climate-model inputs,
such as supporting impact analyses, but to as-
sume no new climate-policy interventions.  Al-
though not explicitly in the terms of reference,
it was also clearly understood that the scenarios
would address the criticism of the IS92 scenar-
ios by focusing on convergent development
paths between North and South.
In January 1997 the IPCC established a writing team,
including members of several energy-economic
modeling groups and experts in related areas
such as population, technological change, and
scenario development methods.  The process
ran under tight time pressure to provide prelim-
inary scenarios by early 1998 for climate-model
runs in the IPCC Third Assessment.  
Prior scenarios were compiled in a web-based
database,65 and any researcher was invited to
submit new ones.  By mid-1998 the database
contained more than 400 scenarios.  Most of
these projected only energy-related CO2 emis-
sions, but they were highly diverse in their cov-
erage and resolution, the variables included, and
their methodologies.  The usefulness of these
scenarios in constructing new ones was limited
by several weaknesses, however.  Many were in-
complete, lacked documentation of inputs, or
made inconsistent assumptions.  Few included
sulfur or land-use emissions, which were specif-
58 The scenarios were mentioned in a 1-page Appendix
to the Working Group 1 report.  The one non-equilib-
rium run available was a preliminary transient run
using 1 percent annual CO2 concentration increase.
See Mitchell et al. 1990, Bretherton et al. 1990, IPCC
1990.
59 Leggett et al. 1992.
60 The 1 percent scenario was similar to IS92a, but gave
total radiative forcing about 20 percent greater by 2100.
Washington and Meehl 1989; Stouffer et al. 1989;
Bretherton et al. 1990:180-182.
61 Nakicenovic and Swart 2000.
62 Alcamo et al. 1995.
63 Parikh 1992, 1998.
64 Nakicenovic and Swart 2000: 324, Appendix I (terms
of reference).
65 Morita and Lee 1998.
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ically requested of the new scenarios.  Many
were unclear on whether they assumed mitiga-
tion efforts, while the new scenarios were in-
structed to exclude them.  Consequently, the
development of new scenarios had to proceed
largely independently of the collection of exist-
ing scenarios through the literature review and
open process.
Early on, participants decided to use narrative
scenarios in addition to quantitative models, and
to include experts in this approach on the writ-
ing team.  This decision drew on recent suc-
cesses using such scenarios for energy and
environmental applications,66 and responded to
the charge to make the scenarios more inte-
grated and more broadly useful.  Participants in
an April 1997 workshop chose two key uncer-
tainties to explore in the scenarios:  whether
world values would mainly stress economic
prosperity or balance economic and ecological
concerns (labeled “A” vs. “B” scenarios); and
whether the organization of economies and in-
stitutions would continue shifting toward global
integration, or reverse and move toward regional
fragmentation (labeled “1” vs. “2” scenarios).67
Combined, these gave four scenarios, which
were sketched in preliminary terms at the work-
shop.  In the A1 (economic, global) scenario,
economic growth and inter-regional income
convergence continue strongly worldwide – all
developing countries grow like Japan and Korea
from the 1950s to the 1980s – while world pop-
ulation peaks at 9 billion by 2050.  Rapid inno-
vation yields many advanced energy sources,
while acid rain and other local and regional en-
vironmental problems are aggressively con-
trolled.  In contrast, the A2 (economic, regional)
scenario has higher population growth, lower
economic growth with more continuing re-
gional disparities, slower innovation, and
weaker international institutions.  B1 (ecologi-
cal, global) has low population growth, moder-
ate economic growth with strong convergence,
and strong reductions in per capita energy use,
mostly through higher efficiency, while B2 has
intermediate population growth, low economic
growth with weaker convergence, and moderate
improvements in energy efficiency and devel-
opment of non-carbon energy sources.68 The
storylines were elaborated in short text descrip-
tions with some preliminary numbers attached
in fall 1997.69
Modeling teams were asked to produce initial
quantifications of these scenarios in fall 1997,
to match specified 2100 target values within 10
percent.  In February 1998, the preliminary
quantitative targets were re-confirmed and mod-
elers asked to continue work on quantifications,
now including a breakdown of economic output
into four world regions.70 In April, one model’s
quantification was chosen as a “marker sce-
nario” for each of the four scenarios – a partic-
ular scenario that would provide the basis for
interim reporting to climate modelers, some of
whose results other participating models would
be asked to replicate.  The specifications and
models for these marker scenarios are shown in
Table 3.1.
These interim marker scenarios were used to
provide emissions scenarios to climate models
participating in the IPCC third assessment.  An
IPCC climate modelers’ meeting in June 1998
agreed to use SRES scenarios and asked for
three cases, central emissions, stabilization, and
high emissions.71 The writing team initially dis-
cussed meeting this request by identifying sce-
narios corresponding to each of these requested
cases,72 but decided to provide only the marker
scenarios and recommend that all four be used
without identifying any as “central.”
66 See, e.g., WEC/IIASA 1995, WBCSD 1997.
67 Minutes, Lead Authors Meeting, Paris, April 13-15,
1997. 
68 Arnell et al. 2004; Minutes, Lead Authors Meeting,
Paris, April 13-15, 1997.
69 Minutes, informal modelers meeting, Berkeley, Feb
7-8.
70 Draft minutes, informal modelers meeting, Berkeley,
Feb 7-8:4.
71 Minutes of the Laxenburg meeting, July 2-3, 1998,
reporting results of June 29-July 1 IPCC Scoping
Meeting, Bonn.
72 In July 1998, members decided that A1F or A2 could
be the requested high-emissions scenario (with emis-
sions of ~ 30 GtC in 2100), B2 or A1B a central case
(~15 GtC in 2100, with two different SO2 profiles),
and B1 or an A1 variant called A1R a stabilization case
(at about 550 ppm) (Laxenburg report, July 2-3,
1998:1).
The SRES interim
marker scenarios were
used to provide
emissions scenarios to
climate models
participating in the
IPCC third assessment.
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The marker scenarios also provided the basis for
coordination of subsequent scenario develop-
ment.  Up to this point, there had been substan-
tial discrepancy between different models’
quantifications of the same scenarios, particu-
larly at regional level.  With the adoption of the
markers, other groups were asked to replicate
(within 5-10 percent) the marker results on pop-
ulation, GDP, and final energy for the four
world regions, for 2100 and several interim
years.73 Achieving this requested replication
posed significant challenges for modelers.74
With a further year of work, modeling teams
produced a total of 40 scenarios that were re-
tained in the report, of which 26 replicated one
of the marker scenarios.  Although a few of the
14 non-replicates reflected a model’s inability
to match the results of a marker scenario, most
were produced because a modeling team inten-
tionally sought to explore alternative assump-
tions.  For example, the A1 scenario, which
originally balanced fossil and non-fossil energy
sources, was augmented by variants with dif-
ferent assumptions about fossil resources and
non-fossil technology development, giving
widely divergent emissions paths stressing coal,
gas, and non-fossil energy technology.  Modifi-
cations of the scenario set continued until late
in the process.  For example, it was decided in
October 1998 to drop several B variants with
explicit mitigation, including one stabilization
scenario.75 At the final IPCC approval meeting,
it was decided at the request of the Saudi dele-
gation to reduce the two fossil-intensive vari-
ants of A1 to one, a variant of the gas-intensive
scenario which was renamed A1FI (for “fossil-
intensive”).76
3.1.1 Significance and use
The SRES scenarios have been the most com-
prehensive, ambitious, and carefully docu-
mented emissions scenarios produced to date.
They represented a substantial advance from
prior scenarios, and contributed to assessments
and subsequent research on climate impacts and
responses.  The SRES scenarios formed the
basis for climate-model comparisons in the
IPCC Third Assessment (2001) and continuing
work in the Fourth Assessment.  Most subse-
quent climate-model work has used only a few
of the marker scenarios – typically A2 and B2,
sometimes with A1B added.  SRES scenarios
also provided baselines for analysis of mitiga-
tion scenarios in the Third Assessment.77
Several significant insights were illuminated by
the SRES scenarios.  
• Scenarios with similar emissions in 2100
can follow markedly different paths in the
interim, giving wide differences in cumula-
tive emissions and concentrations. 
• Technology and energy-resource assump-
tions can strongly perturb future emissions,
even with constant socio-economic assump-
tions.  For example, the three A1 variants
show that changing these assumptions alone
can generate as wide a range of emissions
futures as substantial variation of demo-
graphic and economic futures.
Table 3.1.  
Target Values
for 2100 in
Initial Scenario
Quantifications
SCENARIO A1B A2 B1 B2
Population 7.1 15.1 7.1 10.4
GDP (trillion) $530 $250 $340 $235
Final Energy (EJ) ~1,700 870 770 950
Model for 
Marker scenario AIM ASF IMAGE MESSAGE
Source: Minutes of Laxenburg meeting, July 2-3, 1998.
73 Because markers were produced by different models
with different time steps, the interim years to be har-
monized differed for each scenario.
74 For example, discussions in Beijing re-confirmed that
allowed deviation from markers at 4-region level would
be 5 percent for GDP and 10 percent for final energy,
but substantial discrepancies in base-year energy could
not be harmonized due to time constraints (SRES mod-
elers meeting report, Beijing, October 6-7, 1998:2). 
75 SRES modelers meeting report, Beijing, October 6-
7, 1998:4.  At this meeting, B1 was also proposed for
removal, but was retained based on a decision that none
of the many policy interventions it presumed was an
explicit greenhouse-gas limitation, so it was consistent
with the terms of reference.
76 A1FI was the gas-intensive scenario, A1G, with re-
visions to methane emissions and additional non-CO2
gases added from the A1 run of the MESSAGE model.
77 Morita et al. 2001.
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• Highly distinct combinations of demo-
graphic, socio-economic, and energy-mar-
ket conditions can produce similar
emissions trajectories, suggesting that a par-
ticular emissions trajectory can pose very
different types of mitigation problems, de-
pending on what combination of driving fac-
tors underlies the emissions.
3.1.2 Criticisms and controversies
The SRES experience raised issues of great sig-
nificance for subsequent attempts to develop
more useful climate-change scenarios: the de-
sirability of and appropriate methods for char-
acterizing probabilities associated with
scenarios; the quantitative representation of the
relationship between North and South; methods
for developing and using narrative scenarios
and integrating them with quantitative model re-
sults; alternative modes for coordinating use of
multiple models and their implications for the
interpretation and use of scenarios; and the re-
lationship between scenario exercises and their
users, including the need for clarity about spe-
cific intended uses, appropriate methods for en-
gaging users in scenario development, and how
to improve utility of scenarios when not all po-
tential user groups are specifically identified.
These are discussed in Sections 4 and 5. 
The first two of these issues were the subjects of
forceful public criticisms.  We discuss these, fol-
lowed by several other issues that have received
less attention but which in our view pose more
central and instructive challenges for future sce-
nario exercises.
Assigning explicit probabilities
The SRES team decided at the outset to make
no probabilistic statements about the scenarios.
Their report used great care in its language to
avoid any suggestion that one scenario might be
more central or more likely than any other.78
This decision was consistent both with standard
practice in developing narrative scenarios, and
with the instruction in their terms of reference
not to favor any model.79
They were sharply criticized for this decision.80
Critics argued that there were no technical ob-
stacles to assigning probabilities to emissions
ranges bounded by the marker scenarios; that
scenario developers must have made proba-
bilistic judgments in generating and evaluating
the scenario quantifications and that not mak-
ing these judgments explicit would withhold
relevant information; and that if scenario devel-
opers decline to assign probabilities, others who
are less informed will do so.  Indeed, many
probabilistic emissions calculations have been
produced since the SRES, using various meth-
ods such as assigning uniform or other speci-
fied distributions over the emissions range of
the marker scenarios, counting scenarios lying
in specified intervals in the larger SRES set, un-
bundling and recombining alternative values of
the drivers underlying SRES emissions figures,
or sampling over parameter distributions within
a single model.  In response to these criticisms,
SRES authors argued that attempting to assign
probabilities to scenarios would require assign-
ing joint distributions to the underlying driving
factors, and that this would lead to an explosion
of combinatoric possibilities over which any at-
tempt to assign probabilities would be spurious
and arbitrary.81
The situation of the SRES scenarios is in fact
more nuanced than the arguments of either their
authors or critics would suggest.  It may well be
unhelpful to assign probabilities to rich, multi-
dimensional narrative scenarios, yet still useful
to assign interval probabilities when scenarios
principally represent uncertainty in one or two
quantitative variables.  And while the SRES sce-
narios began their lives like the former type of
storyline scenario, they finished more like the
latter.  For many users, the scenarios are their
projections of greenhouse-gas emission trends.
When they are viewed in this way, a potential
user may reasonably ask, how likely are emis-
sions to be higher than this – a distinct and bet-
ter-posed question than, what is the probability
of an A1 world?  The uncertainty issue has no
clear resolution in this case, and poses hard de-
sign problem for scenarios and assessments
more broadly.  Although the SRES exercise has
78 E.g., Minutes of London meeting, March 1999.
79 Draft minutes of the Washington, DC, meeting, April
29-30, 1998:6.
80 Schneider 2001, 2002; Pittock et al. 2001; Allen et
al. 2001; Reilly et al. 2001.
81 Grubler and Nakicenovic 2001. 
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raised this controversy most explicitly to date, the
problem is a general one that any scenario exercise
must confront.  We discuss it further in section 4.6.
Exchange rates: PPP versus MER
The most prominently publicized criticism of
SRES focused on the fact that all but one of the
participating models compared GDP across re-
gions using market exchange rates (MER), in-
stead of the more correct purchasing-power
parity (PPP) approach.  PPP comparisons cor-
rect for price differences among countries, provid-
ing a more accurate comparison of real incomes.
Because lower-income countries have lower price
levels, MER-based comparisons overstate the in-
come gap between rich and poor countries.
In a series of letters to the IPCC chairman and
several subsequent publications, two critics ar-
gued that the use of MER caused SRES scenar-
ios to over-estimate future income growth in
developing countries (because they over-esti-
mated the initial income gap), and consequently
to over-estimate future emissions growth.  Their
criticism was widely circulated and repeated by
prominent climate-change skeptics.82
But, although using MER does overstate future
income growth, it does not necessarily follow
that future projections of emissions growth are
also overstated.  MER is universally recognized
as a flawed measure of income, whose use in
global-change scenarios is only justified by bet-
ter availability of current and historical data,
and the fact that international emissions trades
in any future mitigation regime will likely be
made at market exchange rates.  But changing
the measure of income also changes the rela-
tionship between income and such physical
quantities as energy and food consumption,
which determine emissions.  Consequently,
while MER overstates future income growth in
poor countries, it also overstates future reduc-
tions in energy and emissions intensity.  These
opposing errors are likely to be similar in size,
in which case any error in emissions projections
from using MER will be small.83
A related, more serious concern is that all SRES
scenarios assumed varying degrees of real in-
come convergence between North and South;
this was done in response to criticisms that the
IS92 scenarios were biased in favor of the
North.  But an exercise to construct potential
climate-change futures may need to consider
less optimistic and less desirable futures in
which some currently poor regions fail to solve
the development problem.  Not considering less
fortunate futures, including ones that might
challenge the adequacy of current responses, in-
stitutions, and decision-making capacity, may
limit scenarios’ usefulness in supporting long-
term risk assessment and planning for the soci-
etal response to climate change.
Underdevelopment 
of narrative scenarios
Although the SRES storylines were produced
first and featured prominently in publications,
they remained underdeveloped and underused
throughout the process.  In part due to time
pressure, in part due to the predominance of
quantitative modelers in the process, little at-
tention was given to further development of the
storylines once initial quantifications were es-
tablished and modeling work began.  Nor was
significant effort devoted to integration and
cross-checking between storylines and quanti-
tative scenarios, although a major purpose of
the narratives was to give coherent structure to
quantifications.84 Concerns raised about the
storylines included lacking specification of
characteristics other than those needed to gen-
erate emissions; imbalance between the story-
lines, with A1 much more developed than the
others and B2, the least developed, likely to be
heavily used as the median scenario for emis-
sions; apparent inconsistencies within A2; and
lack of clarity regarding the distinctions be-
tween A2 and B2 – a serious enough concern
that merging them was repeatedly considered
until late in the process.85
82 Castles and Henderson 2003a, 2003b; The Economist
2003a,b; Michaels 2003b.
83 Nakicenovic et al. 2003, McKibben et al. 2004,
Holtsmark and Alfsen 2005, Manne et al. 2005, Gr bler
et al. 2004.
84 Minutes of the Beijing meeting, October 6-7,
1998:10.
85 Draft minutes of the Bilthoven meeting, September
17-19, 1997:7-8; draft minutes of the Berkeley meet-
ing, February 7-8, 1997:6; draft minutes of the Wash-
ington, DC, meeting, April 29-30, 1998.
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Moreover, participants disagreed over the mean-
ing of some of the scenarios, as indicated by the
persistent difficulty they had in agreeing on de-
scriptive names.86 These names were dropped
late in the project, in the context of a broad re-
treat from attempting to flesh out the storylines.
That so little integration of qualitative and
quantitative components was achieved in spite
of serious and persistent efforts suggests the
magnitude of the analytical and methodological
challenges involved. 
Harmonizing scenarios, interpreting
the results
Scenario exercise that use multiple models can
coordinate them in several ways:  choosing one
or a few illustrative scenarios as coordinating
devices for subsequent analyses, as was done
with the SRES marker scenarios; fixing values
of a small set of exogenous inputs to multiple
models, to characterize resultant uncertainties
and examine their origins through focused
model intercomparisons; or fixing key outputs
as targets, to reason backwards and examine re-
quirements for achieving them.
Choosing a few quantitative variables as the ini-
tial link between storylines and models makes
these variables serve as a framework to capture
the storylines’ basic logical structure.  Although
these choices are not obvious, the variables cho-
sen here appear reasonable.  But the causal
structure of a model will not generally mirror
the presumed causal logic of a narrative, so a
model cannot be expected to calculate values
for other variables that flesh out the storyline
logic.  Moreover, the few key variables so cho-
sen may not be exogenous inputs for every
model used in the subsequent quantification.
Of the three variables specified in the SRES
process, only population was exogenous for all
participating models.  Because GDP and final
energy were endogenous for some or all partic-
ipating models, matching their specified values
required manipulating other internal model
characteristics.  Once one model run was cho-
sen as the marker for each scenario, subsequent
attempts by other models to replicate the results
posed the same problem more acutely, since
more outputs were specified at this point.
The problems associated with attempting to har-
monize model outputs are related to the under-
development of narrative scenarios and limited
integration of qualitative and quantitative com-
ponents.  The storylines were associated with
relatively restrictive numerical targets even
though the storylines did not develop the rich-
ness or coherence that would carry implications
for additional characteristics.  The preliminary
targets were only slightly modified throughout
the project, despite subsequent discovery of 
significant problems.  For example, the United
Nations 1998 population projections, with sub-
stantial reductions in projected fertility, were
completed while the scenario development
work was underway but not incorporated.87
Clarity about uses, involving users:
The SRES scenarios were charged with serving
uses beyond driving climate models but given
little guidance on what specific additional uses
or users to serve, or how the scenarios might
best serve them, neither of which is obvious.88
Providing climate-model inputs remained the
most prominent and most clearly specified use,
as well as the only use that had an early dead-
line.  But climate modelers were not involved in
the scenario development process, and there
was substantial divergence between their needs
and the outputs and capabilities of the SRES
process.  A September 1997 briefing identified
the principal needs of climate modelers as early
availability of scenarios and greater emissions
detail.89 They wanted separate emissions tra-
jectories for major greenhouse gases, not just
86 While names proposed for the “1” storylines suggest
substantial common understanding (A1 was called
“High Growth,” “Productivity,” and “Golden Eco-
nomic Age,” B1 was “Green” and “Sustainable devel-
opment”), names proposed for the “2” scenarios,
particularly B2, do not (A2 was called “Regional Con-
solidation,” Divided World,” and “Clash of Civiliza-
tions”; B2, “Regional Stewardship,” “Small Is
Beautiful,” “Dynamics as Usual,” “Gradually Better,”
and “Muddling Through”) (draft minutes of the
Bilthoven meeting, September 17-19:7-8; draft min-
utes of the Berkeley meeting, February 7-8, 1997;
UKCIP 1998 report summarizing SRES progress;
Pitcher 1998 presentation slides.
87 Minutes of the Bilthoven meeting, September 17-19,
1997:11.
88 Alcamo et al. 1995.
89 Draft minutes of the Bilthoven meeting, September
17-19, 1997:5.
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CO2-equivalent, including regional detail for
some emissions such as sulfur – even suggest-
ing that it would be desirable to have sulfur
emissions disaggregated by stack height, to dis-
tinguish dispersed emissions from large point
sources.  Although SRES provided gridded sul-
fur data by post-processing model outputs, in
most cases the emissions included and their spa-
tial detail (not to mention stack height) were
limited by the capabilities and structures of par-
ticipating models.
Other uses received less attention, and repre-
sentatives of other potential uses were even less
involved than climate modelers in the process.
Supporting assessment of mitigation strategies
was largely deferred to the post-SRES scenarios
prepared for the IPCC Third Assessment Re-
port, although ambiguity about the degree of
mitigation effort implied by some SRES sce-
narios complicated that task.  Impact and vul-
nerability assessments depend on diverse,
small-scale socio-economic and ecological fac-
tors that a global exercise centered on energy-
economic models cannot provide.90 For the
population and economic projections that were
provided in the course of generating emissions
scenarios, the key issue for impacts and adap-
tation was the degree of spatial detail provided.
For consistency among scenarios, and to avoid
base-year discrepancies with national and re-
gional datasets, SRES scenario results were re-
ported only for four large world regions.
Greater regional detail was available from indi-
vidual models, but with inconsistent regional
boundaries.  Providing the greater regional de-
tail desired for impact assessments would gener-
ate discrepancies between the global-model
results represented in scenarios and the more de-
tailed data and projections available at national
and regional levels.91 Developing valid methods
to downscale socio-economic scenario informa-
tion and integrate it with national and regional
datasets remains a key challenge for producing
useful scenarios for impact assessment.92
3.2. THE US NATIONAL
ASSESSMENT  
The US National Assessment was the most
comprehensive attempt to date to assess climate
impacts on the United States over 25-year and
100-year horizons, and to consider both major
sub-national regions and sectors.93 Responding
to a requirement in the 1990 Global Change Re-
search Act, the National Assessment was or-
ganized by federal agencies participating in the
US Global Change Research Program.  Work
began in 1997, with various components com-
pleted between 1999 and 2003.  Regional im-
pacts were initially considered in 20 regional
workshops, followed by more extended analy-
ses of impacts, leading to published assessments
for 12 regions, conducted by university-based
teams.  Sectoral impacts were examined by na-
tional teams focusing on agriculture, water,
human health, coastal areas and marine re-
sources, and forests.  A federal advisory com-
mittee, the National Assessment Synthesis Team
(NAST), provided direction for the assessment
and synthesized its results in two published re-
ports.94 Roughly two thousand experts and
stakeholders participated.
As an assessment focused on climate impacts,
the National Assessment needed both climate
scenarios and scenarios of potential future
socio-economic conditions over the 21st century,
since substantial changes are likely over this pe-
riod in socio-economic conditions that might in-
fluence vulnerability to climate and adaptive
capacity. 
3.2.1. Emission and climate
scenarios 
For climate scenarios, the National Assessment
relied predominantly on data and model results
previously produced. Study teams conducted
additional checking, processing, documenta-
tion, and dissemination as needed to make these
90 See, e.g., discussion with Mike Hulme on behalf of
TGICA, draft minutes of the Washington, DC, meet-
ing, April 29-30, 1998:9.
91 January 1998, meeting with Richard Moss, WG2
Technical Support Unit, described in draft meetings of
the Berkeley meeting, February 7-8, 1997.
92 Pitcher 2005.
93 There had been two previous assessments of US cli-
mate impacts.  The US EPA (1989) did a preliminary
assessment for five representative US regions and five
sectors (agriculture, forests, water resources, health,
and coasts), while the US OTA (1993) examined im-
pacts for six sectors – coasts, water, agriculture, wet-
lands, protected areas, and forests.
94 NAST 2000, 2001.  
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usable.  The assessment encouraged the use of
three types of climate scenarios: historical sce-
narios produced by extrapolating observed
trends or re-imposing historical climate vari-
ability or extremes; an inverse approach using
sensitivity analyses to explore the responses of
climate-sensitive systems, with particular em-
phasis on thresholds defining key vulnerabili-
ties; and climate model simulations of future
climate conditions.95
Of these three approaches, the climate-model
scenarios were the most precisely specified and
the most widely used.  The National Assessment
did not have the resources or time to commis-
sion new climate model runs and so had to rely
on those completed and published when it
began its work.  A set of criteria was developed
by the NAST for the climate model scenarios to
be used in the assessment. Climate-model sce-
narios used in the assessment should, to the
greatest extent possible:96
1. Include comprehensive representations of
the atmosphere, oceans, and land surface,
and key feedbacks among them
2. Simulate the climate from 1900 to 2100,
based on a well-documented emissions scenario
that includes greenhouse gases and aerosols
3. Have the finest practicable spatial and tem-
poral resolution, with grid cells of less than
5˚ latitude x longitude
4. Include the daily cycle of solar radiation, to
allow projections of daily maximum and
minimum temperatures
5. Be able to represent significant aspects of
climate variability such as the El Niño-
Southern Oscillation (ENSO) cycle
6. Be completed in time to be quality-checked
and interpolated to the finer time and spa-
tial scales needed for impact studies
7. Be based on well-documented models par-
ticipating in the IPCC Third Assessment (for
comparability between US and international
efforts)
8. Be able to interface results with higher-res-
olution regional model studies 
9. Provide a comprehensive array of results
openly over the internet.
To ensure timely dissemination, the National
Assessment chose climate-model scenarios to
be used in its analyses in mid-1998. At that
time, only two groups had completed runs that
met most of the key criteria: the UK Hadley
Centre (Model Version 2) and the Canadian
Centre for Climate Modeling and Analysis
(Model Version 1).97 All participating regional
and sector teams were asked to use these sce-
narios.  The climate sensitivity of these models
was 2.5°C (UK Hadley) and 3.6°C (Canadian),
lying in the middle of the 1.7 to 4.2°C range of
sensitivities represented by models participat-
ing in the IPCC Third Assessment.98
These two models were limited in their ability to
reproduce observed patterns of inter-annual and
inter-decadal climate variability.  But other cli-
mate-model runs available at the time failed to
meet essential requirements of the ecosystem
models that were the basis for an important part
of the assessment: availability of documented
results, projections to 2100, standard/compara-
ble emissions scenarios, and explicit treatment
of the day-night cycle.
For these two climate models, model runs using
only one emissions scenario were available, and
only one ensemble run was used for each.99 The
95 NAST 2001:25.  It is arguable whether or not the in-
verse approach involves scenarios by the definition we
have adopted here, because it does not stipulate speci-
fied future climate conditions, but attempts to identify
them from presumed thresholds or breakpoints. How-
ever, we are following the usage of the NAST reports
in calling these approaches three types of scenarios. 
96 NAST 2001:31-32; MacCracken et al. 2001; Mac-
Cracken et al. 2003:1714.
97 Johns et al. 1997; Boer et al. 1999a, 1999b; Mac-
Cracken et al. 2003.
98 Cubasch et al. 2001, Table 9.1:538-540; and Table
9A.1:577.
99 Ensembles of climate-model runs are repeated simu-
lations with small variations in initial conditions which
improve the characterization of climate variability.  The
Canadian group had completed only one ensemble run
at this time.  The Hadley Center had completed three,
but the National Assessment was only able to use one.
Of the three
approaches, the
climate-model
scenarios were the
most precisely
specified and the most
widely used.
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emissions scenario was IS92a, which repre-
sented the middle of the range of IPCC’s 1992
scenarios.100 In addition to greenhouse gases,
the scenario included atmospheric loadings of
sulfate aerosols, which were assumed to in-
crease sharply through 2050 and then level off
for the rest of the 21st century.101
The applicability of these two scenarios was
tested by checking the models’ ability to repli-
cate broad patterns of US climate change over
the 20th century when driven by historical green-
house-gas forcings.  Model results were com-
pared against the VEMAP (Vegetation-
Ecosystem Mapping and Analysis Project)
dataset, a corrected climatic dataset for the 20th
century.  This comparison showed reasonable
accuracy in reproducing the spatial distribution
of average temperatures and century-long tem-
perature trends, but significantly weaker repro-
duction of observed patterns of precipitation,
mainly because the spatial distribution of pre-
cipitation depends on topographic detail that is
too fine-scale to be captured even by the 0.5-
degree VEMAP grid.102
With the specified scenario of future emissions,
the two climate-model scenarios projected
global warming by 2100 of 4.2°C (Canadian)
and 2.6°C (Hadley).103 These projections were
at the high end and in the middle, respectively,
of the range of warming projected for this emis-
sions scenario by models participating in the
IPCC Third Assessment Report.104 For the con-
tinental United States, the two models projected
warming by 2100 of 5.0°C (Canadian) and 2.6°C
(Hadley), at the high end and below the middle,
respectively, of the range of projections in the
IPCC Third Assessment.105 In their projections of
precipitation change over the United States, these
scenarios both lay at the high end – the Hadley
scenario projected the highest precipitation in
2100 and the Canadian the second-highest106 – but
the Canadian model’s greater warming offset the
effect of this precipitation increase on soil mois-
ture, which was projected to decrease over most of
the continental United States.107
Although only the Hadley and Canadian cli-
mate-model scenarios were used throughout the
assessment, several others that met some or all
of the assessment’s needs became available dur-
ing its work.  Several region and sector teams
were able to use these additional scenarios.  In
some cases, the additional scenarios allowed
groups to strengthen their conclusions.  For ex-
ample, an analysis of future Great Lakes water
levels under climate change using eleven cli-
mate models found that ten of these showed
lower levels and only one higher.108 In other
cases, using multiple models allowed more de-
tailed characterization of uncertainties in future
regional changes.  For example, the Pacific
Northwest team presented distributions of re-
gional temperature and precipitation change in
the 2030s and 2090s using seven GCMs.109
Despite the National Assessment’s aim of ex-
ploring future climate using three distinct types
of scenario, historical scenarios and sensitivity
analyses were less extensively used than GCM
scenarios and featured less prominently in the
100 The IS92a scenario is described in section 3.1. There
were small differences among climate-modeling
groups in the way they converted emissions trajecto-
ries into atmospheric concentrations and radiative forc-
ings, making the actual scenarios driving each model
run very close, but not quite identical.
101 See www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/nacc/background/sce-
narios/emissions.html for further detail on emissions
scenarios used in the National Assessment.
102 VEMAP members 1995, Kittel et al. 1995.
103 NAST 2001:36, Table 2.
104 Cubasch et al. 2001, Figure 9.5a:541.  While the
Canadian model lies at the high end, it is not an outlier.
The GFDL model (which was more responsive than
the Canadian model, with a climate sensitivity of 4.2°
C) projected higher global warming than the Canadian
model in this scenario for the first few decades of the
century, but only had results through 2060 in time for
the TAR.
105 The seven models for which these results were avail-
able clustered at the top and the bottom.  Three of them
– the Canadian, GFDL, and Hadley 3 models – lay very
close together at the high end, the Canadian the high-
est by a fraction of a degree; three others lay close to-
gether at the low end, Hadley 2 the highest of them by
somewhat less than a degree.  A seventh model,
ECHAM4, tracked the high group through 2050, the
last year for which its results were available.  Since
these comparisons usually reflect only one ensemble
run of each model, small differences between runs may
reflect consistent inter-model differences, or noise re-
flected in a single ensemble run.  See NAST 2001:547,
Figure 7.
106 NAST 2001:545, Figure 8.
107 NAST 2001:552, Figure 16 and 18.
108 Lofgren et al. 2000; NAST 2001:175.
109 NAST 2001:256.
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assessment’s publications.  Two uses of histori-
cal climate data – describing observed impacts
of climate variability and using observed his-
torical extremes as benchmarks to compare pro-
jected future changes – were made by all
groups.  To support systematic use of historical
scenarios, the VEMAP 20th-century dataset was
provided to all groups, but no further guidance
was provided on how to generate climate sce-
narios from these historical data, e.g., on what
periods to choose or how to use them to assess
potential future impacts.  Several groups used
these historical data to describe the impacts of
particular recognized patterns of climate vari-
ability, such as ENSO or the Pacific Decadal
Oscillation (PDO).110 Many groups examined
past climate extremes, but only in qualitative
ways; most did not follow the approach, taken in
some previous impact studies, of using histori-
cal extreme periods as quantitative proxies for
potential future climate.111
The third approach, vulnerability analysis, was
the least used in the National Assessment.  This
“inverse” approach involves describing the
properties of a climate-sensitive system, speci-
fying some important change or disruption, and
asking what climate changes would be required
to bring about that disruption and how likely –
based on historical data and model calculations
– such climate changes appear to be. Given the
complex dynamics of climate-sensitive systems
and models of these systems, and the multiple
dimensions of climate on which these can 
depend, this approach requires a substantial pro-
gram of new research, analysis, and method-
ological development.112 In part because of the
intrinsic difficulty of this task – and in part due
to management and resource problems – this
approach was not pursued.  The NAST pro-
posed it, but more tractable approaches to 
analyzing climate impacts dominated the as-
sessment’s work.  This remains an important
area for further work in development of assess-
ment and modeling methods.
3.2.2. Socio-economic scenarios 
As discussed in Section 2.5 above, assessing
impacts of future climate change can require
specifying not just scenarios of future climate,
but also socio-economic characteristics of the
future society that will experience the changed
climate.  Specifying future socio-economic con-
ditions might be necessary for two reasons.
First, socio-economic conditions may influence
the demands placed on particular resources that
are also sensitive to climate change, the value
assigned to them, and the non-climatic stresses
imposed on them.  For example, future flow
regimes in river systems will be influenced by
upstream demands for municipal and irrigation
water use, in addition to the changes caused by
climate.  Socio-economic scenarios are also
needed to assess climate-change impacts on
human communities – e.g., economic impacts
and their distribution, human health effects, and
vulnerability to extreme events – because socio-
economic characteristics of a community expe-
riencing a changed climate will strongly
influence the community’s vulnerability to
changes and its capacity to adapt. 
In contrast to climate scenarios, little prior 
information or experience was available on con-
structing scenarios of socio-economic condi-
tions for impact assessment.  Consequently, the
assessment developed new methods, using an
approach that combined centralized and decen-
tralized elements.  Centralization was needed
because a few variables, such as population,
economic growth, and employment, are likely
to be important in all regions and sectors.  For
these, consistent assumptions are required to
allow comparison of impacts across regions and
sectors, and to aggregate from separate assess-
ments up to overall national impacts.  A NAST
sub-group developed high, medium, and low-
growth scenarios of these variables at the na-
tional level.  These followed the US Census
Bureau high, middle, and low scenarios for fer-
tility and mortality through 2030, but assumed
a wider range of values for net immigration to
account for possible illegal immigration.113
Over this period, national population, GDP, and
employment were disaggregated among regions
and sectors using a commercial regional eco-
110 E.g., Mote et al. 2003, Southeast Regional Assess-
ment Team 2002.
111 Rosenberg et al. 1993.
112 For an example of such efforts, see the AIACC (As-
sessments of Impacts and Adaptations to Climate
Change) project, information at http://www.aiaccpro-
ject.org. 113 Parson et al. 2001:102-103.  
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nomic model.114 Beyond 2030, national projec-
tions of these variables followed OECD growth
rates in the SRES marker scenarios.115
Decentralization was also needed because the
particular socio-economic characteristics that
most strongly influence climate impacts and
vulnerability may differ among regions, activi-
ties, and resources.  For example, major socio-
economic determinants of climate impacts on
Great Plains agriculture may include the crops
grown, the extent of irrigation, and the tech-
nologies used to provide it, while the main de-
terminants of coastal-zone impacts may be
patterns of coastal development, zoning, infra-
structure, and local property values.  The NAST
judged that those assessing regional or sector
impacts were likely to know more about such
factors than a central body.  Consequently, to
support decentralized scenario development, the
NAST proposed a consistent template for as-
sessment teams to follow in creating their own
scenarios.  Teams were asked to identify two
socio-economic factors they judged most im-
portant for their impacts of concern; to identify
a range of these factors to represent roughly 90
percent confidence; and to create socio-eco-
nomic scenarios by combining high and low
values of these factors, plus middle or best-
guess values if they so chose.
Implementation of socio-economic scenarios in
the National Assessment was weak.  Few as-
sessment teams used the proposed approach.
Many made no socio-economic projections at
all, but rather projected only biophysical im-
pacts based on GCM results.  One assessment
team found the socio-economic scenarios were
inconsistent with superior local estimates of
current population, and so decided not to use
them.116 The teams that did use the socio-eco-
nomic scenarios used only aggregate projec-
tions of population and economic growth, or in
some cases assumed continuation of present
conditions in the assessment period.  None used
the proposed template for identifying and pro-
jecting additional important socio-economic
characteristics.  
Several factors contributed to this limited use of
socio-economic scenarios.  In addition to vari-
ous managerial and communication problems,
many participants were reluctant to use socio-
economic scenarios, especially the proposed de-
centralized approach.  Some preferred to avoid
any socio-economic projections, implicitly pre-
suming either that socio-economic conditions
did not matter for impacts, or that those that did
matter would remain similar to present condi-
tions.  Others objected to specific contents 
of the scenarios or the methods used to gen-
erate them, or judged that their team lacked 
the expertise required to evaluate them.  Still
others objected that uncertainties in future 
socio-economic conditions made any attempt to
construct scenarios for more than a few years in
the future unacceptably speculative.117 Conse-
quently, while the assessment attempted to ad-
vance scenario methods, weak implementation
of these methods limited its ability to identify
key vulnerabilities.  More useful assessments of
impacts and vulnerability will require more ex-
tensive use of socio-economic scenarios, im-
proved integration of socio-economic with
climatic and environmental scenarios, and sub-
stantial further investment in development and
testing of new methods.118
3.2.3. Criticisms and controversies
The National Assessment was the object of sub-
stantial political and scientific controversy.
Here, we summarize the major criticisms that
pertain to the development and use of scenar-
ios. Criticisms focused predominantly on the
climate scenarios, especially those derived from
GCMs, probably because these were more pre-
cisely defined, widely used in the analyses, and
featured in the assessment’s publications.  Three
criticisms of these were advanced. 
The first, widely circulated during 2000, was
that the use of non-American climate models
for climate scenarios was inappropriate and po-
tentially injurious to national interests.119 While
this criticism indicates a dimension of political
114 Terleckyj 1999a,b.
115 The high-growth scenario was roughly comparable
with A1, medium with B1, and low with A2 and B2.
116 Rosenzweig and Solecki 2001.
117 Morgan et al. 2005. 
118 Lorenzoni et al. 2000, Berkhout and Hertin 2000,
Parson et al. 2003.
119 Congressional Record, June 16, 2001, Statements of
Senators Hagel (page S5292) and Craig (page S5294).
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vulnerability of the assessment, it does not ad-
dress the assessment’s technical quality. Since
climate models represent the physics of the
global atmosphere, they contain no representa-
tion of political or economic factors.  The
Hadley and Canadian global climate models
were extensively documented in peer-reviewed
scientific literature – and, moreover, were the
only models that met the most critical of the as-
sessment’s criteria.  That they were developed
by scientific groups outside the United States
has no significance for their ability to provide
scenarios to assess US impacts.  Using US mod-
els would have avoided this criticism, but at the
cost of either weakening the analysis by using
scenarios that did not meet the assessment’s
needs, or delaying the work by one to two years.
In deciding to proceed with non-US models, as-
sessment organizers judged that these costs
were too high.
The second major criticism was that the two cli-
mate-model scenarios used were at the extreme
end of available models in their projected cli-
mate change.  This is partially correct.  When
temperature and precipitation factors are con-
sidered together (because high precipitation in
some cases may offset the impacts of high tem-
perature), the Canadian scenario lies at the high-
impact end – although not an outlier, as other
IPCC model projections lie close to it – while
the Hadley lies at or somewhat below the mid-
dle for most analyses. 
The National Assessment’s organizers and its
critics agreed that using more models would
have been preferable, but the assessment was
limited by its schedule and its technical re-
quirements.  Given a limit of only two, there can
be good reasons to choose one scenario in the
middle of current projections and one near the
top that provides a plausible upper-bound, but
the significance of the results must then be com-
municated with great care.  Some critics sug-
gested that presentation of results based on the
relatively high Canadian scenario should be
more carefully qualified to highlight its position
near the top of current projections.120 Such
qualifications must be crafted very subtly, how-
ever, lest they imply these results may safely be
ignored, when most analyses suggest the full
range of future climate-change uncertainty ex-
tends both below the Hadley scenario and – in
a long, thin tail – above the Canadian.
A related criticism of the climate scenarios
claimed that the emissions scenario driving
them was implausibly high.  The issues bearing
on choice of emission scenarios are similar to
those for choice of climate models.  It would be
preferable to have a wide and relevant range of
emissions scenarios driving an impact assess-
ment – at least for the post-2050 period.  Using
a wide range of emissions scenarios would also
allow comparison of projected impacts under
high and low emissions futures, and so give in-
sights into what degree of impacts could be
avoided by what degree of mitigation effort.
Model runs with this emissions scenario were
all that were available, however.  Moreover,
there is no clear basis to reject this particular
scenario, since it was the scenario most widely
used in climate-model runs at the time and lies
near the middle of the range of both the 1992
and the 2001 IPCC scenarios.  Finally, there is
no support for the claim that this scenario was
chosen with the aim of making 21st-century cli-
mate change appear as frightening as possi-
ble.121 But, although using just two climate
models with one emissions scenario was un-
avoidable in this assessment, it still represented
a serious limitation.  With more model simula-
tions testing a range of emission scenarios al-
ready available, future assessments will be able
to remedy this deficiency.
In contrast with the preceding criticisms that the
scenarios used in the assessment understated
uncertainty, another criticism focused on the
disparities between the two scenarios’ projec-
tions.  Some critics argued that such disparities
– e.g., the Canadian scenario projects the South-
eastern states becoming much drier than the
Hadley model does – show that our limited
knowledge of regional climate change makes
any attempt to assess future impacts and vul-
nerabilities irresponsible.122 This criticism im-
120 MIT Integrated Assessment project, comments on
National Assessment, Aug 11, 2000:15.
121 Michaels 2003a:171-192.
122 Disparities between the two models’ projections were
the basis of an unsuccessful lawsuit brought against the
Assessment under the Federal Data Quality Act (See
Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Complaint for De-
clarative Relief,” http://www.cei.org/pdf/3595.pdf, at
paragraph 24.)
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plies that impact assessment should wait until
precise, high-confidence regional climate pro-
jections are available. Since a major purpose of
the assessment was to represent current uncer-
tainty about climate change and its impacts,
such discrepancies between model projections
served a valuable purpose, as indications of the
uncertainty of projections at the regional scale –
particularly when the model disparities had a
clear origin, such as differences in projected jet-
stream location. 
In sum, the National Assessment’s use of cli-
mate-change scenarios was hampered by the
lack of available relevant runs, but reflected an
adequate attempt to represent then-understood
variation in climate projections for the United
States. Future assessments will need to use
more climate-model projections – including
multiple ensemble runs – informed by a wider
range of relevant emissions scenarios.  The Na-
tional Assessment attempted to advance the
state of the art in using socio-economic scenar-
ios, but achieved only limited success in imple-
menting its plans. Future assessments will need
to invest substantial resources in developing the
state of underlying knowledge, models, and as-
sessment methods for integrating socio-eco-
nomic considerations into assessments of
climate impacts. This includes further develop-
ment of novel approaches to link climate and
socio-economic scenarios, such as the proposed
“inverse” approach to vulnerability analysis.
The experience of the National Assessment
raises three significant issues for future climate-
change scenario exercises.  First, like several of
the experiences reviewed here, it illustrates the
difficulty and scale of effort involved in pro-
ducing scenario-based assessments.  Second,
the large required start-up effort and time to
build the capacity to conduct such an exercise
illustrates the great value of sustaining analytic
and institutional capacity over time, rather than
relying on separate projects.  Such continuity of
capacity will avoid wasteful repetition of start-
up efforts, support accumulation of learning and
experience, and develop and maintain the re-
quired collaborative networks.  Finally, the as-
sessment’s experience illustrates both the need
for consistency in large-scale assessments, and
the great specificity of information needs within
particular impact and adaptation assessments.
This combination of centralized and decentral-
ized information requirements suggests the
need for a cross-scale organizational structure
for developing and applying scenarios, includ-
ing scenarios of both climate and socio-eco-
nomic conditions.
3.3. THE UK CLIMATE IMPACTS
PROGRAMME
The UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP)
was established in April 1997 as one element of
a broad program of scientific research, assess-
ment, and support for policy-making on climate
change.  The UKCIP supports research and
analysis of impacts for particular regions, sec-
tors, and activities in the UK.  The program pro-
vides common datasets and tools, as well as
ongoing support to university researchers and
organized stakeholder groups in all UK regions.
As part of its role in stimulating, supporting,
and coordinating decentralized and stakeholder-
driven impact analyses, the UKCIP has pro-
duced and disseminated three sets of scenarios:
climate scenarios in 1998 and 2002, and socio-
economic scenarios in 2001. 
The 1998 climate scenarios provided informa-
tion only at the rather coarse scale of the Hadley
Centre’s HadCM2 climate model, with four
grid-cells over the entire UK.  Four scenarios,
called “high,” “medium-high,” “medium-low,”
and “low,” combined variation in emissions as-
sumptions with variation in assumed climate
sensitivity.  The medium-high and medium-low
scenarios both used the HadCM2 model, with a
sensitivity of 2.5°C.123 The medium-high sce-
nario was driven by a 1 percent per year equiv-
alent-CO2 transient scenario, similar to IS92a.
The medium-low scenario was driven by a 0.5
percent per year equivalent-CO2 transient sce-
nario, similar to the lowest IS92 scenario,
IS92d.  The high and low scenarios used the
same two emissions scenarios driving a simpler
climate model, whose sensitivity was set at
4.5°C for the high scenario and 1.5°C for the
low.  These scenarios were used in an initial im-
pact assessment focusing predominantly on di-
rect biophysical impacts.124 The scenarios did
not include any explicit statements of probabil-
123 UKCIP 1998:13-15.
124 UKCIP 2000.
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ity, although their documentation suggested that
the medium-high and medium-low scenarios
“in one sense … may be seen as being equally
likely,”125 while the high and low scenarios cap-
tured part of the tails of the distribution.  Nor
did they include any potential extreme climate
events such as those associated with large
changes in the North Atlantic circulation.
The UKCIP’s socio-economic scenarios drew
on the Foresight Program, a broader exercise of
the UK Department of Trade and Industry to de-
velop scenarios for long-range planning in sev-
eral policy areas, with additional detail in areas
relevant to greenhouse-gas emissions and cli-
mate impacts.126 As in several other scenario
exercises, developers identified two fundamen-
tal uncertainties and combined two alternative
outcomes of each to produce four scenarios.
The two core uncertainties they chose were sim-
ilar to those used in the SRES exercise: social
and political values, which varied from an in-
creased focus on individual consumption and
personal freedom (“consumerism”) to a wide-
spread elevation of concern for the common
good (“community”); and governance, which
varied from authority and power concentrated
at the national level (“autonomy”), to power 
increasingly flowing to global institutions,
downward to local ones, and outward to non-
governmental institutions and civil society 
(“interdependence”).  The two dimensions of
uncertainty, values and governance, were as-
sumed to be independent of each other.  Other
major uncertainties such as demographic
change, the rate and composition of economic
growth, and the rate and direction of technolog-
ical change, were treated largely as conse-
quences of alternative realizations of the two
core dimensions of values and governance.127
The four scenarios built around these two 
dimensions of variation were called “National
Enterprise,” “World Markets,” “Local Steward-
ship,” and “Global Sustainability.”  Each was
initially developed as a qualitative narrative of
future conditions in UK society intended to
apply broadly to both the 2020s and 2050s.
Each scenario specified several dozen socio-
economic characteristics qualitatively, includ-
ing multiple aspects of economic development,
settlement and planning, values and policy, agri-
culture, water, biodiversity, coastal zone devel-
opment, and the built environment.128
Each scenario was also realized in projections
of multiple quantitative variables, at the national
scale only.  For the 2020s, these provided detail
on population, GDP (including the governmen-
tal share and the sector split between industry,
agriculture, and services); household numbers
and average household size; land use and rates
of change; total transport and modal split; agri-
cultural production (including such details as
chemical and financial inputs, subsidies, yields,
and organic area); freshwater supply, demand,
and quality; and several indicators of biodiver-
sity and coastal vulnerability.  For the 2050s a
smaller set of quantitative variables was pro-
jected, describing population, GDP, land use,
and transport.  The plausibility of projections
was checked, mainly by comparing projected
future rates of change to historical experience.
The scenarios were published with a detailed
guidance document, which provided sugges-
tions on how to use them together with climate
scenarios for impact studies.129
As of 2005, the socio-economic scenarios had
been used in six impact studies.130 There has
been some difficulty applying the national-level
scenarios in specific, smaller-scale regions.  
The most ambitious use has been a preliminary 
integrated assessment of climate impacts 
and responses in two regions of England, the
Northwest and East Anglia.131 This study pro-
duced four integrated scenarios of regional 
climate impacts, by pairing each of the four
socio-economic scenarios with one climate sce-
nario based on a rough correspondence between
the socio-economic scenario and the IPCC
emissions scenario underlying the climate sce-
nario132 Based on these four scenarios, the
125 UKCIP 1998:iv.
126 UKCIP 2001.
127 UKCIP, 2001.
128 Berkhout et al. 2001.
129 Berkhout and Hertin 2001. 
130 UKCIP 2005.  
131 Holman et al. 2002.
132 Regional (National) Enterprise was taken as UKCIP
High (IPCC A2); Global Markets as UKCIP Medium-
High (A1B); Regional (Local) Stewardship UKCIP
Medium-Low (B2); and Global Sustainability UKCIP
Low (B1).
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study elaborated preliminary regional scenarios
corresponding to the four national socio-eco-
nomic scenarios, and conducted an assessment
of coastal-zone impacts and responses using
these scenarios and a formal land-use model.
Four new climate scenarios were produced in
2002, based on the SRES marker scenarios and
new versions of Hadley Center climate models.
These new scenarios differed only in their emis-
sions assumptions, not climate sensitivity.  The
high, medium-high, medium-low, and low sce-
narios were driven by the A1FI, A2, B2, and B1
marker scenarios, respectively.  These were used
to drive the HadCM3 global climate model
(with a grid-scale of 250-300 km), generating
climate-change projections for 30-year future
periods centered on the decades of the 2020s,
2050s, and 2080s.  For some emissions scenar-
ios and time periods, climate projections were
processed through a nested hierarchy of three
Hadley Center climate models: the HadCM3
model at global scale, the HadAM3H model at
intermediate scale, with a horizontal resolution
of about 120 km, and the HadRM3 model for
high-resolution climate projections in the
United Kingdom and Europe, with a horizontal
resolution of about 50 km.  This nested pro-
cessing was done for the baseline period (1960-
1990), and for the most distant projection period
(2070-2100) to produce three ensemble runs for
the medium-high (A2) emissions scenario and
one for the medium-low (B2).  For the other
emissions scenarios and the intervening projec-
tion periods, results of the global-scale model
were downscaled using statistical patterns of
fine spatial-scale climate variation derived from
full runs using scenario A2.  These scenarios
were widely distributed and supported through
a web-based interface, including map-based
graphical display of projected changes in more
than a dozen climate indicators on a fine-scale
(50 km) grid of the United Kingdom.
Several analyses are continuing to use the 2002
climate scenarios in conjunction with the socio-
economic scenarios.  For example, a 2004 inte-
grated analysis of flood risk and erosion control
over a 30-100 year time horizon produced a
threat assessment, a set of scenarios of flood
risk, and a set of policy recommendations.  An
evaluation of this study’s effects one year later
found that it was being used by several public
and private actors to inform decision-making.133
The UKCIP, in contrast to the US National As-
sessment, has built a sustained assessment ca-
pability.  In addition, the central program has
less authority over the separate assessments, in-
stead acting more as motivator, resource, and
light coordinator.  Access to scenarios is to li-
censed users, of whom there are about 130 –
roughly half in universities, the rest about
equally split among private sector and all levels
of government.  Most active users have been na-
tional officials responsible for climate-sensitive
resources, with less participation from the pri-
vate sector and local governments.134
The program has invested in generating, dis-
seminating, and documenting useful climate
scenarios for impacts users.  The jury appears
to still be out on whether the level of effort and
success is similar for socio-economic scenarios,
which have not yet been either downscaled or
repeated.  Getting scenarios used is a slow
process, but the scenarios produced by this pro-
gram are starting to be used by decision-makers
in support of their practical responsibilities.  A
significant limitation of the program, however,
is its exclusive reliance on just one family 
of climate models.  This may pose risks of
under-estimating future climate uncertainty and 
over-confidence in assessments of potential cli-
mate impacts and responses.  Although the UK 
program followed a substantially different or-
ganizational model from the US National As-
sessment, its experience highlights some of the
same issues for future scenario exercises, in par-
ticular the importance of continuity of institu-
tional and analytic capacity and the desirability
of developing and supporting scenarios using
an organizational structure that combines cen-
tralized and decentralized elements.
133 UK Office of Science and Technology 2002.
134 West and Gawith 2005.
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3.4.  THE MILLENNIUM
ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA)
was a large, United Nations (UN)-sponsored as-
sessment of the current status, present trends,
and longer-term challenges to the world’s
ecosystems, including climate change and other
sources of stress.  Conducted between 2001 and
2005, the MEA sought to assess changes in
ecosystems in terms of the services they provide
to people and the effects of ecosystem change
on human well-being.  It also sought to identify
and assess methods to mitigate and respond to
ecosystem change, for various private and pub-
lic-sector decision-makers, including those re-
sponsible for the several international treaties
that deal with ecosystems.135 More than 1350
authors from 95 countries participated in the
global assessment’s four working groups, and
hundreds more in about 30 associated sub-
global assessments.  The assessment’s goals
were broad, ranging from providing a bench-
mark for future assessments and guiding future
research to identifying priorities for action.136
Results of the global assessment were presented
in a March 2005 synthesis report, and in addi-
tional volumes presenting the output of the as-
sessment’s four working groups, “Current State
and Trends,” “Scenarios,” “Policy Responses,”
and “Multi-Scale Assessments.”  The current
state and trends group examined ecosystem
trends over the past 50 years and projections to
2015; the scenarios group took a longer view to
2050 and beyond.  Because of time limitations,
the work of these two groups proceeded 
largely independently.
All components of the assessment used a com-
mon large-scale conceptual framework, which
distinguished indirect drivers of ecosystem
change, direct drivers, ecosystem indicators,
ecosystem services, measures of human well-
being, and response options.  Direct drivers in-
cluded direct human perturbations of the
environment such as climate change, air pollu-
tion, land-use and land-cover change, resource
consumption, and external inputs to ecosystems
such as irrigation and synthetic fertilizer use.
Indirect drivers included underlying socio-eco-
nomic factors such as population, economic
growth, technological change, policies, atti-
tudes, and lifestyles.137
The scenarios working group sought to apply
this conceptual framework to long-term trends
in ecosystems, looking ahead to 2050 with more
limited projections to 2100.  They developed the
structure of the scenarios in an iterative process,
including consultations with potential scenario
users and experts in a wide range of decision-
making positions around the world.138 Like sev-
eral other major scenario exercises, they initially
sought to identify two basic dimensions of un-
certainty in long-term ecosystem stresses,
which together would produce four scenarios.139
For the first dimension, like SRES they chose
globalization: continuation and acceleration of
present global integration trends, versus reversal
of these trends to increasing separation and iso-
lation of nations and regions.  For the second di-
mension, in contrast to the broad value-based
uncertainties used in the SRES and UKCIP sce-
narios, they chose one more specifically related
to ecosystems:  whether responses to increasing
ecosystem stresses are predominantly reactive
– waiting until evidence of deterioration and
loss of services is clear – or predominantly
proactive, taking protective measures in ad-
vance of their clear need.  The combination of
two polar values of each of these uncertainties
yielded four scenarios, summarized in Table 3.2.
The Global Orchestration (global, reactive) sce-
nario presented a globally integrated world with
low population growth, high economic growth,
and strong efforts to reduce poverty and invest
in public goods such as education.  In this sce-
nario, society focuses on liberal economic val-
ues, follows an energy-intensive lifestyle with
no explicit greenhouse-gas mitigation policy,
135 E.g., the Convention on Biological Diversity, the
Convention to Combat Desertification, the Convention
on Migratory Species, and the Ramsar Convention on
Wetlands.
136 MEA 2006:xii.
137 MEA 2006:153 (Table 6.1) and 304 (Table 9.2).
138 MEA 2006:152.
139 MEA 2006, Figure 5.2.
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and takes a reactive approach to ecosystem
problems.140 In Order from Strength (regional,
reactive) the reactive approach to ecosystem
problems takes place in a fragmented world pre-
occupied with security and less attentive to pub-
lic goods.141 This scenario exhibits the highest
population growth and lowest economic growth.
Economic growth is particularly low in the de-
veloping countries, and it decreases over time.
In Adapting Mosaic (regional, proactive), polit-
ical and economic activity are concentrated at
the regional ecosystem scale.  Societies invest
heavily in protection and management of
ecosystems in locally organized and diverse ef-
forts.  Population growth is nearly as high as in
Order from Strength, and economic growth is
initially slow but increases after 2020.  Finally,
TechnoGarden (global, proactive) presents a
world that is both focused on ecosystem man-
agement and globally connected, with strong
development of environmentally friendly tech-
nology.  Population growth is moderate, and eco-
nomic growth is relatively high and increasing.142
Each scenario was initially constructed as a
qualitative description.  Population and GDP
were specified quantitatively, while all other in-
direct drivers – including social, political, and
cultural factors – were qualitative. Population
scenarios were derived from the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis’
(IIASA’s) 2001 probabilistic projections, cap-
turing the middle 50-60 percent of the distribu-
tion, with world population in 2050 ranging
from 8.1 billion (Global Orchestration) to 9.6
billion (Order from Strength).143 No statements
of probability or likelihood were made about the
scenarios.
From the indirect drivers, a more specific and
quantified set of direct drivers was developed,
using formal models where possible.  Species
introduction and removal was the only unquan-
tified direct driver.144 Separate pre-existing mod-
els were used of the world energy-economy,
greenhouse-gas emissions and climate change,
air pollution, land-use change, freshwater, ter-
restrial ecosystems, biodiversity, and marine
and freshwater fisheries.  To the extent possi-
ble, these quantitative models were used to rea-
son from indirect and direct drivers to
ecosystem effects, changes in ecosystem serv-
ices, and effects on human well-being.145 In
some cases this was achieved by soft-linking
models, using outputs from one as inputs to an-
other, but this was limited by different variable
definitions, spatial and temporal resolution, and
other model incompatibilities.146 Not all sce-
nario elements could be modeled quantitatively,
so expert judgments were also extensively used.
The qualitative scenario process proceeded in
parallel with quantitative modeling – elaborat-
ing aspects of the scenarios that were not
amenable to modeling, filling gaps, and stipu-
lating feedbacks between ecosystem services
and human well-being and behavior.147
ECOSYSTEM 
MANAGEMENT
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Global Regional
Reactive Global Orchestration Order from Strength 
Proactive TechnoGarden Adapting Mosaic 
Table 3.2.
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Scenarios
140 MEA 2006, Ch 5.5.1
141 This scenario was originally named “Fortress World”
(report of first meeting of MEA global modeling
group, Jan 7, 2003).  The later name reflected partici-
pants’ judgments that in such a decentralized world
preoccupied with security concerns, maintaining global
order would require democratic nations to be militarily
strong – i.e., it is a world of “realist” international af-
fairs (MEA 2006:133)
142 MEA 2006:131. 
143 MEA 2006:182.
144 MEA 2006:304, Table 9.2.
145 MEA 2006, Table S3. 
146 MEA 2005, Table S2.
147 MEA 2006:155.
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The groups attempted to check for consistency
between quantitative and qualitative scenario el-
ements through periodic consultations,
particularly for feedbacks that could not be
modeled analytically.  Some of these were 
interactions between direct drivers and ecosys-
tems, but the most difficult occurred in scenar-
ios that assumed strong socio-economic
feedbacks and regulating mechanisms.  Adapt-
ing Mosaic, for example, assumed strong feed-
backs from new ecosystem observations and
knowledge to changes in human behavior that
could not be incorporated into the models used.
Representing these required allowing qualita-
tive scenario logic to override both the quanti-
tative results and the structure of models.
Unfortunately, time limits prevented this con-
sistency checking from being done thoroughly,
so unexamined disparities between qualitative
and quantitative aspects of the scenarios re-
mained a significant weakness.
Many of the conclusions developed from the
scenarios are common to all four scenarios,
while in others Order from Strength is the ex-
ception.  For example, one major conclusion is
that rapid conversion of ecosystems for use in
agriculture, cities, and infrastructure will con-
tinue, and that habitat loss will continue to 
contribute to biodiversity loss.  However, if
ecosystem services increase as projected, some
ecosystem services – although not biodiversity
– may be decoupled from ecosystem stresses.
Food security is projected to remain out of
reach for many people.  Extreme, spatially 
diverse changes are projected for freshwater re-
sources, with general deterioration in developing
countries under both “reactive” scenarios.  In-
creasing demands for fishery products are pro-
jected to increase risks of regional marine fishery
collapses.148 In sum, ecosystem services show
mixes of improving and worsening trends in all
scenarios except Order from Strength, in which
nearly all ecosystem services are projected to be
more impaired in 2050 than in 2000.  The same
three scenarios also suggest that significant
changes in policies, institutions, and practices
can mitigate some negative consequences.149
In sum, the MEA scenarios project invested
substantially more effort in developing rich
qualitative and narrative scenarios than the
SRES, but also fell short on integrating quali-
tative and quantitative components.  In part be-
cause of the greater elaboration of the
qualitative components, this limited coordina-
tion resulted in significant inconsistencies and
requirements to resolve conflicts between the
two components.  These inconsistencies arose
even with just one model used for several com-
ponents of the assessment, so the challenges of
harmonization among models – and the associ-
ated possibility to explore model-structure un-
certainty – did not arise.  A related problem was
that for many factors it was difficult to generate
the desired level of variation between scenar-
ios.150 This raises issues of potential method-
ological interest, such as how to distinguish
robust results from inadvertent convergence of
assumptions or model structures, which remain
to be investigated.  Finally, the great breadth of
conditions represented in the scenarios, as well
as possible concerns with logical circularity 
between their presumptions and results,151
make interpreting the significance of the 
results difficult.
The experience of this scenario exercise pro-
vides a different perspective on some of the
same key challenges for future scenarios high-
lighted by the other activities reviewed.  The
quite distinct difficulties faced here in attempt-
ing to combine quantitative and qualitative sce-
narios highlight the central importance and the
difficulty of developing new methods to inte-
grate these two approaches.  In addition, this ex-
perience highlights the value of clarity about the
intended uses of scenarios, including clarity
about whether they are intended to address spe-
cific questions, guide decisions, or explore long-
term conditions.  The risk of scenarios becoming
148 MEA 2006, Table S3.
149 MEA 2006:127.
150 Report of the First Meeting of the MEA Global Mod-
eling Group, 7 Jan 2003, at www.usf.uni-kassel.de/ma-
gmgroup/dl/first_report.doc; Second Report of the
MEA Global Modeling Group, 7 March 2003, avail-
able at www.usf.uni-kassel.de/ma-gmgroup/dl/sanjose
_report.doc.
151 This concern is particularly present regarding impli-
cations of the assumption that ecosystem management
is either proactive or reactive (See, e.g., MEA 2006, Ch
8.4.2.1 and Ch 9).
152 NAST 2001.
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less useful due to breadth and vagueness may be
particularly acute for scenarios that attempt to
capture multiple stresses on some system – even
though such multi-stress assessment is repeatedly
advocated for climate-change and other forms of
environmental assessment.152
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This section discusses several issues that have arisen in multiple scenario exercises related to cli-
mate change, issues that pose challenges for expanding the usefulness of scenarios to climate
change analysis, assessment, and decision support.  Section 4.1 examines the type of information
needs of specific types of decisions related to climate change and considers the requirements and
challenges of crafting scenarios to serve these needs.  Section 4.2 considers the use of scenarios
that has been more common thus far, in structuring climate-change assessments and framing
broad policy debates, and identifies the distinct challenges in enhancing the value of scenarios in
these purposes.   The remaining sub-sections examine particular design challenges in crafting sce-
nario exercises: how to structure interactions between experts and stakeholders in developing
scenarios; how to communicate scenarios to potential users not involved in their creation; how
to pursue the two, not perfectly aligned goals of consistency and integration in scenarios; and
how to represent and interpret uncertainty in scenarios. Throughout this section, we present il-
lustrative examples of scenario activities in text boxes. These examples shed additional light on
various challenges, especially relating to scenarios’ use in decision-making.
4.1. SCENARIOS AND DECISIONS
As discussed in Section 1, the general purpose of scenarios is to inform decisions, but their con-
nection to specific, identified decisions can be more or less close and direct.  In interpreting and
evaluating present experience with scenarios and identifying key challenges in making them more
useful, it is important to distinguish scenario exercises by their major characteristics, including
their specificity, their proximity to decisions, the degree of normative presumptions embedded in
them, and where they lie in the causal chain outlined in Section 2.  To consider how scenarios can
help inform climate-change decisions, we must first specify the relevant decisions and decision-
makers more sharply.  This section considers the major concrete decisions that comprise a response
to climate change.  Decisions related to assessment, modeling, and research are considered in Sec-
tion 4.2.  This discussion must be somewhat hypothetical, extending from rather thin current prac-
tice to reasonable speculation about future decisions and likely information needs.
Because the dynamics of climate change operate on multiple spatial scales from the local to the
global, there is no single global climate-change decision-maker.  Rather, many distinct decision-
makers with diverse responsibilities will affect and be affected by climate change.  Because of cli-
mate’s recent appearance on policy agendas and its dense connections to other issues, many of
these decision-makers’ primary responsibilities are defined as something other than climate change.
Some of them are already considering how climate change might affect their responsibilities, but
many are not.  
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Section 2 described climate-change decisions
using the conventional dichotomy of mitigation
versus adaptation.  To consider potential contri-
butions of scenarios in more detail, we discuss
three types of decision-maker:  national officials,
impacts and adaptation managers, and energy
resource and technology managers.  These can
often be identified as particular programs, divi-
sions, agencies, organizations, or individuals,
each with different responsibilities and types of
information they might consider in making their
decisions.  All three groups face decisions under
uncertainty with long-term consequences related
to climate change, and so might benefit from sce-
narios providing structured information and as-
sumptions about the values at stake, the available
choices, and their consequences under alterna-
tive climate-change futures.  
National officials’ responsibilities are the broad-
est and the most likely to be explicitly related to
climate change.  They develop national policies
that target greenhouse-gas emissions and moti-
vate investment in technologies that will influ-
ence future emissions trends.  They negotiate
policies internationally with officials from other
nations, and with sub-national officials who
may share mitigation responsibilities or under-
take mitigation measures at their own initiative.
They also have responsibilities to anticipate and
respond to climate-change impacts in their na-
tions.  Their climate-change responsibilities are
open-ended, not limited to mitigation and
adaptation: these decision-makes will deter-
mine the extent to which other responses such
as geoengineering are considered, and the de-
sign of systems and institutions for assess-
ment.  They are also responsible for overall 
national welfare, including not just the environ-
mental effects of their decisions but also other
linked national interests such as economic pros-
perity and security. 
Impacts and adaptation managers have respon-
sibility for particular assets, resources, or inter-
ests that might be sensitive to climate change.
They must decide how to anticipate, prepare for,
and respond to the threat, minimize its harm,
and maximize any associated benefit.   They
may be private or public actors – e.g., owners 
or managers of long-lived assets such as ports
or water-management facilities; managers of
lands, forests, or protected areas; emergency
preparedness or public health officials; officials
making zoning or coastal development policy;
or firms in insurance or financial markets who
may bear secondary risks from impacts or seek
to develop new instruments to exchange these
risks.  Unlike national officials, these actors’ 
decisions are purely responses to climate
change, realized or anticipated: they have little
influence over how the climate will change.
Their responsibilities will often connect with
the impacts-related responsibilities of national 
officials, but are narrower in scale or scope.  Im-
pacts and adaptation managers would be con-
cerned not with aggregate climate-change
impacts on the United States, but with more
specific impacts such as those on seasonal flows
and water-management operations on the 
Upper Mississippi.
Energy resource and technology managers in-
clude developers and operators of fossil or non-
fossil energy resources, investors in long-lived
energy-dependent capital stock such as electri-
cal utilities, and researchers, innovators, and in-
vestors in new energy-related technologies.
These decision-makers are mostly but not ex-
clusively in the private sector.  Their decisions
may have consequences that interact with vari-
ous processes operating over multiple time-
scales, from short-term market responses, to
decadal-scale processes of investment, resource
development and depletion, and penetration of
new technologies, to century-scale processes of
climate change.153 These actors’ decisions will
strongly influence society’s ability to control
greenhouse-gas emissions. This group also in-
cludes energy consumers such as firms or pub-
lic agencies considering mitigation actions in their
own operations.  While their areas of responsibil-
ity may be vulnerable to climate change and its
impacts, the largest climate-related risks for this
group are likely to come not from climate
change itself, but from climate-change policies:
national mitigation policies, and other market
and regulatory decisions that shape the outcomes
of private mitigation activities.
At greatly varying levels of precision and speci-
ficity, scenarios can present two types of infor-
mation to support decisions by these three types
153 Shell International 2001, Davis 2003. 
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of actors.  Scenarios can represent potential fu-
ture developments that may threaten decision-
makers’ interests or values, call for decisions,
or challenge conventional thinking and prac-
tices.  And they can provide a structure to as-
sess potential consequences of alternative
decisions for things that matter to the decision-
maker.  Beyond this generalization, the three
types of decision-makers will differ substan-
tially in the specific types of information they
need, the time horizons of their decisions, and
the type and extent of causal connections be-
tween their decisions and the conditions
specified in scenarios.
4.1.1. Scenario needs: 
national officials 
As national officials have the broadest respon-
sibilities related to climate change, they are also
likely to have the broadest information needs.
In their responsibilities to build national adap-
tation capacity and manage key vulnerabilities,
their needs are similar to those of impacts and
adaptation managers: scenarios of potential fu-
ture climate change under specified emissions
assumptions and resultant impacts on particular
resources and communities in their nation, with
particular focus on areas of greatest vulnerabil-
ity.  They will likely have less need for fine spa-
tial and sectoral detail in potential impacts, but
more need for consistent scenarios that allow
comparison and aggregation across sub-national
regions and sectors.  These will help to priori-
tize, identify key areas of vulnerability, and es-
timate aggregate costs for planning purposes.
In their responsibilities for national mitigation
policy, national decision-makers will also need
information about the aggregate impacts of 
climate change, since the more severe climate
impacts are likely to be, the greater the justifi-
cation and likely political support for mitigation
measures.  But mitigation decisions also require
additional information – including projections
of future emissions in the absence of explicit
mitigation efforts, and the consequences of alter-
native mitigation policies, in their effects on emis-
sions, their cost, and their implications for other
dimensions of national interest. 
These needs introduce a dimension of com-
plexity into mitigation scenarios, sometimes
called “reflexivity.”  Because mitigation policies
seek to reduce future emissions by altering the
socio-economic drivers of emissions growth,
the analysis of mitigation policies and their con-
sequences must be coupled to the causal logic of
emissions scenarios.  Whereas climate scenarios
can be treated as exogenous when assessing
adaptation decisions, emissions scenarios can-
not be treated as exogenous in assessing miti-
gation decisions.  Any emissions scenario
embeds some assumptions about mitigation
policies, assumptions that may have to be
changed to assess particular mitigation policies.
This effect will be strongest when emissions
projections and mitigation options are being
considered at the same spatial scale, e.g., na-
tional mitigation policies are being assessed rel-
ative to national emissions projections.  The
effect of national mitigation strategies on global
emissions will be weaker: no nation controls
global emissions trends, and the effects of small
nations’ mitigation strategies on global trends
can be very small.
Scenarios to inform mitigation decisions are
also likely to require considering alternative as-
sumptions about the policy context in which
these decisions are made.  The effects of na-
tional mitigation strategies – including how
much they reduce national emissions, as well as
their costs and other consequences – will de-
pend on the economic, technological, and policy
context, including related decisions by other
major nations, individually and through inter-
national coordination.  Assumptions about the
policy context will be less important in scenar-
ios to inform international mitigation decisions,
since when decisions are globally coordinated
there is no “elsewhere” – but alternative as-
sumptions about nations’ degrees of compliance
and form of implementation of international
commitments may still be needed.
Scenarios of emissions, climate change, and im-
pacts inform mitigation decisions by helping to
characterize the potential severity of climate
change and therefore how important it is to con-
trol emissions.  This support is indirect, serving
primarily to elevate or moderate the general
level of concern on the issue.  More focused
work on mitigation has been done using con-
Any emissions scenario
embeds some
assumptions about
mitigation policies,
assumptions that may
have to be changed to
assess particular
mitigation policies.
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structed scenarios of limited emissions, often
aiming at stabilizing atmospheric concentrations
or radiative forcing at various levels, and exam-
ining the configurations of technology, energy re-
sources, and economic and population growth
that are consistent with the specified scenario.
Some studies have used quantitative models to
estimate costs of such scenarios, relative to an as-
sumed baseline emissions scenario.154
4.1.2. Scenario needs: impacts and
adaptation managers
To assess the threats and opportunities they face
and evaluate responses, impacts and adaptation
managers need scenarios of potential future cli-
mate change, its impacts in their areas of re-
sponsibility, and the factors that influence
vulnerabilities.  With few exceptions, these ac-
tors’ decisions will have no effect on the climate
change to which they must respond, so scenar-
ios of climate-change stresses can be con-
structed independently of the assessment of
potential adaptation decisions, without concern
for feedbacks that may modify the conditions
specified in the scenario.
Particular decision-makers’ needs will be highly
specific in the variables they require, and their
time and spatial scale and resolution.  A planner
of water-management infrastructure may need
monthly or finer-scale rain and snow projec-
tions over a watershed; a designer of coastal in-
frastructure may need probabilistic projections
of sea level, storm intensity and frequency,
storm surge, or saltwater intrusion.  But in their
climatic elements, these information needs all
rest on a common core of scenarios of global
climate change and emissions drivers.  This dual
structure of information  – highly particular cli-
mate variables, based on a set of common “core
scenarios” – suggests a cross-scale organiza-
tional structure for providing scenario infor-
mation: commonly produced scenarios of
climate change and other components requir-
ing consistency, specialized expertise, or high-
cost resources; development of decentralized
capabilities in impact assessments to adapt these
core scenario elements and develop assessment-
specific extensions; and close communication
between these groups to ensure that useful vari-
ables are generated and saved, and that data and
documentation are transferred accurately.
This is the area of climate-related decisions for
which the provision of information from cli-
mate-change scenarios is most advanced.  Still,
further progress is needed in the development
and use of scenarios of socio-economic condi-
tions, and in creation of methods and tools 
to augment centrally provided scenario infor-
mation with information tailored to specific 
impact assessments.  In addition, many impacts-
related decisions will require scenarios of cli-
mate change in the context of other linked
stresses and changes. 
4.1.3. Scenario needs: energy
resource and technology managers
Energy and technology managers will most ben-
efit from scenarios that explore alternative pol-
icy regimes and their consequences for the
value of energy and technology assets and in-
vestments.  For some, the predominant concern
may be overall policy stringency, perhaps sum-
marized as alternative emissions-price trajecto-
ries over time; for others, specific details of
policy design and implementation may need to
be considered.  Scenarios of emissions, climate
change, and impacts only matter for decisions
via their likely influence on policy stringency,
and so do not need to be explicitly represented
in scenarios.  These actors may have some in-
fluence on policy, but probably not such strong
influence that climate-policy scenarios would
have to incorporate feedbacks from their own
advocacy efforts.
Unlike the other two types of decision-makers,
these actors are likely to compete with each
other.  If, for example, they are investors allo-
cating research effort between higher and lower-
emitting energy sources, those who better
anticipate future policy will benefit relative to
those who do worse.  If they use scenarios, they
may consequently choose to produce them pri-
vately, perhaps coupled with other analyses to
generate practical guidelines for investments.155
As for the other types of decision-makers, these
specialized scenarios could be based on general
scenarios of global emissions and climate
154 Morita et al. 2001, CCSP 2007. 
155 Ged Davis, personal communication. (posted expert
review comments).
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change.  Published scenarios produced to date
on the climate-change issue, however, have not
considered mitigation policies with the speci-
ficity necessary to inform these actors’ decisions.
4.1.4. Representing decisions 
in scenarios
A major challenge to developing scenarios to
support decisions is reflexivity, that is, how to
represent decisions within scenarios without
making scenarios either circular or contradic-
tory.  In meeting this challenge, the most basic
distinction to draw is between decisions by the
scenario’s targeted users and decisions by other
actors.  From the users’ perspective, decisions
by others over which they have no influence are
indistinguishable from non-choice events.  If the
factors influencing these decisions are confi-
dently understood, they might be represented
deterministically, like well-understood biophys-
ical or economic processes.  In the more fre-
quent case that others’ choices cannot be
confidently predicted, they might be represented
as uncertainties – again, just like uncertain bio-
physical or economic processes.  As with all un-
certainties, how to treat them depends on their
judged importance for the users’ decisions: if it
is high, they can be represented in alternative
scenarios; if not, they can be fixed at some best-
guess value for all scenarios.  In either case,
these decisions are treated exogenously.
Representing decisions by the scenario users is
fundamentally different.  Since the scenarios are
intended to inform these decisions, alternative
choices should not be represented as exogenous
uncertainties but be stipulated independently
from the scenarios.  Users can then explore their
implications under conditions imposed by sce-
narios, including representation of major un-
certainties.  Various degrees of coupling can be
required between the logic of scenarios and the
analysis of consequences of the users’ decisions.
In scenarios for impacts, these can usually be
separate; in scenarios for mitigation, they may
have to be closely coupled, since emissions sce-
narios may change under alternative assump-
tions about mitigation decisions.
In scenarios to inform global climate-change
decisions, the sharpest question is how to rep-
resent mitigation decisions within scenarios.
Following the general reasoning above, how
these are treated should depend on what type of
decision is being informed.  In climate scenar-
ios to inform impact assessments and related
decisions, the scenario users are not consider-
ing mitigation decisions and have little influ-
ence over them, so emissions scenarios should
include assumptions about the likely or plausi-
ble range of mitigation efforts.  The range of fu-
ture climate change considered may thus be
narrowed to reflect the possibility of negative
social and political feedbacks:  sustained rapid
emissions growth may generate pressure for ag-
gressive mitigation, due to increasing signs of
climate change, alarming projections of future
change, or other environmental harms from
rapid expansion of coal or synthetic fuels.  
Such a negative-feedback mechanism may not
be effective, of course.  Many factors could in-
tervene: mitigation measures may not gain
enough support to be adopted, socio-political
capacity to enact stringent policies may be di-
minished, policies adopted may be ineffective,
or early technology or policy decisions may
lock in high-emitting future paths.  But to the
extent that such a negative-feedback mechanism
does operate, persistence of the highest emis-
sions paths beyond a few decades would be-
come unlikely.  
Parallel reasoning may apply to extremely low
emission paths, if sustaining such low emissions
requires continued costly mitigation efforts that
come to be seen as unnecessary.  This negative-
feedback mechanism would likely be weaker
than that operating at the high end of the emis-
sions distribution, however, because long time-
constants mean that increasing signs of climate
change are likely to continue through most of
the 21st century even if we follow a low-emis-
sions path.  If impacts assessors and managers
judge these negative feedbacks to make extreme
emissions paths sufficiently unlikely, particu-
larly high ones, they may reasonably decide not
to consider these extreme emissions futures in
their planning for adaptation.
For scenarios to inform mitigation decisions,
particularly at the international level, the situa-
tion is different.  Informing these choices re-
quires information about potential emissions
paths and their consequences under all levels of
In climate scenarios to
inform impact
assessments and
related decisions …
emissions scenarios
should include
assumptions about the
likely or plausible
range of mitigation
efforts.
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mitigation effort that decision-makers might
plausibly consider – including no additional
measures, or even reversal of previous measures
if this is on the agenda.  Consequently, in con-
trast to scenarios for impacts, extreme emis-
sions futures should not be excluded when
assessing mitigation decisions.  For example, if
scenarios that truncate high-emissions futures
by assuming stringent mitigation are used to
support a decision that stringent mitigation is
not necessary, the result is contradictory: a con-
clusion supporting a decision is based on the
presumption of the contrary decision.  To avoid
such contradictions, scenarios to inform miti-
gation decisions must consider alternative mit-
igation choices explicitly, not embed them
implicitly in the underlying logic of the scenario.
Moreover, national officials act only for their
own nations in the near term, even when they
negotiate global mitigation.  They may make
choices for long-term planning and institutional
design for future mitigation as well, but it is
their successors who will decide whether to
continue, strengthen, or otherwise change meas-
ures adopted today.  From the perspective of
current national officials, mitigation decisions
by other nations and in the future fall between
the two cases discussed above: they are not con-
trolled by the scenario user, but can be influ-
enced to some degree.  For policy choices by
other nations, national officials may need to be
advised in two modes, reflecting their dual re-
sponsibilities to make national policy and to ne-
gotiate international agreements.  In the latter
capacity, alternative approaches to global miti-
gation strategy should be represented as
choices.  But when they consider national deci-
sions separate from globally coordinated strat-
egy, relevant decisions of other major nations
should be represented as uncertainties.  This
may require use of two distinct types of scenar-
ios to advise development of different aspects
of national mitigation policy.
How to represent future mitigation decisions
poses a still harder dilemma.  On the one hand,
it appears risky or even irresponsible to assume
that the bulk of mitigation efforts can be left to
future decision-makers, even if we assume this
will be easier for them because of greater wealth
or technological prowess.  On the other hand,
assuming that future decision-makers cannot be
relied on to act responsibly at all can easily lead
to decisions that incur excessive costs, by try-
ing to achieve rapid mitigation immediately or
tie future decision-makers’ hands.  
Two approaches appear promising for integrat-
ing future mitigation decisions into scenarios to
inform current decisions.  Scenarios could pre-
sume that today’s decision-makers choose the
future path of mitigation, allowing them to as-
sess and contribute to a trajectory of effort that
considers the welfare of both current and future
citizens.  Alternatively, scenarios could treat fu-
ture large-scale mitigation choices as uncer-
tainties represented in alternative scenarios,
while also considering how current choices can
seek to influence the opportunities and incen-
tives faced by future decision-makers.  
In sum, the importance of connecting scenarios
to actual decisions is widely recognized, but
there is a large gap between, on the one hand,
the value scenarios could provide to climate-
change decisions and the aspirations of scenario
producers to provide that value, and current
practice on the other hand.  There has been lit-
tle use of scenarios to directly inform climate-
change related decisions, although there appears
to be a sharp increase in the interest of decision-
makers and early attempts.  The rapid increase
in interest is particularly evident for informing
decisions related to climate-change impacts and
adaptation.  There are fewer indications of sim-
ilarly direct use of scenarios to inform mitigation
decisions, perhaps in part because nearly all cur-
rent mitigation decisions have been near-term.
Mitigation decisions at the national and inter-
national level have taken scenarios into account
indirectly.  Most scenarios have been con-
structed to provide inputs to assessments, mod-
els, or other analyses.  This has included serving
as inputs to the production of other types of sce-
narios, which then describe other potential fu-
ture conditions that depend on those specified
in the scenario, as for example a model-based
climate scenario depends on inputs from an
emissions scenario.  While these uses can be
characterized as supporting decisions (i.e., de-
cisions about assessments, modeling, and re-
search), their connection to concrete decisions
of mitigation and adaptation is indirect,
achieved through contributions such as sup-
…in contrast to
scenarios for impacts,
extreme emissions
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underlying logic of the
scenario.
156 Rosenzweig and Solecki 2001; Kinney et al. 2005,
2006; Rosenzweig and Major 2006.
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porting strategic planning and risk assessment,
providing advance analysis for potential future
decisions, exploring plausible extreme cases,
helping to characterize and prioritize key un-
certainties, or educating decision-makers or the
public.  This description applies to the major
scenario exercises discussed in this report, in-
cluding the IPCC emissions and climate sce-
narios, the US and UK assessments of climate
impacts, and the MEA scenarios. 
Three linked activities – the Metropolitan East Coast (MEC) assessment of the US National As-
sessment, the New York Climate and Health project (NYCHP), and the New York City Department
of Environmental Protection (NYCDEP) Task Force on Climate Change – have used or are using
scenarios to assess impacts of climate change on the New York Metropolitan Region, identify areas
of vulnerability, and inform regional planning and decision-making.156
The MEC assessment began with a regional workshop in April 1998, involving about 150 participants,
including public agencies at all levels of government as well as climate researchers.  The subsequent
assessment was conducted by sector teams of researchers and officials from agencies responsible
for the study sectors.  Teams developed regional scenarios of climate change and sea level rise based
on the downscaled climate-model scenarios provided by the US National Assessment, plus two ad-
ditional scenarios based on extrapolation of recent regional climate trends and historical extremes.
The scenarios were used to project climate-change impacts on beach nourishment, 100 and 500-
year flood heights, wetland aggregation and loss, adequacy of the water supply system under
droughts and floods, illnesses from acute air-pollution episodes, and peak energy loads.  These im-
pact projections were used for preliminary assessment of adaptation strategies and policies.
Following the MEC Assessment, the NYCHP created updated regional climate scenarios in consul-
tation with an expert-stakeholder Advisory Board.  This study further analyzed public health impacts,
focusing on air quality and extreme heat events.  The updated climate scenarios used the IPCC A2
and B2 emissions scenarios driving global and regional climate models to create downscaled sce-
narios for the region.  These were augmented with newly developed scenarios of future regional land
use and population growth based on the IPCC A2 and B2 storylines. 
In response to the widespread public attention received by the MEC Assessment Report, the Com-
missioner of the NYCDEP established the Climate Change Task Force, a collaboration among re-
gional researchers and the agency that manages the water system.  The Task Force uses the latest
climate-model simulations from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, as well as additional global and
regional climate models, to develop new regional scenarios.  These will include probability distribu-
tions of average and extreme temperature and precipitation change, as well as sea level rise.  The
Task Force is also developing qualitative scenarios of extreme sea level rise in the region.  DEP is
using these results to develop a comprehensive adaptation strategy for the New York City water
system, including assessment of many specific adaptation options, that considers both uncertainties
in future climate change and managerial factors such as the time horizon of different adaptation re-
sponses and capital turnover cycles.  
This is a successful example of scenario-based assessment of climate impacts and adaptation options.
The scenarios are connected with the concrete responsibilities and concerns of stakeholders, who
were involved in their design from the outset.  Although officials have found the wide range of un-
certainty in climate scenarios difficult to incorporate into infrastructure design specifications, par-
ticularly for precipitation, the exercise has effectively conveyed the challenges posed by future
climate uncertainty to current decisions of planning and infrastructure design.  Stakeholders’ will-
ingness to support and participate in three separate phases of these activities and NYCDEP’s in-
corporation of them into a strategic planning exercise provides clear evidence of the practical utility
of the exercises.
BOX 4.1.  Scenarios for Climate-Change Adaptation 
in the New York Metropolitan Region
157 Gosselink 1984, Williams et al. 1999, Burkett et al.
2005, Morton et al. 2002.
158 Shinkle and Dokka 2004, Barras et al. 2003.
159 US Army Corps of Engineers 2004.
160 See, e.g., http://www.clear.lsu.edu/clear/web-content
/index.html.
161 Presentation by Randy Hanchey, Louisiana Depart-
ment of Natural Resources, to Governor’s Advisory
Commission on  Coastal Protection, Restoration and
Conservation, Baton Rouge, LA, June 22, 2006.  
162 Cook 1939, Doyle et al. 2003.
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Sea-level rise is one of several factors that contributed to the decline of coastal ecosystems along the US Gulf
of Mexico coast in the 20th century (Figure 4.1).157 In southeastern Louisiana, where the local rate of land sur-
face subsidence is as high as 2.5 cm per year, rise in local “relative sea level” may be the most important fac-
tor in the rapid loss of coastal zone wetlands over the past several decades.158
Despite the importance of sea level rise in historical losses of coastal lands, planning projections of future
changes in coastal Louisiana used by both federal and state agencies prior to the devastating impact of Hurri-
canes Katrina and Rita in 2005 were based on just one scenario: no change in the rate of sea level rise.  No al-
ternative sea level scenario was considered in the plans then being developed to restore and protect the
Louisiana coastal zone.159 This assumption sharply contrasts with the IPCC projections, which state that the
global average rate of sea level rise in the 21st century may increase 2- to 4-fold over that of the 20th.  Such in-
creases will exacerbate wetland losses throughout the Gulf Coast region and obstruct restoration plans that
do not take account of likely increases in water levels and salinity.  
The ecosystem modeling team working for the State of Louisiana and the US Army Corps of Engineers is
presently integrating accelerated sea level rise scenarios into planning exercises that will aid federal and state
agencies in evaluating restoration alternatives.160 The State of Louisiana is consulting with the Rand Corpora-
tion to obtain probability estimates for various scenarios of sea level change to help guide engineering deci-
sions and the design of projects aimed at restoring levees and coastal landforms that protect coastal
communities.161 Sea level rise scenarios are also being used to assess the impacts of climate change and vari-
ability on the Gulf Coast transportation sector.  To assess transportation impacts, a sea level rise simulation
model developed by the US Geological Survey generates scenarios of sea level change using over a dozen
GCMs and six SRES emission scenarios. 
Sea level rise scenarios are important not just in regions like Louisiana.  The Big Bend region of the Florida pan-
handle is experiencing very little vertical movement of the land surface, so sea level there has been rising at
approximately the global average rate of 1 to 2 mm per year.  But even here, coastal wetlands positioned on
flat limestone surfaces may be subject to highly nonlinear effects as sea level reaches a threshold at which large
areas are subject to increased salinity or inundation.162
Regional scenarios of potential sea level rise are needed to support coastal management and protection ac-
tivities, as well as plans for wetland restoration and post-hurricane reconstruction.  Absent consideration of
such scenarios, restoration and rebuilding programs are likely to lock in errors that result in wasted resources and
avoidable increases in future vulnerability.
BOX 4.2.  Scenarios of Sea Level Rise along the Gulf Coast
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Figure 4.1.  Output from a Gulf Coast
sea level rise scenario tool
Historical sea level change and projected sea level
rise under three greenhouse-gas emissions
scenarios, in meters, are shown for Galveston,
Texas. Both historical data and future projections
are smoothed from monthly data using a 
12-month moving average. (Source:  Thomas W.
Doyle, National Wetlands Research Center, United
States Geological Survey.)
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4.2. SCENARIOS IN
ASSESSMENTS AND POLICY
DEBATES
Within large-scale assessments of climate
change or other environmental issues, scenarios
can serve several roles.  Most straightforwardly,
they can provide required inputs to other parts
of the analysis, as the IPCC emissions scenarios
support the controlled comparison of climate-
model runs.  They can also serve as devices to
organize and coordinate the multiple compo-
nents of a large-scale assessment, particularly
when much of the assessment is forward-look-
ing.  In the IPCC assessments, for example,
emissions scenarios have not just been used to
drive coordinated climate-model projections,
but have also increasingly been followed
through to coordinate characterization of cli-
mate impacts and adaptation opportunities, and
used in a more preliminary way to organize as-
sessments of the economic and technological
implications of alternative mitigation strategies.
Similarly, the US National Assessment and UK
Climate Impacts Programme have both at-
tempted to identify a small set of climate and
socio-economic scenarios, to coordinate and
gain comparability across multiple studies and
allow aggregate assessment of impacts and vul-
nerabilities at the national level.
In a broad assessment including many teams
considering separate questions of climate-
change, impacts, mitigation, and adaptation,
simple coordinating devices are needed to make
teams’ work comparable and allow synthesis to
produce aggregate conclusions.  Emissions sce-
narios are natural devices to provide such coor-
dination, both because emissions hold the
clearest near-term opportunities for interven-
tion, and because they have clear and recog-
nized connections both directions in the causal
chain, to every aspect of the climate-change
issue.  However, in part due to management is-
sues, these efforts to use scenarios as broad co-
ordinating devices have not been wholly
The California Department of Water Resources (DWR) produces an updated Califor-
nia Water Plan every five years.  The plan projects water supplies and demands, and eval-
uates current and proposed demand-management programs and supply investments, to
“provide a framework for water managers, legislators, and the public to consider options
and make decisions regarding California’s water future.”163
In contrast to prior plans that constructed only one future scenario, the 2005 plan ex-
plicitly considered uncertainty in supply and demand projections.  Three alternative sce-
narios of supply and demand conditions were constructed through 2030: one extending
current trends in population and economic growth, agricultural production, environ-
mental restrictions on water use, and water conservation occurring without policy ini-
tiatives (e.g., through equipment replacement, technological change, and revised building
codes); and two presenting higher and lower increases in demands.  The report of the
2005 plan discusses global climate change and the potential challenges it poses to water
supply and demand in California, but climate change is not explicitly represented in the
plan’s three scenarios. 
In addition to adopting these scenarios, the State of California is developing data and an-
alytic capacity to enrich the treatment of uncertainty and climate change in future plans.
In parallel with development of the three principal scenarios in this plan update, DWR
sponsored development of several analytic tools to strengthen the treatment of uncer-
tainty in future plans.  In addition, the California Climate Change Research Center with
co-sponsorship from DWR is developing fine-scale regional climate-model scenarios to
support analysis of climate-change impacts on water resources.164 The DWR plans to
incorporate these climate-change scenarios explicitly in the next plan update in 2010.
BOX 4.1.3.  Scenarios in the California Water Plan
163 California Water Plan home page, http://www.water-
plan.water.ca.gov. 164 California DWR 2005:4-32. 
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satisfactory in practice.  To serve as coordinat-
ing devices, scenarios must be developed and
disseminated early in the process, preferably be-
fore the work of assessment teams even begins.
Moreover, they must be documented with de-
tailed information about the process and rea-
soning used to generate them, including explicit
identification of underlying assumptions and
supporting data, models, and arguments.  In
practice, timely, detailed, and transparent dis-
semination of scenario information has rarely
been achieved. 
Scenarios used in large-scale assessments can
also make other contributions that are related to
the prominent dissemination a major assess-
ment receives.  They may, for example, be used
as inputs to planning or decision-support
processes that were not part of the original as-
sessment.  In such use, they may gain a more di-
rect connection to decision-making than they
had in their original production or use.  Scenar-
ios of global emissions and the model-based cli-
mate scenarios based on them especially lend
themselves to such derivative uses, informing
many different decisions by diverse actors.  
Scenarios in prominent assessments can also
contribute to the framing of public and policy
debates.  In this role, scenarios inevitably be-
come political objects, in two senses.  They are
subject to political forces that seek to influence
their development, and political reactions to
them once developed.  These pressures pose
challenges and risks that differ quite markedly
from those that apply in using scenarios to in-
form decision-making, where we tend to as-
sume a greater degree of commonality of
knowledge, perspective, and interest in the
process among participants and some group of
relatively well-defined users. 
Within scenario exercises, various actors may
seek to bias scenarios’ content to help advance
their policy preferences or their broader politi-
cal objectives, by limiting consideration to fu-
tures they judge desirable or showing some
problem in an acute state that would appear to
demand a response.  While it is not possible to
eliminate biases in scenarios, unacknowledged
normative biases in scenarios can pose the risk
of excluding consideration of futures that are
judged undesirable or that pose sharp decision-
making challenges.  Such biases can be difficult
both to detect and to correct.  Beyond exhorting
developers to scrutinize scenarios critically to
avoid bias, the best protection against such biases
lies in transparency about the assumptions and
information underlying scenarios and associated
judgments of likelihood.
Other political pressures come onto scenarios in
the broader use, debate, and criticism that they
encounter after release.  For impartial support
of policy decisions, scenarios should fairly pres-
ent knowledge and uncertainty about potential
variation on important dimensions.  This typi-
cally requires consideration of a wide range of
potential futures – often a wider range than rel-
evant decision-makers might initially think
plausible, due to well-known habits of conven-
tional thinking and excessive confidence. 
Sometimes a scenario’s implications for deci-
sions may be obvious.  For example, a scenario
might represent developments so severe that
most people would judge it to demand inter-
vention. Another might represent developments
that most people would judge inconsequential
or beneficial, so not meriting any intervention.
A wide-ranging set of scenarios may include ex-
amples of both such extremes.  Consequently,
such a wide range of potential futures in a set
of scenarios – even if this is faithful representa-
tion of present knowledge and uncertainty –
provides opportunity for partisan distortion and
efforts to make scenarios policy-prescriptive.
In global change scenarios, conflicts and op-
portunities for bias arise most acutely over
emissions scenarios.  Since much of the uncer-
tainty about climate change beyond 2050 comes
from uncertainty in future emissions trends, ac-
tors with strong policy preferences can highlight
emissions scenarios that lend support to their
views.  Those who advocate aggressive mitiga-
tion may highlight the highest-emissions sce-
narios to emphasize the elevated risk of 
climate change that would follow. Those who
oppose mitigation may highlight the lowest-
Scenarios inevitably
become political
objects, in two senses.
They are subject to
political forces that
seek to influence their
development, and
political reactions to
them once developed.
61
Global-Change Scenarios - Their Development and Use
emission scenarios to suggest that no action to
limit emissions is warranted.  Because scenarios
are used when knowledge of causal processes is
weak, it is easy to make any scenario appear
salient and likely, even if it is extreme.  It is
equally easy to probe inside the details of any
scenario to find inconsistent or implausible im-
plications, particularly when a scenario is rich in
detail.
But, although political actors may have legiti-
mate reasons to highlight one extreme scenario,
it is not appropriate for any scenario to domi-
nate assessment or consideration of decisions.
A claim that only a single scenario is plausible
– especially one near the top or bottom of the
present range – is a claim to predict the future,
which can be readily dismissed.  Claims that a
particular scenario is implausible cannot be so
easily dismissed, however, since scenarios rep-
resent only the imperfect judgment of the team
that produced them.  Leaving aside scenarios
that violate clear principles of science (e.g., one
whose energy assumptions violate the laws of
thermodynamics) or economics (e.g., one that
presumes a large new capital stock in a few
decades without the investments needed to cre-
ate it), it is possible to construct pictures of the
next century so extreme or unprecedented that
most observers would agree they do not merit
serious consideration.  But short of such an ex-
treme – which describes no global-change sce-
nario discussed here or known to us – claims
that a broad class of potential futures is implau-
sible should have to pass a high hurdle.  Identi-
fying specific extreme or implausible elements
within a scenario does not suffice to make this
case, since virtually any scenario will be found
to contain these if scrutinized closely enough.
Nor does identifying ways that a scenario of fu-
ture change diverges from some established
trend or pattern, since established trends can
and do change.
Historical studies of forecasting exercises such
as energy forecasts have repeatedly found them
too confident that the future will extend recent
trends.165 The threshold any single scenario
must pass is to appear sufficiently plausible or
instructive to merit consideration in planning
and analysis, and this is a judgment to be made
by developers and users – with enough trans-
parency about underlying assumptions and rea-
soning that users can make an informed
judgment.  A  set of scenarios should be con-
structed so that the range of conditions they rep-
resent encompasses present knowledge and
relevant uncertainties that might influence
mitigation or adaptation decisions.  Since
subjective judgments cannot be avoided in
constructing scenarios, the range provided
should err on the side of being broad rather than
narrow, at least initially.  Identifying problems
with one scenario does not necessarily impugn
the credibility even of that one scenario, cer-
tainly not the whole set, because scenarios can-
not be consistent in every underlying detail.
In subsequent revisions as knowledge advances,
scenarios can continue to play their role coordi-
nating assessments and framing policy debates
with more focus and less arbitrariness.  Contin-
uing research and analysis might come to
identify some scenarios as severe in their con-
sequences and others as inconsequential, or
might revise the initial characterization of the
determinants and feasibility of particular sce-
narios, including suggesting that some are too
unlikely to merit serious consideration.  These
judgments can feed into decisions about con-
tinuing analysis of scenarios: which ones can be
dropped and what new ones should be added.
One major basis for updates in scenarios will be
policies adopted, which can set a baseline to
focus further deliberations.  Perfect attainment
of targets and success of policies should not be
assumed, but scenarios can focus subsequent
debate by posing such questions as “What if we
just meet this target; what if we fall short by this
much; and what if we exceed it by this much, or
adopt these additional measures?” 
A claim that only a
single scenario is
plausible – especially
one near the top or
bottom of the present
range – is a claim to
predict the future,
which can be 
readily dismissed.
165 Smil 2005, Greenberger et al. 1983.
166 This example is drawn from Parson 2003.
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Emission scenarios of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other ozone-depleting chemicals
substantially influenced policy debates over control of these chemicals to protect the
ozone layer.  Until the early 1980s, these policy debates used a convention to project
ozone losses that originally served as a simplifying research assumption: constant emis-
sions forever.  This convention has obvious research benefits, like the simple doubled-
CO2 equilibrium scenarios used in climate models.  It standardized input assumptions,
allowing exploration of scientific and modeling uncertainties without the confounding ef-
fect of different emissions assumptions.  Moreover, this convention made no claim to re-
alism, and so avoided distracting arguments over whether one emissions projection or
another was more realistic.  Nevertheless, the resultant calculations were frequently
mistaken for projections of realistic future trends.
The question of what future emissions trends were likely only became prominent in
policy debates around 1983.  World CFC production had dropped nearly a third in the
late 1970s due to both regulatory and market-driven reductions in their largest use,
aerosol spray propellants, and declined further in the early 1980s recession.  It was
widely argued that further restrictions were unnecessary—CFCs’ major markets were
saturated and further growth was highly unlikely.  The resumption of sharp growth in
1983 undermined this claim, making it clear for the first time that managing the ozone
risk required considering scenarios of CFC growth as well as steady-state and decline.
How much emissions might grow and what that would mean for the atmosphere re-
mained highly controversial, however.
Emissions of other chemicals complicated the picture.  Advances in stratospheric chem-
istry showed that future ozone loss depended not just on CFCs, but also on emissions
of several other gases, including carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide.  But the
knowledge and computing capacity to credibly model interactions among all these pol-
lutants only began to appear in the early 1980s.  In 1984, a major scientific assessment
conducted the first standardized comparison of multiple stratospheric models using a
few simple scenarios of emissions trends for CFCs and other chemicals.  This exercise
had the striking result that under a wide range of trends in other emissions, constant
CFC emissions would lead to only very small ozone losses, while CFC growth above
about 1 percent per year would lead to large losses. 
This result, together with resumed growth in CFC production, had a powerful effect in
breaking the deadlock in international negotiations that had persisted since the mid-
1970s.  Although not the only factor that mattered, this result was crucial in persuading
long-standing opponents of CFC controls to accept limits on their future growth.  This
decisively shifted the agenda for the subsequent negotiations that in 1987 yielded agree-
ment on the Montreal Protocol, which cut CFCs by 50 percent. 
In this debate, scenarios used in model-based projections of ozone loss identified di-
vergent trends in future risk that were robust to a wide range of assumptions about
trends in other emissions over which there was disagreement.  By parsing projected fu-
tures into high-risk and low-risk cases, scenarios served to coordinate and simplify a
policy debate and so help to focus an agenda for collective decision-making.
BOX 4.4.  Scenarios of Ozone Depletion in International Policy-making166
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The insurance and reinsurance industries face large financial risks from climate change.
These are present in many business lines, but the clearest risk is in insurance for prop-
erty damage from weather-related events, especially windstorms and floods. 
In the past two decades, weather-related insurance losses have increased rapidly.  By
some estimates losses have doubled, even controlling for population and insured value
– a much faster increase than that in losses from non-weather events.  Climate change
is likely to increase insurance risks in multiple ways, increasing the frequency and sever-
ity of loss events and also their correlation.  Historically based pricing, which is often re-
quired by regulations or market conditions, can compound insurers’ vulnerability by
preventing them from anticipating and adapting to a changed risk environment.
Insurance companies do not use scenarios of future climate change in pricing decisions,
because property and casualty contracts are written for short periods, usually one year.
Since 1992’s Hurricane Andrew, these have mostly been priced using historically based
Catastrophic Event Risk Models (Cat models).  These estimate losses using a simulated
distribution of storm conditions based on historical experience, together with estimates
of the durability of insured property.  While future climate change poses no risk for
these short-term pricing decisions, insurers are concerned that climate change may al-
ready have invalidated the historical distributions on which these models are based, by
increasing either the probability of severe events or the correlation among them.
Two published exercises have used climate-change scenarios to explore longer-term
risks to the insurance industry.  The first, conducted for the Association of British In-
surers in June 2005, examined potential impacts of climate change on the costs of ex-
treme weather events (both insured and total economic costs) under the six SRES
marker scenarios, as well as IS92a and CO2 stabilization at 550 ppm.  The analysis 
calculated changes in losses due to US hurricanes, Japanese typhoons, and European
windstorms.
The second scenario exercise, conducted by Harvard Medical School researchers with
sponsorship by Swiss Re and the United Nations Development Program, used two sce-
narios of 21st-century climate change to examine potential impacts on human and
ecosystem health, and associated economic costs, not limited to the insurance industry.
The two climate scenarios both assumed CO2 doubling by approximately mid-century,
one with continued incremental climate changes and one with hypothesized nonlinear
impacts and abrupt events.  The exercise examined potential changes in infectious and
water-borne diseases, asthma, agricultural productivity, marine ecosystems, freshwater
availability, and natural disasters (including heat waves and floods).  The analysis was based
primarily on qualitative judgments.
The first scenario showed increased property losses and business interruptions relative
to recent trends, emergence of new types of health-related losses, and increasing diffi-
culty in underwriting.  The second scenario was qualitatively similar but more severe, with
substantial increases in both average losses and variability leading to large premium in-
creases and withdrawal of insurers from many markets, particularly along coastlines. As
many insurance firms succumbed to mounting losses, those remaining established strict
limits on coverage, shifting more exposure back to individuals and businesses.
Neither of these exercises was connected to any specific, near-term business decision
faced by insurance companies.  Both could serve longer-term decision-making, however,
including planning for reserve accumulation, providing supporting analysis for advocat-
ing mitigation and adaptation policies, and supporting changed regulations to allow more
flexible pricing of risks experiencing long-term increases.  Such exercises can also serve
to inform firms’ long-term risk-avoidance strategies, including decisions to exit certain
areas of business.
BOX4.2.2.  Climate-Change Scenarios for the Insurance Industry
168 www.nwcouncil.org/energy/powerplan/plan.
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In conjunction with the US National Assessment, researchers at the University of Wash-
ington studied climate impacts on the Columbia River system, which is the primary
source of energy and irrigation water for the Northwest and one of the most intensively
managed river systems in the world.167 The project examined the response of annual and
seasonal flows both to existing patterns of climate variability – the El Niño Southern Os-
cillation (ENSO) and the Pacific Decodal Oscillation (PDO) – and to projected 21st cen-
tury climate change. 
The study projected climate change through 2050 using eight climate models driven by
one emissions scenario (1 percent per year CO2 concentration increase), which on av-
erage projected 2.3°C regional warming by the 2040s with precipitation increases of 10
percent in winter and a few percent in summer.  In the Columbia, these changes are
projected to increase flows in winter (because there is more winter precipitation and
more of it falls as rain) and to decrease flows in summer (because there is less snow-
pack and it melts earlier in the spring).  The impact of summer decreases is likely to be
substantially more serious than that of winter increases.  Because the Columbia is a
snowmelt-dominated system, winter flows could double or even triple and remain below
the present spring peak.
Assessing the impacts of these flow changes requires assumptions about water demands
and system management.  The study used a reservoir operations model that calculated
the combined effects of flow changes and alternative system-operation rules on the re-
liability of different water-management objectives, such as electrical generation, flood
control, irrigation supply, and preserving flows for salmon.  Under historical climate vari-
ability, all objectives can achieve high reliability in high-flow years (i.e., in the cool phase
of ENSO or PDO), but conflict between them occurs in low-flow (warm) years, when
only one top-priority objective can be maintained at or near 100 percent reliability and
other uses suffer substantial risks of shortfall.  Different operating rules distribute this
risk among uses.  
Under the projected climate and flows of the 2040s, this model showed a pattern of
competition between uses similar but additional to what already prevails in low-flow
years, suggesting increases in already sharp conflict among uses over flow allocations.
One objective could be maintained near full reliability, but other uses suffered reliability
losses up to 10 percent from the changed climate, in addition to effects of continued cli-
mate variability.  
In this analysis, scenarios helped to illustrate interactions between management decisions
and climate change and variability, and to explore opportunities and limits for adaptation
through management changes alone, with no change in infrastructure or larger-scale
policies.  This analysis has not been incorporated into any operational decisions, but has
been integrated into the Fifth Conservation Plan issued by the Northwest Power and
Conservation Council.168 More detailed assessment of climate-change impacts would re-
quire extending this analysis to include projected changes in water demands, both
through direct climate effects and through scenarios of regional economic and popula-
tion growth, allowing a more realistic assessment of potential effects of new water-man-
agement investments and changes in large-scale policies to alter water demand, balance
competing uses, or improve coordination among the multiple organizations involved in
managing the river system.
BOX 4.6.  Scenarios of Climate Impacts in the Columbia River Basin
167 Mote et al. 2003, Payne et al. 2004.
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4.3.  THE PROCESS OF
DEVELOPING SCENARIOS:
EXPERT-STAKEHOLDER
INTERACTIONS 
Scenario exercises are collaborative activities
that need to be managed.  As Section 1 dis-
cussed, managing a scenario exercise includes
deciding who participates, what jobs they are
assigned and how these jobs fit together, how
disagreements are resolved, and how much time
and money are dedicated to the exercise.  These
matters can be decisive for the success of an ex-
ercise. For some of them, the nature of chal-
lenges and tradeoffs they pose are fairly
obvious.  For example, scenario exercises need
enough time to build a team, research scenario
components, consult with users, and dissemi-
nate results, but often too little time is available,
so various compromises must be made.  Adding
participants expands the expertise and the range
of views represented, but increases the time
needed for team building and internal commu-
nication.  Delegating parts of the exercise to
smaller groups can overcome this tradeoff, but
can introduce coordination problems and in-
consistencies among groups.  Accepting exter-
nal direction on scenario exercises increases the
chance that decision-makers will take the sce-
narios seriously, but also increases the risk that
they are seen as biased or simply reflect con-
ventional wisdom.  These issues pose various
challenges, but the challenges are not unique to
scenario exercises.
The more central process problems for scenar-
ios concern the relationship between experts
and stakeholders in the design, creation, evalu-
ation, and application of scenarios.  There has
been substantial experience and research in
processes for involving stakeholders in envi-
ronmental decisions, in the United States and
other regions.169 In the most well-established
areas of scenario use – e.g., strategic planning
for corporations or other organizations, and mil-
itary and security planning – it is widely under-
stood that there should be close, intensive
collaboration between developers and users in
the production, revision, and application of sce-
narios.  While high-level decision-makers are
not usually involved in the detailed work of sce-
nario construction, they or their surrogates may
be intensively involved in problem definition,
identification and elaboration of key uncertain-
ties, large-scale scenario design, evaluation and
criticism of scenario outputs, and deliberation
over lessons and implications.  Their level of in-
volvement must be high for results to be useful,
particularly if a major purpose of the exercise
is to challenge decision-makers’ assumptions
and promote creative thinking.
In these areas, scenarios typically serve a clearly
identified, relatively small and homogeneous set
of users who have some degree of agreement on
what values they are trying to advance, what is-
sues are relevant, and what choices are feasible,
acceptable, and within their power and author-
ity.  This is most clearly the case when scenar-
ios are developed for a single organization, but
also applies to scenario exercises for larger
groups that are sufficiently homogeneous in
their interests and perspectives, e.g., scenarios
for property and casualty insurers, for organized
labor in the United States, or for European en-
vironmental groups.  In such context, the prob-
lems of deciding participation are likely to be
manageable.
Intensive user involvement has also been advo-
cated in developing scenarios for climate
change.  This is obviously correct when climate-
change scenario exercises serve specific, clearly
identified user groups.  The strongest examples
are scenarios to support narrowly targeted as-
sessments of impacts and adaptation in particu-
lar industries, resources, or regions, e.g.,
scenarios for coastal managers considering the
establishment or revision of setback lines for
coastal-zone construction as sea level rises,170
for rangeland managers considering the pur-
chase of conservation lands or easements for the
purpose of providing migration corridors, or for
insurance and reinsurance firms examining the
nature of climate-change risks they may face
and potential responses.  In such cases, inten-
sive participation of users is relatively easy to
achieve and provides access to valuable expert-
ise and assurance of practical utility.  
169 Chess and Purcell 1999; Gregory and McDaniels
2005; Holling 1978; NRC 1996, 2005; Renn et al.
1995. 170 McLean et al. 2001.
Managing a scenario
exercise includes
deciding who
participates, what jobs
they are assigned and
how these jobs fit
together, how
disagreements are
resolved, and how
much time and money
are devoted to the
exercise. These matters
can be decisive for the
success of an exercise.
171 CCSP 2003:112.
172 See, e.g., Envision Sustainability Tools 1999, Roth-
man et al. 2003, Stockholm Environment Institute
1999.
66
The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Section 4 - Challenges and Controversies in Scenarios for Climate Change
But climate-change scenarios typically serve
larger and more diverse sets of users and stake-
holders.  This is especially true for scenarios
produced in large-scale, official assessments
such as the IPCC or US National Assessment.
Climate-change stakeholders – defined by the
CCSP as “individuals or groups whose interests
(financial, cultural, value-based, or other) are
affected by climate variability, climate change,
or options for adapting to or mitigating these
phenomena”171 – are an enormous group, di-
verse in their interests and responsibilities.
Even when the set of all potential users is nu-
merous and diverse, there may be some types of
users who are clearly identified – e.g., climate
modelers who need input from emissions sce-
narios or impact assessors who need input from
climate-change scenarios – and who have highly
specific scenario needs, including such prosaic
factors as data format and resolution.  Close
consultation with such users is clearly impor-
tant, especially when their desires exceed what
scenario developers can confidently provide,
e.g., when climate modelers need emissions
data at fine spatial resolution and for specific
gases or aerosols, which are not readily avail-
able from the energy-economic models used for
emissions scenarios.  These situations call for
particularly close and sustained consultation, so
the two sides can understand each other’s needs
and capabilities in enough detail to develop
workable resolutions.
Other users, however, may be numerous, diverse
in their disciplinary foundations, methods, and
tools, and not clearly identified.  Their infor-
mation needs may have some commonalities
but substantial differences.  They may even have
points of conflicting interest in the construction
and use of scenarios.  The general case for
stakeholder involvement remains strong with
such diverse users, especially in the initial de-
sign of a scenario exercise, and in the evalua-
tion and refinement of scenarios for relevance,
practicality, and utility.  In principle, the re-
quired approach is to involve a reasonably di-
verse and representative group of users and
stakeholders, as well as an appropriate range of
disciplinary and modeling experts, while keep-
ing the size of the scenario team manageable.
But the judgments about participation and rep-
resentation needed to carry out this approach in
any particular scenario exercise will be complex
and challenging.
Can a scenario process be completely open?  In
political settings, some insulation from users
may be needed to insure consistency across par-
ticipating models and analyses.  Whatever ap-
proach to stakeholder participation is adopted,
numbers must be kept manageable.  Despite re-
cent progress in scenario methods allowing a
substantial increase in the number of partici-
pants, there are still practical limits.  Although
requirements for expertise external to the core
scenario team increase with scenario complex-
ity, a scenario process is unlikely to work with
a hundred people in the room.  A few scenario
processes have engaged much larger numbers
of participants, but these have greatly reduced
the complexity of the scenario-creation process
by limiting it to specifying inputs to a single in-
teractive model, or have involved large numbers
of participants in independent, parallel sessions
interacting with a computer-based model or sce-
nario construction system.172 These tensions be-
tween representational realism, participation,
and managerial feasibility pose challenges for
design of processes of representation and con-
sultation in scenario development, on which fur-
ther progress is needed.
Climate-change
stakeholders are an
enormous group,
diverse in their
interests and
responsibilities.
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4.4. COMMUNICATION 
OF SCENARIOS
Scenarios related to climate change must be
communicated to multiple audiences, with di-
verse interests and information needs.  Involv-
ing users in scenario development can aid
subsequent communication in various ways –
e.g., by ensuring that scenarios are understand-
able and practically oriented, and helping to dis-
seminating scenarios to their constituencies.
But, in all likelihood, most users to whom sce-
narios must be communicated did not partici-
pate directly in scenario development.  
Although specific needs will vary from case to
case, any communication of scenario-based in-
formation to a large, diverse public audience is
likely to require a few common elements.  First,
in addition to the scenarios’ content, informa-
tion should be provided about the process and
reasoning by which the scenarios were devel-
oped.  This allows users and stakeholders to un-
Two programs, one in the United States and one in Europe, developed scenarios in
integrated-assessment models of acid rain to inform policy decisions over sulfur emissions.  Among
many other differences, the two programs differed strongly in their approaches to involving stake-
holders and in their effectiveness at informing decision-making. 
The US National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP) was created in 1980 as a 10-year
program to study all aspects of acid deposition: emissions, transport and deposition, impacts, and
control strategies.173 Managed by a committee of six government agencies and supported by a full-
time staff office, the program involved roughly 2,000 researchers.174 Although charged to conduct
both scientific research and assessment, NAPAP strongly emphasized research.  Its assessment re-
port was opaque on the origin and interpretation of its scenarios, and did not use the scenarios to
integrate across the issue or examine implications of alternative policies.    Overall, NAPAP is re-
garded as having succeeded as a research program, but fallen critically short in providing useful in-
formation for decision-making.175
An alternative approach to acid-rain assessment was taken in Europe as part of the policy debates
under the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP).  The core of this as-
sessment was a cooperative program to monitor and model acid emissions, transport, deposition,
and impacts.  In contrast to NAPAP, this program focused more on assessment than research, being
specifically established to inform the policy process.176 Scientific models of components of the 
acid-rain issue were chosen to contribute to a simplified integration of the problem; scenarios of
emissions and controls were chosen in consultation with officials, in an attempt to replicate the
policy alternatives under consideration.
The culmination of this pursuit of simple, accessible, and policy-relevant analyses was the RAINS
model, developed at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria.  As
a result of its flexibility, ease of use, and relevance to policies under consideration, the RAINS model
was used extensively by policy-makers in the negotiation of sulfur-control agreements under the
Convention, and had substantial influence over the controls adopted.177
The contrast in approach and outcome between these two programs suggests the potential value
of close interaction between experts and stakeholders in producing scenarios, at least when the
stakeholders are relatively expert officials responsible for a specific set of decisions. In the European
case, such close interaction helped to ensure the credibility of baseline emissions scenarios and the
relevance of proposed control scenarios, despite the diverse and sometimes contending interests
of the participating officials.  The contrast between the two programs also suggests that there can
be significant tradeoffs between scientific and assessment objectives in programs that seek to inte-
grate the two activities.
BOX 4.7.  Scenarios in Acid-Rain Assessments:  Two Approaches 
173 NAPAP 1982, Herrick 2002.
174 Herrick 2002.
175 Roberts 1991, Cowling 1992, Russell 1992, Miller
1990, Perhac 1991, Rubin 1991.
176 Gough et al. 1998.
177 Levy 1995.
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derstand and critique scenarios, and to deter-
mine their own levels of confidence. Second,
scenario developers should identify the uncer-
tainties considered. A particularly important
distinction to communicate clearly is between
scientific uncertainty and scenario uncertainty,
including explicit statements of when and how
scenarios change (e.g., the reduced SO2 projec-
tions in the IPCC SRES scenarios), and clear
explanations of the effects of such changes.
Third, related to uncertainty, developers should
acknowledge the unavoidable elements of sub-
jective judgment in developing scenarios, and
be prepared to explain and defend the judg-
ments they made.  Fourth, when particular sce-
narios were constructed to have specific
meanings – e.g., a reference case, a plausible
worst-case, or the exploration of a particular
causal process taken to its extreme – these
should be clearly conveyed.  Fifth, if scenario
developers have articulated any indicators of the
confidence they place on scenarios or distribu-
tions of associated variables, this information
and any supporting reasoning should also be
made available.  
A communication strategy should attempt to
steer users away from certain common pitfalls,
such as choosing one scenario and treating it as
a highly confident prediction, or taking the
range spanned by a set of scenarios as encom-
passing all that can possibly happen.  An effec-
tive strategy of communicating scenarios and
their underlying reasoning can help to engage
users in the process of updating and improving
scenarios.  Providing transparency rather than
claiming authoritative status for scenarios is
likely to increase users’ confidence that the sce-
narios have reasonably represented current
knowledge and key uncertainties.  It also pro-
vides users with the tools to develop alternative
representations if they are unconvinced.
In large and complex assessments such as the
IPCC and US National Assessment, communi-
cation of scenarios and underlying information
both to various groups within the assessment
and to potential outside users poses representa-
tional and managerial challenges.  Scenario de-
velopers have experimented with various visual
techniques for conveying complex information
in vivid and understandable form, including
landscape representations, maps, and pictures,
as well as various graphical and tabular for-
mats.178 In the US National Assessment, cli-
mate scenarios and other related information
were provided to participating assessment teams
in several formats (e.g., tabular summaries,
models, graphic representations), through web-
sites backed up with workshop presentations.  In
the IPCC, the Task Group on Data and Scenario
Support for Impact and Climate Analysis
(TGICA) was established in 1997 to facilitate
distribution of climate scenario data, model re-
sults, and baseline and scenario information on
other environmental and socio-economic con-
ditions, for use in climate impact and adaptation
assessments.  Data, scenarios, and supporting
information are distributed over the internet by
the IPCC Data Distribution Center (DDC).179
To compactly communicate uncertainty in cli-
mate scenarios, the TGICA and several national
scenario efforts have developed various graph-
ical methods, including scattergrams showing
the range of projected temperature and precipi-
tation changes generated by several climate
models using four SRES marker scenarios, and
comparing these projected changes to estimates
of natural variability.180 In Figure 4.2, each data
point represents one climate-model projection
associated with a given SRES emissions sce-
nario.  Efforts to develop similarly compact rep-
resentations of the distribution of scenarios for
extremes as well as annual and seasonal aver-
ages are underway. 
To help users select climate scenarios for
impact assessments, an alternative to summa-
rizing climate-model scenarios in such scatter-
grams is to combine various climate-model
results using statistical methods to construct ex-
plicit probability distributions for important cli-
mate variables.181 Figure 4.3 shows one such
method, which assigns weights to model results
178 See, e.g., Svedin and Aniansson 1987.
179 Information on the TGICA is at ipcc-
wg1.ucar.edu/wg1/wg1_tgica.html. The DDC is jointly
operated by the UK Climatic Research Unit and the
Deutsches Klimarechenzentrum, with several mirror
sites around the world.  Data are provided via the web
or CD-ROM.  All data distributed are in the public do-
main.
180 Ruosteenoja et al. 2003. 
181 Raisanen and Palmer 2001; Tebaldi et al. 2004, 2005.
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Figure 4.2.  Regional
scattergram for
eastern North America,
2040-2069.  
The x-axis shows
temperature changes in °C,
the y-axis precipitation
changes in percent.  Each
point shows one model’s
projection under one
emissions scenario.  A point’s
color denotes the
corresponding emissions
scenario, its shape the
corresponding model (per
legends in upper left figure).
Ovals show 95 percent
confidence bounds for
natural 30-year climate
variability, calculated from
unforced 1000-year runs of
the models CGCM2 (orange)
and HadCM3 (blue).  Points
outside the ellipses indicated
projected climate change
significantly outside the range
of natural variability, most
frequently due to changes in
temperature rather than
precipitation. (Source:
Ruosteenoja et al. 2003.)
Figure 4.3.
Constructed
probability
distributions of model-
simulated temperature
change in 2080-2099 
The x axis shows projected
temperature change in
Eastern North America from
the 1980-1999 historical
average, using 19 climate
models participating in the
IPCC Fourth Assessment
Report driven by the SRES
A2 (red) and B1 (blue)
emissions scenarios.  Each
point on the x axis shows the
result from one model.  The
curves above the axis show
probability distributions
constructed from these
individual model results.
(Source: Tebaldi et al. 2005.)
1 2 3 4 5 6
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
Change in Temperature (deg. C)
D
en
si
ty
70
The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Section 4 - Challenges and Controversies in Scenarios for Climate Change
based on their bias in simulating the current cli-
mate (smaller biases are assigned higher
weight) and their correspondence with other
model results (outliers are assigned lower
weights).  This method compactly communi-
cates multiple model results, clearly conveying
which ones fall at the top and bottom of the dis-
tribution (“unlikely to be higher/lower than
this”), and which fall in the middle of the range.   
This current focus on collections and intercom-
parisons of model-based projections with vari-
ous emission scenarios represents a new
approach for communicating scenario-driven
model output to users engaged in assessment
and adaptation activities.  It has enabled users
to consider a broader range of emission scenar-
ios and climate models than was feasible in the
US National Assessment and previous IPCC as-
sessments.  It allows users to consider all avail-
able model and scenario combinations to span
the literature, or to select only scenarios that ex-
ceed some threshold of interest or fall within
some specified probability range.  Future as-
sessments should benefit from this type of
multi-model, multi-scenario approach, which
allows users more effective and informed choice
over scenarios to consider. 
4.5. CONSISTENCY AND
INTEGRATION IN SCENARIOS 
One of the most often stated requirements for
scenarios is that they be “coherent” or “inter-
nally consistent.”  This is clearly an important
goal.  Scenarios usually specify multiple char-
acteristics of an assumed future, whether as
multiple elements of a narrative or multiple
quantitative variables, so these elements should
fit together.  Difficulties arise in the pursuit of
such consistency, however, and in some scenario
exercises the pursuit of consistency, together
with the goal that scenarios integrate many
components of a broad issue such as climate
change, may jeopardize the validity and useful-
ness of the scenarios.
Certain elements of internal consistency in sce-
narios are unproblematic, such as avoiding
gross contradictions with well known principles
of behavior of biophysical or socio-economic
systems, and not inadvertently moving far out-
side the bounds of historical experience.  Inad-
vertently implausible assumptions can arise, for
example, when multiple elements of a scenario
are specified without cross-checking; e.g., end-
year specifications of a region’s population and
GDP without checking the implied growth rate
in GDP per capita, or specifying energy-related
emissions trajectories without checking what
they imply for resource availability.  Avoiding
these pitfalls requires thorough cross-compar-
isons of related values with each other, of ter-
minal values with implied time-trends in the
intervening period, and of values within and
among regions.  Scenario developers should not
always and necessarily avoid extreme or un-
precedented outcomes, however.  Presenting
extreme or seemingly implausible future con-
ditions intentionally, with an explanation of
how they could in fact arise, can contribute to
several of the major purposes of scenarios, e.g.,
shaking up habitual thinking and broadening
expectations of what future developments 
are plausible. 
But statements about internal consistency in
scenarios usually claim much more than the
mere absence of gross contradictions and inad-
vertently implausible values.  They tend to
claim that the multiple elements of a scenario
are related in a way that reflects reasonable,
well-informed judgments about causal relations,
suggesting that some events or trends are more
likely to occur together, some less.  Expressing
the goal as “coherence” rather than “internal
consistency” suggests a higher level of per-
ceived affinity among scenario elements, evok-
ing normative or even aesthetic aspects.
Expressed in probabilistic terms, statements
about internal consistency may be interpreted
as claims that alignments of factors similar to
those in the scenario are more likely than other,
dissimilar alignments.  One might, for example,
claim that a scenario with rapid growth in both
the economy and energy use is more internally
consistent than one in which the economy grew
rapidly but energy use did not.  But where do
these perceptions of greater or lesser likelihood
come from, and how valid are they?  In some
cases a well-founded theory or model might say
that certain outcomes tend to be related.  Alter-
natively, explicit analyses might connect the
claim to underlying assumptions that are open
to scrutiny and criticism.  But in the absence of
The current focus on
collections and
intercomparisons of
model-based
projections with
various emissions
scenarios represents a
new approach for
communicating
scenario-driven model
output to users
engaged in assessment
and adaptation
activities.
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such transparent foundations for judgments of
what scenario conditions are consistent and
what are not, these claims can only rest on more
diffuse judgments by scenario developers, re-
fined and tested through various deliberative
processes – e.g., arguing about the claims,
working through their implications relative to
those of alternative specifications, and identi-
fying additional bodies of research and scholar-
ship that can be brought to bear.  
These difficulties can be compounded when, in
addition to consistency, a goal of scenario “in-
tegration” is also pursued (although the precise
meaning of “integrated” can be difficult to as-
certain).  The integration of a scenario is a func-
tion of its complexity or breadth, which is
related to the number of characteristics it jointly
specifies.  In global climate-change scenario ap-
plications, integration typically refers to in-
cluding all major elements of the causal chain of
the issue, i.e., multiple dimensions of emissions
and their socio-economic drivers, climate, im-
pacts of climate change, and responses.  
Asking a scenario to be integrated in this way
imposes on the scenario the burden of captur-
ing all relevant elements of the future.  Such an
expansive scenario may occasionally be needed
– e.g., for preliminary assessment of a threat for
which no relevant data or current research ex-
ists.  However, the risks of error, bias, and arbi-
trariness in such a scenario are greatly increased,
because so much of reality (with whatever un-
known causal processes by which it actually op-
erates) is being stuffed into the scenario.
More likely, an integrated scenario would be
constructed by combining exogenous assump-
tions about some elements with model-calcu-
lated values for others.  This approach does not
avoid increasing risks of inconsistency and con-
tradiction as a scenario is expanded, particularly
when multiple models are used.  Since models
embody specific, quantitative causal relations
among variables, they do not require – or indeed
allow – all variables to be specified.  Scenarios
provide only those exogenous inputs that the
model does not produce.  These scenario-based
inputs should be consistent with each other, but
to a lesser extent than the precise standard that
defines consistency in a scenario.  These ex-
ogenous inputs, together with model results, can
jointly comprise a scenario that is generated for
some alternative use.
Consistency problems grow when scenario ex-
ercises involve multiple models and attempts
are made to achieve model harmonization.
When scenarios are constructed partly out of
exogenous inputs provided by a scenario (made
consistent as much as possible through qualita-
tive or intuitive causal reasoning) and partly out
of models, multiple models are often used.
Using multiple models in parallel can allow for
more extensive exploration of causal relations,
and helps to characterize uncertainty in scenar-
ios since different models embody different rep-
resentations of causal processes.  It may also
enhance the credibility of the process.  But
models of the same broad set of phenomena –
e.g., models of the economy and energy sector
– frequently differ in which variables they require
as exogenous inputs and which ones they calcu-
late endogenously.  In this case, some variables
must be specified exogenously for some models,
but are calculated endogenously by others.
This creates various problems for consistency.
In general, when scenario exercises are con-
ducted in this way, some elements are assumed
and others are model-calculated.  Attempting to
avoid this poses even more serious problems,
however.  It is not usually possible to arbitrarily
perturb the exogenous input variables so all in-
puts and outputs match across all models, since
such perturbations will influence other variables
in the model.  Consequently, avoiding these in-
consistencies will require manipulating internal
relationships within models to make their out-
puts match the specified values, given the com-
mon inputs.  But such reverse-engineering of
internal model relationships to match specified
outputs, in addition to being exceedingly cum-
bersome and arbitrary, can corrupt the internal
logic of models, obscure the interpretation and
significance of results, and make it impossible
to use model variation to illuminate uncertainty.
For example, in an exercise to generate
non-intervention scenarios of potential future
emissions, little insight is likely to be gained
from defining scenarios in terms of the resulting
emissions and forcing the different models to
In the absence of
transparent
foundations for
judgments of what
scenario conditions are
consistent and what
are not, claims can only
rest on more diffuse
judgments by scenario
developers, refined and
tested through various
deliberative processes.
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generate these emissions targets.182 It may be
equally fruitless to define scenarios in terms of
GDP and energy consumption trajectories and
to force multiple models to reproduce these.
For this reason, multi-model exercises such as
the Energy Modeling Forum usually seek to
harmonize only a few of the most essential and
commonly used inputs.183 When multiple mod-
els are used to generate scenarios, the most use-
ful way to pursue consistency may be to develop
common assumptions for the variables furthest
back in the causal chain, but the wide variation
of model structure can make even this approach
to harmonization challenging.
In addition to consistency within a scenario,
consistency across scenarios within an exercise
also requires attention.  Ideally, factors not ex-
plicitly recognized as the basis for inter-scenario
differences should be consistent across scenar-
ios.  Or alternatively, all bases for differences
between scenarios should be explicitly recog-
nized and stated.
When models are used in a scenario exercise,
significant variation in model structures sug-
gests less mature underlying knowledge, or at
least greater recognition of knowledge gaps,
than when model structures converge and all re-
maining uncertainty is over exogenous input pa-
rameters.  For scenarios to provide faithful
representation of present knowledge and uncer-
tainty, this variation should not be suppressed or
concealed.  Consequently, when scenarios are de-
fined over variables that include outputs of some
participating models as well as inputs, it is crucial
not to pursue false consistency by forcing mod-
els to match the target outputs through manipu-
lation of their internal causal processes.  This is
suppressing model uncertainty. 
One preferable alternative would be for the re-
sults of scenario exercises involving both ex-
ogenous inputs and multiple models to
explicitly distinguish between three classes of
variables: (1) a minimal set, exogenous to all;
(2) those specified exogenously for some mod-
els, but generated by others; (3) model outputs,
whose variation reflects partly model and partly
parameter uncertainty.  
An alternative way to use multiple models is to
let each model produce one scenario, as was
done in the selection of the SRES marker sce-
narios.  With this approach, each scenario rep-
resents a particular realization of uncertainty
over both exogenous inputs and model struc-
ture.  But this approach confounds model un-
certainty with parameter uncertainty.  It may be
preferable to cross exogenous inputs with mod-
els to produce a larger number of scenarios from
which subsets can be extracted as needed, per-
haps organizing these as a nested hierarchy of
scenarios similar to the SRES: six marker sce-
narios, 40 SRES scenarios in total, and hun-
dreds of scenarios in the literature review.
There are good reasons to combine narrative
with quantitative approaches, as scenario exer-
cises have increasingly sought to do.  But the
connection between qualitative and quantitative
aspects of global-change scenarios has been in-
adequate, diminishing the usefulness of the ex-
ercises due to inconsistencies within each type
of scenario and between the two types.  This
problem has partly been due to limited time and
resources, but has also reflected substantive dif-
ficulties in linking the two types of scenario,
difficulties that have not been understood or
managed well.  Narrative scenarios typically
specify deep structural characteristics like so-
cial values and the nature of institutions, which
are associated with structural characteristics of
models such as the determinants of fertility
trends, labor-force participation, savings and in-
vestment decisions, and substitutability in the
economy.  Consequently, the differences among
alternative narrative scenarios, reflecting differ-
ent basic assumptions about how the world
works, correspond more closely to variation of
model structure than to variation of parameters.
Better integrating the two approaches will re-
quire developing ways to connect narrative sce-
narios to model structures, rather than merely
to target values for a few variables that models
are then asked to reproduce.  This has not hap-
182 Note that this is not the case if the purpose of sce-
narios is to explore the implications of specified limits
on future emissions.  If an emission constraint is as-
sumed to be imposed by policy, then different models
can be used to explore the implications of that con-
straint for costs, technologies, and other impacts.  In
this case, caution is needed in deciding what other
model variables, if any, should be constrained. 
183 Weyant and Hill 1999.
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pened because scenario exercises have not had
the capability or resources to direct new model
development, or to induce modelers to under-
take substantial structural changes to their mod-
els.  This would require substantial efforts,
including getting modelers to interact with sce-
nario exercises in a new way, but might hold
more promise for allowing scenarios to usefully
inform discussions about large-scale policy
choices for mitigation and adaptation.
4.6. TREATMENT OF
UNCERTAINTY IN SCENARIOS
Representing and communicating uncertainty is
perhaps the most fundamental purpose of sce-
narios.  This section discusses how scenarios
represent uncertainties, how these methods con-
nect scenario exercises to simpler formal exer-
cises in the analysis of decisions under
uncertainty, and what challenges are posed in
how uncertainty is represented.  It also ad-
dresses several important debates in the treat-
ment of uncertainties.
In most scenario exercises, uncertainty is repre-
sented not in a single scenario, but in variation
across several scenarios considered together.184
The choices to be made in deciding how to rep-
resent uncertainty include the following:
• What characteristics are varied 
• By how much these characteristics are var-
ied, separately and together (e.g., should ex-
treme values of multiple characteristics be
combined, or extremes of some combined
with the middle cases of others?)
• How many scenarios to create and consider
together
• What description, documentation, or other
information is attached – including whether
and how specifically measures of likelihood
are assigned.
4.6.1. Uncertainty in simple
quantitative projections: 
basic approaches
How these choices are made and their implica-
tions for scenario use and effectiveness are
closely related to the large-scale decisions in de-
signing a scenario exercise outlined in Section
2.1.  In particular, the role of uncertainty in a
scenario exercise is strongly linked to scenario
complexity, richness, and use.  In the simplest
case, a scenario exercise may be dominated by
a single quantitative variable, so all uncertainty
could be represented by alternative future lev-
els or time-paths of that variable.  This case is so
simple that many scholars and practitioners
argue it should not be considered a scenario at
all.185 Still, even this simple and extreme case
raises significant issues.  We begin here and
then move to more complex cases. 
If we also assume that the probability distribu-
tion is known, the situation reduces to a formal
exercise in analysis of decision-making under
uncertainty.  Given a known set of choices and
outcomes of each choice under each uncertain
outcome, alternative choices can be evaluated
by formal methods such as seeking the best out-
come on average or under some risk-averse val-
uation scheme, or seeking robust strategies. This
decision-analytic approach can be extended to
situations of a few uncertain variables with a
known joint distribution, multiple decision-
makers who evaluate outcomes differently, or
(with somewhat more difficulty) decision mak-
ers with different probability distributions.
Further relaxation of these simplifying assump-
tions moves us toward activities that are more
widely recognized as scenario exercises.  First,
if a scenario exercise is addressed to more than
just a few decision-makers with known choice
sets and outcome valuations, scenarios can no
longer simply be inputs to an analytic exercise,
but rather become descriptions of potential fu-
ture states that must be communicated directly
or indirectly to decision-makers for their reflec-
tion and deliberation.  Second, if distributions
of important quantities are unknown, it is nec-
essary to exercise judgment regarding how to
184 When a scenario exercise uses just one scenario, this
usually presents some specific threat or challenge
posed to existing procedures or decision-makers.  In
these cases, uncertainty is still represented by differ-
ences among scenarios, but the single scenario is im-
plicitly contrasted to the status quo. 
185 E.g., Wack (1985a:74) states that such a scenario is
just “quantification of a clearly recognized uncer-
tainty.”
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draw on relevant knowledge to construct and
describe alternative future values of the quanti-
ties, and how to represent these values to users
with a manageable number of scenarios.
Since scenarios describe future conditions, the
distributions of quantities in scenarios cannot
be known in the same sense that the distribution
of current characteristics – e.g., the November
daily high temperature at O’Hare Airport – can
be known through repeated observations.  Prob-
abilistic statements about future conditions al-
ways incorporate elements of subjective
judgment.  Many forms of current knowledge –
including data, models, and expert judgments –
are relevant to forming these judgments about
future conditions.  In constructing scenarios of
population growth, for example, the distribution
of observed past growth rates can be used to
construct a range or distribution of plausible fu-
ture values.  But while scenarios can draw on,
and be made conditional on, such knowledge,
this does not overcome their unavoidable re-
liance on subjective judgments as well. 
Scenarios can also be based on model repre-
sentations of knowledge of causal processes.
For example, instead of simply extrapolating
past population growth rates, one could use a
demographic model that represents trends in
fertility rates, lifespan, and migration to calcu-
late a resultant population trend.  Formal mod-
eling can represent the structural relationships
transparently, reducing the risk of generating in-
consistent projections.  Structural models can
possibly also perform better in extrapolating to
conditions beyond the observed range of be-
havior.   Because models represent causal re-
lationships among multiple variables, these
models can extend the range of current and his-
torical data that are relevant to projections, al-
though this may result in an expansion of data
needs.  Models can also help characterize un-
certainty in future quantities of interest, by al-
lowing the uncertainty to be attributed to input
parameters – explored through sensitivity analy-
sis or simulation techniques such as Monte
Carlo – or to model structure.
Estimating output distributions based on assumed
distributions of uncertain input parameters does
not capture all uncertainty of importance for 
assessment and decision-making.  The input
probability distributions are not known with
certainty, nor are the structural assumptions that
determine the mapping of inputs onto outputs
within any particular model.  Uncertainty analy-
sis can embrace this additional level of uncer-
tainty, sometimes called “meta-uncertainty,” by
stepping up one more level of abstraction –
considering not just uncertain quantities, but
uncertainty about their uncertainty, or alterna-
tively, probability distributions over probability
distributions of unknown quantities.  Methods
to represent and process such meta-uncertainty
mirror those used for first-order uncertainty.
This is an active area of research, but its impor-
tance for assessment methods and their appli-
cation is unclear.  This level of abstraction
increases the difficulty of communicating sce-
narios and their underlying reasoning transpar-
ently and comprehensibly to non-specialists.
Moreover, since any step of analysis represents
an act of potentially fallible judgment, taking
the step to meta-uncertainty still does not cap-
ture all possible uncertainty.  It is not clear
whether, for purposes of constructing and using
scenarios, the explicit separation of uncertainty
in outcomes from uncertainty in probability dis-
tributions brings more benefit than could be
gained from simple heuristic guidance to as-
sume distributions are wider than initially seems
necessary. 
A major risk in all scenarios is subjective bias,
which can be reduced but not eliminated
through use of existing data and formal model-
ing.  Judgment is an essential element in con-
structing scenarios, both to apply relevant data
and models when these are available, and to
build future descriptions using less formal
methods when they are not.  The expert judg-
ments supporting such less formal projections
may be better founded than mere uninformed
speculation, since there is typically much rele-
vant knowledge available beyond what is ex-
plicitly captured in present datasets and models. 
Approaches to developing expert-judgment
based projections vary widely in their structure
and formality, from simply asking one or more
experts to state their best estimate of some un-
known quantity, to highly structured elicitation
exercises that provide multiple cross-checked
Probabilistic
statements about
future conditions
always incorporate
elements of subjective
judgment.  Many
forms of current
knowledge – including
data, models, and
expert judgments –
are relevant to
forming these
judgments about
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estimates of the same quantity.186 Such meth-
ods must attend to risks of overconfidence and
bias, which are well documented in experts as
well as laypeople.   Carefully designed elicita-
tion protocols can reduce the effects of such bi-
ases, e.g., by prompting experts to broaden their
estimates of uncertain quantities, but cannot
eliminate them.187 An additional challenge to
these methods is that there is no generally ac-
cepted method for selecting or aggregating es-
timates from multiple experts. 
4.6.2. How many scenarios, over
what range?
In communications of scenarios, limited time,
resources, and attention usually require that
only a few discrete values or time-paths are
specified, not a complete distribution.  Scenario
developers must decide how many scenarios to
provide and how to space them.  
How many scenarios to provide rests on a judg-
ment of the value provided by each additional
point from the underlying distribution relative
to the burden of producing and using each new
scenario.  If the use made of each scenario is ex-
pensive – e.g., consuming large quantities of
time of busy senior people, or running a large
model – then the number of scenarios that can
be adequately treated may be very few.  The
1992 IPCC scenario exercise provided six sep-
arate scenarios, of which nearly all subsequent
analyses used just one or two.  Of the 40 scenarios
produced by the SRES process, only 6 (initially 4)
were highlighted as “marker” scenarios, while
most subsequent analyses used just 2 or 3.188
Deciding how many scenarios to provide also
involves some element of attempting to avoid
predictable errors in their use.  While the most
obvious and frequent choice in providing sce-
narios of a quantitative variable has been to pro-
vide three – one high, one low, and one in the
middle – it has been widely noted that this prac-
tice runs the risk that users will ignore the top
and bottom, pick the middle, and treat it as a
highly confident projection, suppressing the un-
certainty that scenario developers tried to com-
municate by providing, and carefully spacing,
three scenarios.  The same risk applies to any
odd number of scenarios, leading many devel-
opers of quantitative scenarios to the informal
guideline that the number provided should al-
ways be even, so there is no “middle” scenario
that users can inappropriately fix on.
More specific guidance on the appropriate num-
ber and range of scenarios must reflect both 
scenario developers’ sense of the underlying dis-
tribution from which scenarios are drawn, and
their intended use.  One must consider whether
departures in both directions from the middle are
of similar importance, or whether only departures
in one direction need be represented.  For exam-
ple, one might judge that in an assessment of im-
pacts of climate change a scenario drawn from
the lower tail of potential climate change is likely
to provide little substantive insight, since in most
cases the impacts of a small-change scenario are
predictably small.  
One must also consider how far a set of scenar-
ios should extend toward including extreme or
unlikely futures.  In estimating unknown quan-
tities, many fields of empirical research draw
intervals to capture from 90 percent to 99 per-
cent probability, but in constructing scenarios
to inform decisions there may be good reasons
to consider more extreme and less likely possi-
bilities, whether these likelihood judgments are
expressed quantitatively or qualitatively.  As-
sessments and policies in both regulation of
health and safety risks and national security, for
example, routinely focus on high-consequence
risks that are judged much less than 1 percent
likely.  Similarly for global environmental
change, low-probability risks might need to be
considered if their consequences or their effects
on preferred decisions are large enough.
It is often suggested that a set of scenarios
should “span the literature” of prior scenarios
or projections of the same quantities.  However,
there may be good reasons for a wider or dif-
ferent range, or even a narrower range – al-
though developers should be cautious about a
set of scenarios that spans a much narrower
range than published estimates of the same
quantities.  A published scenario may have been
186 Morgan and Keith 1995.
187 Tversky and Kahnemann 1974, Wallsten and Whit-
field 1986.
188 Initially A2 and B2 were most widely used.  More re-
cent work has used A2 and B1, sometimes with A1B.
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constructed to serve various purposes other than
providing an independent new estimate of a
quantity of interest.  Previous scenarios devel-
oped to serve some particular purpose may or
may not be relevant to a new scenario exercise,
depending on the relationship between their in-
tended purposes.  Moreover, previously pub-
lished scenarios can be highly self-referential,
since many published analyses use prominent
pre-existing scenarios as inputs to a new study,
or examine a new model by forcing it to repro-
duce some pre-existing scenario.  For all these
reasons, previously published scenarios are bet-
ter regarded as one input to the judgment of de-
velopers of new scenarios than an authoritative
picture of present knowledge that new scenarios
must follow.
4.6.3. Bifurcations and major 
state changes
While many uncertainties may be treated as a
continuous range of possible values, some un-
certainties may capture large-scale bifurcations
or abrupt changes.  For climate change, poten-
tial abrupt changes include melting of major
continental ice sheets or shifts to some new
mode of ocean circulation.189 Large-scale bi-
furcations may also arise from breakthroughs in
energy technology.  Such possibilities are typi-
cally not captured in either historical data (be-
cause they are by assumption novel), or models
(because they would represent a change in the
causal structure represented in models).
Abrupt changes can pose particular challenges
for deciding the number and range of scenarios
to include in an assessment or decision-support
exercise, either because their consequences are
so extreme or because they would fundamen-
tally change our understanding of how the sys-
tem operates.   The decision of whether and how
to consider these uncertainties consequently
turns on the balance between their probability
– which is believed to be low but not well char-
acterized – and their high consequences, which
must be evaluated relative to the scenarios’ in-
tended use.  This will be a particularly difficult
choice when only a few scenarios are being gen-
erated.  For example, in a coastal impacts as-
sessment the enormous consequences of the
difference between a half-meter and a five-
meter sea level rise over this century – and the
well-identified mechanism by which such a
large rise could occur – may suggest the impor-
tance of explicitly considering a scenario in-
volving loss of one of the major continental ice
masses.  But including such a scenario runs the
risk that users will assign it a much higher prob-
ability than is appropriate, either because of its
vividness and extremity or because they pre-
sume that developers’ decision to include the
scenario meant that they assigned high proba-
bility to it.  When such a scenario is included,
scenario developers have a serious responsibil-
ity to communicate, loudly and consistently, its
different status.
A further challenge in representing large-scale
or discrete changes in scenarios is that there
might be many such possibilities, all of them
high-consequence but believed to be unlikely.
Including any particular one may mislead both
by exaggerating its likelihood and by strength-
ening users’ tendency to ignore others, when
these all represent “unknown unknowns” that
should receive some consideration.  The more
there are, the more the right approach might be
to shift all scenarios further out to reflect the
various mechanisms by which conventional un-
derstanding may under-represent the tail of the
distribution, rather than highlighting any par-
ticular abrupt-change mechanism by giving it a
scenario of its own. 
4.6.4. Uncertainty in multivariate 
or qualitative scenarios
As the characterization of future conditions
within scenarios grows more complex, so does
the process of representing uncertainty within
them.  While many of the issues discussed above
in the simplified context of scenarios on a single
variable also apply to multi-dimensional scenar-
ios, several additional issues arise.
The most basic of these is that with multiple 
dimensions of variation in scenarios, it is nec-
essary to decide which uncertainties are repre-
sented.  Even when scenarios include only
multiple quantitative variables, it is no longer
possible for a few scenarios to span all corners
of the joint distribution of these variables.
Rather, they must combine variations in ways
189 NRC 2002.
Previously published
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that are most illuminating and important for the
purpose at hand, massively reducing the dimen-
sionality of the problem to make it intelligible
for users.  In addition, increasingly detailed and
realistic scenarios often specify characteristics
that are qualitative, or described less precisely
than cardinal variables.  For example, alterna-
tive scenarios might specify that current trends
of globalization increase, stagnate, or reverse,
or that decision-making capacity on climate
change increases or decreases.  Such charac-
teristics may be judged crucial to include be-
cause they may be among the most important
drivers of preferred choices or consequences
of concern.
Scenarios of this kind pose substantial further
challenges in representing uncertainty and in-
terpreting its meaning.  Relative to the simple
quantitative scenarios we have considered up to
this point, these lie in a much higher dimen-
sionality space of future possibilities; they may
not lie in any ordinal relationship to each other;
and they may include characteristics whose def-
initional boundaries are not precisely specified.
Defining a small set of scenarios to reasonably
span the most important uncertainties is conse-
quently even more difficult than for simple
quantitative scenarios.
The approach most widely proposed to repre-
sent key uncertainties in such scenarios is to
seek underlying structural uncertainties that sat-
isfy two conditions: they appear to be most im-
portant in influencing outcomes of concern or
relevant decisions; and they are linked with vari-
ation in many other factors.  These underlying
uncertainties can be simple discrete states such
as peace or war, prosperity or stagnation; or, as
in several major global environmental scenar-
ios, they can be deeper societal trends, such as
more or less globalization or shifts in societal
values toward greater environmental concern,
from which variation in many factors is as-
sumed to follow.
This approach, formalized in the Shell scenarios
method,190 involves two steps: first identifying a
small number of fundamental uncertainties and
a small set of alternative realizations of each;
and then elaborating additional future charac-
teristics associated with each realization
through both qualitative reasoning to fill in a
narrative, and assembly of data and model re-
sults to build a parallel quantitative description
to the extent this is judged useful.  Repeated,
critical iteration between the qualitative and
quantitative elements is conducted, to bring ad-
ditional relevant knowledge and expertise to
bear and to check for consistency.  
Even rich narrative multivariate scenarios must
imply certain claims of likelihood.  Every sce-
nario included must be deemed likely enough
to merit the resources and attention spent on de-
veloping and analyzing it.  This applies even to
extreme-event scenarios that are intentionally
constructed to capture the low-probability tail
of the distribution, since even they must be per-
ceived likely enough to merit time and attention
given their severity.  Since users would reject
any scenario that they persistently judged too
implausible to consider, when decision-makers
find a scenario exercise useful, it validates de-
velopers’ judgment that each scenario was
likely enough to consider. 
In a purely mathematical sense, any one specific
rich multivariate scenario must be arbitrary and
of vanishingly small probability. There are,
however, ways in which it may be reasonable to
assign non-zero probabilities to multivariate
scenarios.  First, if scenario designers in fact
succeed at identifying a few deep structural un-
certainties that strongly condition outcomes on
many other characteristics in a scenario, then
the richness of a scenario description need not
imply that it is vanishingly unlikely.  Whether
this is true or not is a judgment to be made by
scenario developers and users in each applica-
tion.  If they are sufficiently careful in their de-
velopment and critical examination of
scenarios, their judgment may well be correct.
But there will often be no way to further test
these judgments, so it is of course possible that
the proliferation of additional detail in scenarios
– even detail that developers and users recog-
nize is crucial for determining valued outcomes
and preferred choices – is arbitrary or erroneous.
A second way in which rich, detailed scenarios
may be judged sufficiently likely to consider
concerns the precision with which scenario
characteristics are specified.  In rich multivari-
190 Shell International 2003. 
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ate scenarios, many characteristics are often
specified diffusely: economic growth may be
merely “high” or “low,” rather than being stated
as a particular value.  Even when a characteris-
tic is stated quantitatively, its particular value
may be treated as merely illustrative of a range
of similar values; e.g., annual GDP growth
might be set at 4 percent because a user needs a
numerical model input, but it is understood to
represent a broad range of similar values that all
count as “high” growth.  Interpreted in this way,
a multivariate description may remain likely
enough to merit examination – and indeed, a
modest number of scenarios may exhaust the set
of potential futures that matter for the issue at
hand.  Here one is not assigning likelihood to
the precise numerical assumptions used to flesh
out the details of a scenario, but rather to a thick
slice of future conditions that resemble that sce-
nario more than the other scenarios in the set.
4.6.5  The debate 
over quantifying probabilities
A major debate in the use of global-change sce-
narios has concerned whether or not to specify
quantitative probabilities associated with sce-
narios.  This debate is central to the meaning
and use of scenarios, and has been sharpest over
the IPCC’s SRES scenarios.  Developers of the
SRES scenarios decided at the outset of their
process that they would make no attempt to as-
sign probabilities to scenarios, in part because
they were adopting the Shell approach of de-
veloping scenarios from storylines, in which
quantitative probabilities are usually avoided.
After the scenarios were published, several crit-
ics argued that since the most prominent and
important outputs were the projections of emis-
sions under the six marker scenarios, it was nat-
ural – and essential for development of rational
climate-change policy – to describe the distri-
bution of emissions in probabilistic terms.  For
example, how likely are 2100 emissions to lie
above the 30 GtC of scenario A2 or below the
5.2 GtC of B1?  Should the range spanned by
all 40 SRES scenarios be understood to com-
prise 90 percent of all probability? 99 percent?
All of it?   
Developers of the SRES scenarios stood by
their initial decision not to quantify probabili-
ties.  Since the controversy only became promi-
nent long after the decision had been made by a
writing team no longer in operation, it would
have been virtually impossible for the group to
retrospectively assign such probabilities.  But
rather than rely on this argument of managerial
infeasibility alone, SRES organizers offered a
vigorous substantive defense of their initial de-
cision.  This defense relied in part on the state-
ment that the six marker scenarios were all
“equally sound,” without providing any guid-
ance regarding what this meant other than ex-
plicitly denying that it meant “equally likely.”
Describing each of the six marker scenarios as
“equally sound” represents the entirely reason-
able case that in the developers’ judgment these
all needed to be considered seriously – without
making any further judgment as to their likeli-
hood.  While clearly frustrating to those wanting
to use the scenarios as a basis for policy, the re-
sult is entirely consistent with the IPCC man-
date to do assessment, but not to reach policy
conclusions.  
However, this debate will continue; it rests in
part on different conceptions of the meaning
and typical contents of a scenario.  The simpler
the contents of scenarios, the more readily they
lend themselves to explicit quantification of
probabilities.  When scenarios consist only of
alternative time-paths of a single quantitative
variable, or one such variable is of predominant
importance, it is straightforward and sensible to
understand the intervals between those time-
paths to have probabilities associated with them
and there are several strong arguments for being
explicit about these probabilities.  First, stating
probabilities allows comparative risk assess-
ment between scenarios and explicit exploration
of risk-reducing strategies.191 Second, sophisti-
cated decision-makers whose choices depend
on uncertainty in these variables need probabil-
ity information about possible values, not just a
set of alternative values, to evaluate choices –
whether their approach to decision-making is
based on expected values, risk-aversion, seek-
ing robust strategies, or some other approach.
Finally, when such scenarios are presented with-
out probability judgments, users may attach
their own, often via simple heuristic devices that
may misrepresent the developers’ understand-
ing.  For example, many subsequent users of the
191 Webster 2003.
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SRES emissions scenarios have simply assumed
the probabilities they needed to conduct further
assessments, using such simple devices as
counting scenarios or assuming a uniform dis-
tribution over the entire range.
Opponents of explicit quantification of proba-
bilities do not dispute that such probabilities can
coherently be assigned to simple scenarios in
one or two quantitative variables.  Rather, they
raise principled objections to the appropriate-
ness of attempting to quantify probabilities for
more complex scenarios, particularly those in-
volving socio-economic conditions, as well as
practical objections to the use of probabilities
even in the case of simple quantitative scenarios. 
Many researchers are less comfortable using
probabilities for complex scenarios that include
explicit socio-economic elements than for un-
certainties that are purely bio-physical, such as
probabilities of different rates of climate change,
conditional on a particular emissions scenario.
Four main arguments are advanced against the
use of probabilities for such scenarios. 
First, some argue that the large multivariate
space of possibilities from which such scenarios
are drawn, and the vague and qualitative way
that some scenario characteristics are specified,
make it impossible to coherently define the
boundaries of the outcome space to which prob-
abilities are being assigned.  There is no way to
clearly define the interval “between” one sce-
nario and another; and if probability is attrib-
uted to a slice of possibilities around each
scenario rather than to the intervals between
them, is it not possible to define clearly the
boundaries of the slice to which the probability
is assigned.  To the extent that scenarios de-
scribe different types of worlds, which are dis-
tinguished from each other by alternative
resolution of a few key uncertainties – e.g., high
or low growth, high or low globalization –
where the location of the boundary is not pre-
cisely specified, it may be difficult to create a
shared understanding of these boundaries be-
tween users and creators.  But if assigning a pre-
cise numerical probability is judged too difficult
in these cases, less precise descriptions such as
“highly likely,” “more likely,” “less likely,” or
“roughly equal” could be assigned.  In some ap-
plications where scenarios are intended to cap-
ture all the uncertainty of concern to the deci-
sion-maker – i.e., scenarios are intended to be
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive –
there may even be a reasonable basis for nu-
merical probability.
The second argument for rejecting probabilistic
description of socio-economic conditions is
based on “reflexivity” – the proposition that
scenarios may influence the behavior or deci-
sions driving the scenarios, so probability judg-
ments about scenarios could reflect back on
themselves, becoming either “self-fulfilling” or
(more plausibly) “self-denying” prophecies.
Section 4.1 addresses this issue in some detail,
in particular in the distinction between how to
treat mitigation decisions in scenarios to inform
mitigation decisions and impacts or adaptation-
related decisions.  We might only add here that
for scenarios of global emissions, reflexivity
could only operate if both the influence of sce-
nario judgments on their users’ behavior and the
influence of their users’ behavior on global
emissions were extremely strong.  Moreover, it
is not evident why scenarios with explicit like-
lihood judgments should raise this concern,
while scenarios presented without such judg-
ments – which also presume some claims of
plausibility or likelihood – should not.  Concern
about reflexivity appears more serious for sce-
narios prepared in close consultation with na-
tional mitigation policy-makers, and it is for this
reason (among others) that we judge explicit at-
tempts to assign probabilities less valuable for
scenarios prepared in such settings.
Third, some argue that it should not be scenario
developers or experts who make judgments
about likelihood of alternative scenarios, but
users – particularly when scenarios are used to
inform high-stakes public decisions.  But this
depends on the details of the content and use of
scenarios.  For some scenario elements in some
settings, particularly use of scenarios to advise
specific policy decisions, the scenario users
may be as expert as the developers in associated
uncertainties and risks, or more so.  But in such
settings, the use of scenarios normally high-
lights critical examination of these assumptions,
and users have the knowledge and assertiveness
to probe, critique, modify, or reject scenario el-
ements that they find weak, including probabil-
ity judgments.  When scenarios are produced to
Concern about
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serve many diverse users and consequently can-
not rely on intensive interplay with representa-
tive, well-informed, and challenging users,
scenario developers frequently have the best ac-
cess to available knowledge relevant to forming
probability judgments.  Not making these judg-
ments explicit is withholding information that
users may need to understand and interpret the
scenarios.  If scenarios and their underlying rea-
soning and assumptions are presented clearly
enough, users can make informed choices
whether or not to use probability judgments that
are provided. 
Finally, some argue that probabilities cannot 
be known, or even sensibly estimated, for 
socio-economic futures – perhaps because
socio-economic processes and mechanisms are
intrinsically less knowable than biophysical
ones, perhaps due to the unpredictable effects
of human creativity and leadership, and perhaps
because causation does not operate in the
human domain as it does in the bio-physical do-
main.  Although these arguments raise deep
philosophical questions, as a practical matter
probabilistic projections are routinely done in
some socio-economic domains, including pro-
jections of population and economic growth,
but not, or not well, in others, such as projecting
technological innovation.  Provided the basic
concept of subjective probability is accepted,
weaker knowledge and deeper uncertainties can
be accommodated by broadening the relevant
uncertainties rather than declining to make
probabilistic judgments, but the question remains
of whether the resultant broad uncertainty ranges
are meaningful or operationally useful.
Several practical objections have also been
raised to associating explicit likelihood judg-
ments with scenarios.  These include the diffi-
culty of developing probability estimates from
multiple information sources that can achieve
sufficient agreement from diverse experts, and
the non-intuitive nature of probability distribu-
tions in using scenarios to communicate with
non-expert users.  These are both valid con-
cerns, although active areas of research and de-
velopment in expert elicitation techniques and
in simple intuitive devices to communicate un-
certainty are making some progress in mitigat-
ing them.
An additional practical argument against quan-
tifying probabilities is that attempting to do so
may represent a distraction that uses time, gen-
erates conflicts, and is of little value to scenario
users.  Whether this is indeed the case, however,
is in part a judgment to be made by scenario
users, not developers.  Opponents of quantified
probability argue that users typically only need
scenarios to pass some probability threshold.
Beyond this threshold, they will seek robust
choices that yield acceptable outcomes under all
possibilities, so further refinement of probabil-
ity serves no purpose.  This argument has merit,
but only to the extent that it accurately describes
how these scenarios will be used.  Quantitative
assignment of probabilities to scenarios when
high-stakes decisions are implicated is clearly
difficult and contentious, as the SRES contro-
versy illustrates.  Even if this argument cor-
rectly characterizes how scenarios are used,
users might still be able to profitably exploit
more detailed probability information if it were
available – although one must also consider the
risk that non-technical users might somehow be
more likely to misunderstand scenarios with ex-
plicit probability judgments attached (perhaps
by taking a stated probability distribution as the
“true” distribution) than to misunderstand a
simple collection of scenarios presented with no
such probability information (perhaps by taking
the range presented to embrace the totality of
all possibilities).  It is also possible that engag-
ing scenario users in an attempt to assign prob-
abilities, even only illustratively, could both
draw on relevant knowledge of uncertainties
that they possess more than scenario develop-
ers, and provide a valuable device to probe and
sharpen their understanding of the situation.
Any argument based on the information needs
of specific users becomes less persuasive as the
set of potential uses and users, and the likely di-
versity of their information needs, grow larger.
Overall, we find the arguments in favor of quan-
tifying probabilities to be strongest for scenar-
ios whose major outputs are projections of one
quantitative variable (or very few), and weakest
for complex multivariate scenarios with sub-
stantial qualitative or narrative elements.  The
controversy over probabilities in SRES reflected
in part different perceptions of what type of sce-
narios these were.  SRES initially followed a
storyline-based process and rejected quantifi-
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195 Alley et al. 1997. 
196 Note: these regional projections are 5-10 times faster
than the IPCC’s projected global 21st-century warming.
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cation of probabilities on that basis.  Subsequent
efforts, however, consisted predominantly of de-
veloping quantitative emissions projections and
neglected further development of the storylines.
Moreover, with a few significant exceptions,
subsequent applications of the scenarios have
principally used their emissions figures, some-
times together with population and GDP, and
made little or no use of the underdeveloped sto-
rylines that lay behind them.  The controversy
over quantitative probability in this case sug-
gests that when quantitative projections are a
major output of a scenario exercise, developers
may have a responsibility to go further in char-
acterizing the likelihood of the resultant emis-
sions intervals than would be appropriate for the
more complex underlying storylines.
Moreover, even for rich narrative scenarios, the
arguments against rendering probability judg-
ments are strongest when the exercise is pro-
duced for a small number of users with similar
responsibilities and concerns.  In such a setting,
intensive interaction between scenario develop-
ers and users can provide whatever additional
detail about, or confidence in, the scenarios that
users may require to benefit from the scenarios.
When scenarios serve potential users who are
more numerous and diverse, however, such in-
tensive interaction is not possible.  As a result,
the value of explicit likelihood judgments in-
creases.  To the extent that future global-change
exercises continue to strengthen their qualita-
tive aspects and the integration between quali-
tative and quantitative – valuable directions for
future efforts – they should still seek to move fur-
ther toward explicit characterization of likelihood
than has been done thus far.
In 2002, the Office of Net Assessments (ONA), a small strategic planning office in the Office of the
US Secretary of Defense, asked the Global Business Network (GBN), a consulting firm expert in
scenario methods, to develop a scenario of potential national-security implications of abrupt climate
change.  This request was stimulated by widespread scientific interest at the time in abrupt climate
change, particularly shifts in North Atlantic circulation, including a 2002 report by the National
Academy of Sciences.192 In addition, several scientific papers had reported changes in Atlantic cir-
culation and salinity that some scientists thought might indicate impending larger disruption, as well
as new evidence of rapid climate shifts in the past.193
GBN staff developed the scenario by reviewing scientific literature and informally consulting with
climate and ocean scientists.194 They reviewed three past climate events of diverse severity and de-
cided to base their scenario on the one in the middle, the century-long period of strong cooling
8,200 years ago.  Coming after an extended warm period, this event brought cooling of about 5 °F
over Greenland, with cold and dry conditions extending around the North Atlantic basin and sub-
stantial drying in mid-continental regions of North America, Eurasia, and Africa.195
For their future abrupt-change scenario, the authors constructed a path of climate change to reach
these conditions by 2020.  The pathway involved rapid warming through 2010, as high as 4 – 5 °F
per decade in some regions,196 followed by a rapid turn to cooling around 2010, as melting in Green-
land freshens the North Atlantic and substantially shuts down the thermohaline circulation.  By
2020, hypothesized conditions have approached those of the 8,200-year event – cooling of 5 °F in
Asia and North America and 6 °F in Europe, with widespread drying in major agricultural regions
and intensification of winter storm winds.  The authors acknowledge that the scenario pushes the
boundaries of what is plausible, both in the rapidity of changes and in the simultaneous occurrence 
BOX 4.8.  The Global Business Network Abrupt Climate Change Exercise 
continued on next page
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of extreme changes in multiple world regions.  They contend that this is defensible and useful, 
however,  for an exercise focused on sketching the nature of challenges posed by a plausible 
worst case.197
The socio-economic and security implications of the climate scenario were developed judgmentally,
in consultation with ONA.  Incremental changes are projected for the first 10 years, with general
increase in environmental stresses and approximate maintenance of present disparities between
rich and poor countries.  After 2010, catastrophic cooling in Europe and drying of major agricultural
regions worldwide brings widespread shortages of food, due to decreased agricultural production;
of water, due to shifted precipitation patterns; and of energy, due to shipping disruptions from in-
creased sea ice and storminess.  These shortages produce 400 million migrants over the period
2010-2020, as desperate scarcity generates violent conflict in Europe, Asia, and the Americas.  Ex-
tending their speculation on security implications into the 2020s, the authors hypothesize wide-
spread southward migration of Europeans and near-collapse of the European Union, sustained
conflict in East and Southeast Asia including struggles between China and Japan over access to Russ-
ian energy supplies, and increasing political integration of a fortress North America to manage se-
curity risks and refugee flows.
Controversy and criticism
The project was completed in October 2003, its report published in February 2004 and reported
in Fortune Magazine the same month.198 A few weeks later, the London Observer claimed to have ob-
tained the report secretly and used the scenario to criticize US refusal to join the Kyoto Protocol.199
Subsequent news coverage took up the theme that the report was secret or suppressed, and sug-
gested the reason was that the scenario called for more urgent action on climate change.200 In the
resultant controversy, ONA stated – correctly – that the report did not represent US policy, but
was merely a speculative consultant’s study.  Although the controversy subsided after a few weeks,
interest and concern about the possibility of abrupt climate change, although not of this precise char-
acter, have continued to grow.201
This scenario is a sketch of an abrupt climate-change event, with little fine-scale detail about the hy-
pothesized changes or underlying reasoning and no attempt to suggest how likely or unlikely such
an event is.  Rather, it seeks a preliminary answer to the question, what might the worst case look
like?  Such questions are more often posed in security studies than other fields, because of the
unique nature of responsibilities of military organizations – responding to diverse, novel, unknown
threats with extremely high cost of failure.  Many climate-change decision-makers could likely ben-
efit from such upper-bound scenarios too, but this exercise is the only example of a worst-case sce-
nario produced for climate change.  Major official assessments have focused overwhelmingly on
average or best-guess projections.
But the response to this report vividly illustrates the risks of worst-case or extreme scenarios.
Produced in consultation with a sophisticated user – and in this case, one closely connected to sen-
ior decision-makers – who thoroughly understands the outer-bound nature of the underlying as-
sumptions, they can be valuable devices for preliminary risk assessment and threat identification.  But
in a wider and polarized policy debate they are hard to explain and may be misunderstood or mis-
represented.  Attempting to manage the process through secrecy appears counterproductive, fore-
going the potential value such analyses could provide to multiple decision-makers.  More promising
might be to integrate extreme-case scenarios explicitly into analyses that also present multiple mid-
range scenarios.
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This section presents our conclusions regarding the present state of development and use of sce-
narios for climate-change applications, and some recommendations for specific changes or initia-
tives to advance current practice to make scenarios more useful.
Before doing so, we briefly reprise some key definitional points, because uses of the term scenarios
are so divergent.  We have defined scenarios as descriptions of future conditions produced to in-
form decision-making under uncertainty.  This definition distinguishes scenarios from assessments,
models, decision analyses, and other decision-support activities.  Scenarios may be developed and
used in conjunction with these – for example, scenarios can provide descriptions of potential fu-
ture conditions used as inputs to such activities – but are not identical to these, and not alterna-
tives to them.  
We have also distinguished scenarios from other types of future statements intended to inform
decisions, such as projections, predictions, and forecasts.  Relative to these, scenarios tend to be
more multivariate (but still schematic), tend to be developed in groups, and tend to presume
lower predictive confidence.  The last condition is the case in part because scenarios tend to be
used in situations where the basis for forecasting is less established because of deeper uncer-
tainties, or for situations that pertain to further in the future beyond the range for which there
is high confidence in specific projections, even contingent ones.  
Having distinguished scenarios from these related activities, we consider a broad set of scenarios
of diverse characteristics and uses, including simple and complex scenarios, quantitative and qual-
itative scenarios as well as various combinations of the two, and scenarios whose primary use and
interpretation is positive or normative.  Where we intend our conclusions and recommendations
to apply to only certain types or uses of scenarios, we state this explicitly. Unless stated other-
wise, they pertain to all types of global-change scenarios we are considering. 
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5.1  USE OF SCENARIOS IN 
CLIMATE-CHANGE DECISIONS 
Scenarios can make valuable contribu-
tions to climate-change decision-making.
Many of the decisions that will comprise
society’s response to climate change –
whether mitigation, adaptation, or other re-
sponses – involve high stakes, deep uncer-
tainties, and long time horizons.  Scenarios
can help inform these decisions by structur-
ing present knowledge and uncertainty,
prompting critical examination of present
assumptions and practices, stimulating new
insights, identifying key pitfalls and oppor-
tunities, or providing a framework for the as-
sessment of particular decisions.  For some
decisions, which involve irreversible near-
term commitment to choices whose conse-
quences extend over a horizon involving
substantial uncertainties, some form of sce-
nario-based reasoning may be essential.
There is a big gap between the use of sce-
narios in current practice and their po-
tential contributions. Despite their evident
value and capability, many climate-related
decisions that could benefit from scenarios
(e.g., many decisions regarding long-term
management and investments in climate-
sensitive areas such as freshwater systems
or coastal zones) are not using them.  In-
deed, many such decisions are still being
made without considering climate change
at all.  Conversely, many climate-change
scenarios have only weak and indirect con-
nections to practical decisions related to
climate-change mitigation or adaptation.
Interest in considering and using climate-
change scenarios is sharply increasing.
There is increasing interest in considering
climate-change scenarios in diverse deci-
sion and planning processes.  This trend is
strongest for planning and decisions con-
cerned with climate-change impacts and
adaptation. The trend reflects advances in
scientific understanding of climate change,
gradual maturation of models and analytic
tools, and increasing recognition by deci-
sion-makers of the potential importance of
climate change.  Given the high general con-
cern about climate change and the advance
of background scientific knowledge, we ex-
pect this trend to continue, and to broaden
to other types of climate-related decisions.
Scenarios of global emissions and result-
ant changes in atmospheric trace-gas 
concentrations and climate are a core 
requirement shared by many diverse
climate-related decisions. Although cli-
mate-change decision-makers and their
particular information needs are highly di-
verse, many will need scenarios of global
emissions and resultant climate change,
and many more will need information that
depends on these.  Consistent scenarios of
global emissions and climate change, pro-
vided centrally at the national or interna-
tional level, can serve these diverse needs –
if they are presented with enough trans-
parency and documentation of their under-
lying reasoning and assumptions.
Beyond global emissions and resultant cli-
mate change, decision-makers’ needs
from scenarios are highly diverse.  Differ-
ent climate-change decision-makers will
have highly variable needs from scenarios,
in the factors and variables included, the
time and spatial scale at which they are pro-
vided, and the nature of uncertainties rep-
resented.  The means for meeting these
additional needs will likely be diverse, too.
Some will call for separate, specialized sce-
nario production capabilities.  A major dis-
tinction in scenario-related needs can be
drawn between impacts and adaptation
managers, mitigation policy-makers, and
energy resource and technology managers.
Impacts and adaptation managers need
scenarios that project impacts relevant to
their specific responsibilities, and the
major determinants of vulnerability and
adaptive capacity. Impacts and adaptation
managers include both national officials
and others responsible for more specific
domains of impact.  These decision-mak-
ers need climate-change scenarios, driven
by specified global emissions scenarios, to
provide information about potential cli-
mate-related stresses on their areas of re-
sponsibility.  In addition, they need other
environmental and socio-economic infor-
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mation specific to their areas of responsi-
bility, at appropriate spatial and temporal
scales.  Meeting these needs will require
both easy access to centrally produced cli-
mate scenario information with associated
tools and support, and development of de-
centralized capabilities for developing and
applying additional scenario-related infor-
mation.  Many of these specific informa-
tion needs are likely to be similar in
character for many particular locations and
types of impact. 
Meeting information needs for impacts
and adaptation requires a cross-scale or-
ganizational structure.  These decisions’
combination of centralized and decentral-
ized information needs suggests the need
for a linked network of institutions at na-
tional and sub-national levels to develop
scenarios.  Such a structure would combine
central provision of globally consistent
emissions and climate change scenarios;
decentralized elaboration of these scenar-
ios with additional variables required for
regional impacts and adaptation analyses;
and provision of tools and resources to sup-
port development and use of scenarios. 
Scenarios for impact and adaptation man-
agers should be based on emissions as-
sumptions that include a likely range of
mitigation interventions, now and in the
future.  The emissions assumptions under-
lying scenarios for impacts managers
should be based on the likely range of fu-
ture global emissions trajectories, includ-
ing explicit assumptions about what
degrees of further mitigation effort are
likely over time.  This will typically imply
a narrower range of emission futures than is
considered in scenarios to support mitiga-
tion decisions.
Mitigation policy-makers need scenarios
that project alternative emissions trends in
their own jurisdiction and others, and the
major factors that will influence mitiga-
tion opportunities, constraints, and costs.
Mitigation policy-makers are usually offi-
cials who make national policy and partic-
ipate in international negotiations, but this
group also includes sub-national officials
when they share mitigation responsibilities
or undertake mitigation initiatives.  Serious
pursuit of greenhouse-gas mitigation will
require major policy innovations that carry
significant risks of many kinds, including
the effectiveness and cost of the policies
but also their effects on government budg-
ets, competitiveness of particular industries,
opportunities for national technological ca-
pabilities, etc.  Decision-makers consider-
ing such policies will need scenarios of
global and national emissions trends, re-
sultant climate change, and aggregate im-
pacts.  In addition, they will need to
consider many factors specific to their ju-
risdictions – e.g., national policies, institu-
tions, economic structure, technological
capabilities, and the detailed structure of na-
tional emissions – and information about the
policy environment for their choices, in-
cluding alternative scenarios of other na-
tions’ mitigation strategies, international
mitigation decisions, and implementation
and compliance.
Scenarios for mitigation decisions should
include a wide range of baseline emis-
sions assumptions and should not pre-
judge the likely level of mitigation effort.
Scenarios used to inform mitigation deci-
sions should consider the full range of po-
tential mitigation choices on the agenda,
defined relative to baseline assumptions
that, as much as possible, reflect only ef-
forts already enacted or committed, includ-
ing a range of reasonable assumptions
about implementation and compliance.
This assumption typically implies a wider
range of emissions futures than is consid-
ered in scenarios to support impacts and
adaptation decisions. 
Mitigation decision-makers can use tar-
get-driven scenarios for backcasting. Mit-
igation decision-making may also benefit
from scenarios that impose explicit future
environmental targets such as limits on
emissions or atmospheric concentrations,
together with assumptions about policy and
implementation elsewhere, and reason
backwards to explore alternative paths to,
and implications and requirements of attain-
ing that goal, including feasibility, costs, and
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tradeoffs.  These must be defined in ways rel-
evant to the level of decision-making being
informed, i.e., alternative national targets 
to inform national policy-making, in the
broader context of alternative global base-
lines or global targets.
Informing mitigation decisions requires
capacity for scenario development at the
national level. While core scenarios of
global emissions and climate-change can
provide some of the required input into mit-
igation decisions, these decisions require
additional information that must be pro-
vided at the national or sub-national level
where the decisions are being considered,
generated in consultation with relevant de-
cision-makers or their surrogates.
Energy resource and technology man-
agers need scenarios that represent the
political and economic environment for
energy investments, including mitigation
policies.  Energy resource and technology
managers concerned with private responses
to mitigation policy primarily need scenar-
ios that represent alternative policy
regimes.  Emissions and climate change
underlie these as influences on policy de-
cisions, but do not capture the most impor-
tant uncertainties for these decision-
makers.  While many actors may wish to
generate these scenarios privately to keep
their assumptions and analyses confiden-
tial, there may also be value in multi-party
collaborative scenario-building exercises in
which today’s policy-makers and corporate
planners jointly examine what range of pol-
icy, economic, and energy regimes is plau-
sible or likely over the 30- to 50-year time
horizons relevant for investment and tech-
nology-development decisions.
Scenarios must be periodically revised and
updated.  For all types of decisions and de-
cision-makers, developing scenarios, ap-
plying them to inform decisions, and
refining scenario methods, are iterative
processes.  Limitations to present scenar-
ios or methods do not in general justify de-
laying consideration of such decisions, any
more than scientific uncertainties do.  Still,
scenarios must be periodically updated,
based on new knowledge, experience, and
priorities, as well as further developments
in scenario-related methods.  Such updates
are needed much more frequently than the
decision time horizons.
5.2  USE OF SCENARIOS 
IN CLIMATE-CHANGE
ASSESSMENTS 
Large-scale, official assessments are the
major use for scenarios at present and are
likely to remain an important use.  Large-
scale, official assessments represent the
most prominent demand for climate-related
scenarios at present, and are likely to re-
main major users, particularly for coordi-
nated scenarios of global emissions and
resultant climate-change.
Within assessments, scenarios mainly
serve to support further analysis, model-
ing, and assessment.  When scenarios are
used in assessments, certain users are
clearly identified: e.g., climate modelers
are major users of emissions scenarios,
while impacts assessors and modelers are
major users of climate-change scenarios.
These users have specific scenario needs,
and close consultation is possible between
scenario producers and users to meet these
needs. Substantial progress has been made
in providing useful scenarios for these
groups, at both the national and interna-
tional level.  These efforts should be con-
tinued and expanded.  
The presentation of scenarios in assess-
ments leads to many additional, unforeseen
uses. Scenarios presented in large-scale as-
sessments gain prominent dissemination
that results in their being put to many uses
their developers did not foresee.  Scenarios
should pursue clarity of documentation and
transparency about underlying reasoning
and assumptions, to improve the ease of use
and reduce the risk of misunderstanding in
such derivative uses, although they cannot
anticipate all information needs of an open-
ended set of diverse potential uses.
In assessments, scenarios can strongly in-
fluence issue framing.  Also because of
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their prominent dissemination, scenarios
presented in major assessments can exer-
cise substantial influence over the framing
of policy discussions or provide simple,
widely used metrics of the seriousness of
the issue.  They may consequently exercise
broad influence over many decisions that
depend upon such aggregate perceptions of
seriousness.  The prospect of such influ-
ence further heightens the responsibility for
transparency in production of scenarios.
Scenarios contain unavoidable elements
of judgment in both their production and
use. Although they draw on relevant data,
knowledge, and analysis, scenarios in-
evitably contain elements of judgment.  In
addition to putting serious responsibilities
onto scenario developers, this implies that
there is no authoritative way to resolve ar-
guments over whether a scenario is plausi-
ble or not.  When a wide enough range of
potential futures is considered, some sce-
narios are likely to draw criticism, in part
motivated by opposition to their foresee-
able implications for action.  Any scenario
can be attacked as unreasonable, specula-
tive or unlikely, and close enough scrutiny
of any scenario can usually reveal incon-
sistencies, but these do not provide suffi-
cient basis for excluding a scenario from
consideration.  Indeed, scenarios designed
to represent extreme events, or to lie near
one end of a distribution of potential out-
comes, should by definition appear un-
likely.  The most productive response to
such criticisms lies in transparency about
the process, reasoning, and assumptions
used to produce scenarios.  Such trans-
parency can shift arguments to underlying
uncertainties, and help limit biases in the
production of scenarios. 
5.3  CHARACTERISTICS 
OF “CORE” EMISSIONS AND
CLIMATE SCENARIOS
Centrally provided scenarios of emissions
and climate change can help inform miti-
gation and adaptation decisions at na-
tional and sub-national scale, but these
will usually require additional informa-
tion as well.  Central scenarios can provide
information about trends in world emis-
sions, underlying socio-economic condi-
tions at the scale of major world regions,
and the large-scale pattern of global policy
response.  They can also provide access to
climate-model scenario output, plus tools,
data, and support for producing finer-scale
scenario information needed for particular
impact and adaptation applications.  Miti-
gation and adaptation decisions and asso-
ciated assessments at national or smaller
spatial scale will need more detailed and
finer-scale climate and socio-economic in-
formation than can be provided by central-
ized scenarios, so these must be extended
and/or modified by national and sub-na-
tional scenario processes.  
Scenarios of emissions and resultant cli-
mate change should be global in scope
and century-scale in time horizon. Core
emissions and climate-change scenarios
should specify major climate-relevant
emissions and other perturbations, globally
and for major world regions.  They should
extend over a time horizon of at least 100
years (including some that extend 200-300
years to support assessments of sea level
rise), with interim results at roughly
decadal resolution. 
Emissions scenarios of several distinct
logical types will be needed to serve di-
verse purposes.  These will include some
combination of alternative baselines, alterna-
tive levels of incremental stringency of miti-
gation effort, and specified future targets to
support backcasting and feasibility analysis.
For some uses, emissions scenarios should
be coupled to explicit scenarios of alter-
native socio-economic futures.  For these
scenarios, the range of potential socio-eco-
nomic and policy futures considered should
be wider than has been considered to date,
including scenarios of policy failure and
conflict, and a wide range of stringency and
timing of mitigation effort.  For example,
what if development stagnates in major
world regions?  What if world emissions
grow sharply for several decades with lit-
tle control effort, followed by a subsequent
shift to stringent mitigation efforts? What
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if part of the world makes a lot of effort and
part makes very little?  Considering such
varied future histories is crucial for consid-
ering long-term risks and opportunities
from major mitigation choices.
Scenarios should reflect various explicit
degrees of coordination, depending on
their intended uses.  Some uses will re-
quire groups of simple coordinated scenar-
ios to provide standardized inputs for
downstream modeling and analysis – e.g.,
standard emissions scenarios as inputs to
climate models and standard climate sce-
narios as inputs to impact assessments – for
exploring present uncertainties and track-
ing developments of knowledge over time.
Other scenarios should be based on multiple
models using common input assumptions.
Non-standardized scenarios produced at the
initiative of researchers and modelers should
also be produced, which explore alternative
assumptions or meet specific user needs,
provided these meet basic standards of
quality control, transparency, and docu-
mentation. 
Some scenarios should seek to link quali-
tative and quantitative elements. Some
scenarios of socio-economic conditions,
whether produced to support global emis-
sions scenarios or impacts assessments,
should include both qualitative and quanti-
tative elements and sustained analytic ef-
forts to link the two.  Qualitative or narrative
scenario elements can provide a vehicle to
explore major historical uncertainties with
large implications for global emissions, cli-
mate change, and vulnerability to climate
impacts; provide a coherent rationale and
logical structure to connect assumed tra-
jectories for multiple variables, including
both quantitative and qualitative ones; and
provide guidance to other analysts or users
who may wish to extend the scenarios by
elaborating additional detail.  Achieving
these benefits will require more sustained
effort to integrate model-based projections
of quantitative variables with qualitative
and narrative scenario elements, to iterate
between these, and to critically examine
each element in light of the other, than has
been made thus far.  These efforts should
seek to connect alternative qualitative and
narrative scenarios not just to alternative
parameter values in quantitative models,
but also to alternative forms of causal rela-
tions and model structures.  Generating
multiple alternative model quantifications
based on the same narrative and associated
causal logic is one promising route to en-
riching understanding of uncertainties in
key quantitative variables such as future
economic output and emissions.
5.4  SCENARIO PROCESS:
DEVELOPER-USER
INTERACTIONS
There is value in collaboration between
scenario developers and users, particu-
larly at the beginning and ending stages
of a scenario exercise. The appropriate de-
gree and means of this collaboration vary
substantially among scenario exercises.
User engagement is most important in the
initial scoping and design of a scenario ex-
ercise, and in the evaluation and applica-
tion of the scenarios generated.  The value
of user engagement in details of scenario
development, quantification, elaboration,
and checking, depends on the specific case.
The ease of achieving such collaboration
and its value are likely to be greater when
scenario users are clearly identified, few
in number, and similar in their interests
and perspectives. When potential scenario
users are identified, relatively few, and rel-
atively homogenous, close and intensive
collaboration between users and develop-
ers is likely to be most productive.  When
potential users are numerous and diverse,
intensive engagement may be infeasible
and more structured processes for consul-
tation, representation, and information ex-
change are needed.  While progress has
been made in new methods to allow larger
numbers to participate in scenario exer-
cises, further development of such methods
is needed. 
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5.5  COMMUNICATION 
OF SCENARIOS
Effective communication of scenarios is
essential, in forms useful to audiences of
diverse interests and technical skills. Sce-
narios must be communicated effectively to
their potential users, including both techni-
cal and non-technical audiences.  In addi-
tion to the contents or outputs of scenarios,
communication should include associated
documentation, tools, and support for their
use.  Various methods should be used to
promote broad dissemination of scenario
information; for instance, presentations, re-
ports, websites, and centralized data distri-
bution centers.  To facilitate user
understanding of results, various methods
should be used to communicate numerical
and technical information, including multi-
ple tabular, summary, and graphical formats,
ideally with user-interactive capabilities.
Transparency of underlying reasoning
and assumptions is crucial. Scenario com-
munication should include transparent dis-
closure of underlying assumptions, models,
and reasoning used to produce the scenar-
ios, to support the credibility of scenarios,
to alert potential users to conditions under
which they might wish to use or modify
them, and to inform criticism and improve-
ment of scenarios.  This should include ex-
plicit identification of the major
uncertainties represented in each scenario
and the sources of underlying information,
whether drawn from the scientific litera-
ture, formal expert-elicitation exercises, or
informal judgments of the scenario team.
It is possible in virtually all cases to for-
mulate simple, accessible, honest descrip-
tions of why a scenario was undertaken,
why it was necessary, what was done, how
and why, and why it merits respect as a rea-
sonable judgment.  
5.6  CONSISTENCY AND
INTEGRATION IN SCENARIOS
Any scenario should be internally consis-
tent in its assumptions and reasoning, to
the extent this can be established given
present knowledge.  Carefully pursuing
consistency within individual scenarios 
can be an intensive and time-consuming
process, but is crucial to avoid problems
that can discredit a scenario exercise.
In scenario exercises that use multiple
models to explore potential uncertainties
in future conditions, consistency between
models should be pursued primarily
through coordination of inputs, not out-
puts. Use of multiple models in parallel to
produce alternative descriptions of future
conditions can improve understanding of
uncertainties, if models are run under 
consistent assumptions about exogenous
inputs.  Forcing models to generate consis-
tent trajectories for endogenous outputs
poses several risks, including suppressing
variation from alternative causal structures
that could provide valuable insights into
uncertainties, and encouraging over-confi-
dence from spurious precision.  For quanti-
ties that are exogenous in some models and
endogenous in others, the appropriate treat-
ment varies case by case, but it is not gen-
erally desirable to force multiple models to
convergent values of such variables with-
out more detailed examination of the un-
derlying uncertainties.
Imposing consistent outputs in multi-
model exercises can be useful, however,
when these outputs represent common
goals for policy evaluation. For example,
consistent constraints on some environ-
mentally relevant target such as emissions,
atmospheric concentrations, or radiative
forcings, can be used to examine inter-
model uncertainties in the technological,
economic, and resource conditions associ-
ated with meeting the specified targets.
Transparency in reporting scenario and
model differences as well as underlying
assumptions and reasoning can help mit-
igate the effects of inconsistencies among
scenarios.  Ideally, multiple scenarios in an
exercise should differ only on those ele-
ments intentionally chosen to distinguish
them, and be consistent in all other factors.
However, this is not always possible, par-
ticularly when scenarios are produced
using different models.  Pursuing maximal
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transparency about the models, assump-
tions, and reasoning underlying each 
scenario – perhaps by issuing detailed di-
agnostic reports that include explicit dis-
cussion of points of weakness, uncertainty,
and disagreements, and the means used to
resolve them – can mitigate any resultant
confusion.
5.7  TREATMENT OF
UNCERTAINTY IN SCENARIOS
Some scenario exercises should include
more explicit characterization of likeli-
hood judgments than has been practiced
so far.  The advantages of being more ex-
plicit about the probability judgments that
underlie scenario exercises are likely to
outweigh the disadvantages.  Such specifi-
cation should be pursued further than has
been done in major global-change scenario
exercises to date, although not necessarily
in all scenario exercises.  The means avail-
able to express these judgments are of
widely varying specificity, ranging from
agreed terminology202 to explicitly quanti-
fied probability distributions.  All such
judgments should include explicit ac-
knowledgement of their inevitably subjec-
tive elements and appropriate caveats to
help users avoid mistaking them as objec-
tively true.
Explicit probability judgments are easiest
to produce and least controversial in sce-
narios generated using quantitative mod-
els of climate change or specific impact
domains.  Scenarios generated using such
models can be conditioned on specific as-
sumed values for socio-economic inputs
such as emissions, and can represent ex-
plicitly and quantitatively the effects of
specified variation in initial conditions or
unknown parameter values.  These devices
are also available, although in less wide-
spread use, in economic models used to
project emissions.  These devices aid in
constructing distributions of key quantita-
tive characteristics, such as measures of
global or regional climate, or of prominent
quantitative impact measures, such as
changes in river flows or sea level, al-
though they neither capture all relevant 
uncertainty nor avoid the inevitably sub-
jective nature of such probability judg-
ments.  Explicit probability judgments are
more difficult and controversial when they
involve socio-economic factors for which
quantitative models are not available, and
that do not depend in well understood ways
on identified quantitative parameters.  Such
factors include major technological inno-
vations, large-scale changes in attitudes or
norms, or policy response.
Attempting to include explicit probability
judgments is likely to be most useful and
successful when key variables are few,
quantitative outcomes are needed, and po-
tential users are numerous and diverse.
The case for assigning explicit likelihood
judgments is strongest when scenarios’
most salient components are quantitative
projections of a few key variables, such as
emissions or average temperature change
over the globe or some region, because the
technical barriers to assigning probabilities
are least severe in this case.  The case is
strongest when a primary purpose of the
scenario exercise is to provide inputs to
other quantitative assessment activities, or
to inform decisions that primarily depend
on one or a few key quantitative variables,
because such uses are most likely to require
probability judgments.  The case is
strongest when the set of potential scenario
users and uses is large and heterogeneous,
because this situation provides the least op-
portunity for informal communication of
implicit judgments of likelihood or priority
through intense, sustained collaboration be-
tween scenario developers and users.
Attempting to include explicit probability
judgments is likely to be least useful and
successful when scenarios specify multi-
ple characteristics, including prominent
narrative or qualitative components; when
the purpose of a scenario exercise is sen-
sitivity analysis or heuristic exploration;
202 See, e.g., the consistent uncertainty language pro-
posed for IPCC reports by Moss and Schneider 2000. 
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and when potential users are few, similar,
and known.  When scenarios are primarily
construed as rich, qualitative narratives that
present major alternative historical and
socio-economic trajectories, the technical
obstacles to explicit probability assignment
are greatest and the likely confidence in
scenario developers’ subjective probability
judgments lowest.   When the main purpose
of a scenario exercise is to stimulate critical
or creative thought, to probe the limits of a
model or decision strategy through sensi-
tivity analysis, or to explore ways of meet-
ing a specified target, explicit probability
assignment provides little or no benefit.
When users are few, similar, and specifi-
cally identified, they can be intensively in-
volved in scenario production, allowing
effective informal communication of like-
lihood judgments without stating them ex-
plicitly.  Under these conditions, scenario
exercises can also be structured to engage
users in the potentially instructive activity
of assigning and discussing their own prob-
ability judgments, rather than putting that
responsibility exclusively on the researchers
or analysts developing scenarios.
Centrally provided scenarios of global
emissions and climate change should at-
tempt to include explicit probability judg-
ments. Because of the large, diverse set of
users for these scenarios, explicit likelihood
judgments should be provided for ranges of
key quantitative outputs, including global
emissions and global-average temperature
change.  Scenarios should typically include
several paths that span a wide range of
judged uncertainty, e.g., 95 percent to 99
percent.  The associated probability judg-
ments may include some that are uncondi-
tional and some that are conditioned on
specific assumed prior conditions.  Such es-
timates should be provided by multiple
groups using diverse methods.  As for all
such probability judgments, their unavoid-
ably subjective nature and the specific as-
sumptions on which they are conditioned
should be stated explicitly and prominently
.
Providing explicit probability judgments al-
lows scenario users to choose whether to
use them or not.  Some users may choose
to use these explicitly in their subsequent
analysis or decision support, while others
may use them only to help decide which sce-
narios to use, and still others may disregard
them entirely.  Users may select a different
group of scenarios or a different subset of
the uncertainty range for various reasons, in-
cluding differences in risk aversion, differ-
ences in the scope of their decision author-
ity, or differences in their assumptions
about decisions by other actors (present or
future).  Presenting complete descriptions of
scenarios together with underlying as-
sumptions and reasoning, including proba-
bility judgments, preserves all these options
for users.
Scenario exercises should give more at-
tention to extreme cases. Some uses of sce-
narios require consideration of low-probability,
high-consequence extreme cases, such as loss
of a major continental ice sheet or major
changes in meridional ocean circulation.
Consequently, such scenarios should be in-
cluded in large, general-purpose scenario ex-
ercises producing emissions or climate-
change scenarios, together with more likely
middle-case scenarios.  When extreme sce-
narios are included in an exercise, it is espe-
cially critical to be explicit and transparent
about the reasoning and assumptions under-
lying each scenario, and scenario developers’
judgments of relative likelihoods.
In addition to enhancing the utility of sce-
nario outputs, probabilistic methods can
contribute throughout the scenario devel-
opment process.  Developing scenarios re-
quires making many judgments about un-
known characteristics and developing many
arguments and pathways to link these.  Sce-
narios based on quantitative models typically
require specifying many exogenous inputs
and parameters.  Even narrative scenarios re-
quire specifying values of multiple charac-
teristics, both qualitative and quantitative.
Explicit discussion of uncertainties and as-
sociated probabilities can help structure
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and facilitate many aspects of the scenario
development process, including deciding ap-
propriate ranges of variables to consider,
defining boundaries of what outcomes are
considered plausible, elaborating associat-
ed causal mechanisms and linkages, dis-
cussing and integrating knowledge and
judgments from multiple participants, and
clarifying disagreements.  Explicit conver-
sation about probabilities can support in-
sights throughout these processes, in addi-
tion to supporting communication of scenario
judgments to users.
5.8  EXPANDING AND SUSTAIN-
ING CAPACITY FOR PRODUC-
TION AND USE OF SCENARIOS203
Present scenario capacity is inadequate.  Al-
though scenario-based reasoning is required
for many aspects of global change assessment
and decision support, the present capacity to
produce, disseminate, apply, evaluate, and
adapt scenarios is inadequate.  There has not
been enough continuity to enable effective
learning, because scenarios are typically
produced de novo for each major application.
There has not been enough transparency about
methods, reasoning, and assumptions.  Con-
structing integrated scenarios and exploring
alternative methods has been difficult, in part
because scenario exercises have tended to be
dominated by use of quantitative models, sep-
arated along disciplinary lines.  Inadequate re-
sources have been devoted to methods de-
velopment, for scenarios and related decision-
support tools Finally, there has been no sys-
tematic evaluation and critique of scenarios
or their application.
To help fulfill these presently unmet
needs, CCSP should establish a
program to: 
•  Commission scenarios for use in as-
sessments and decision-support
activities. This task includes facil-
itating agreement among relevant
producers and users on standard sce-
narios in cases where multiple as-
sessment activities require stan-
dard scenarios for comparability, and
convening and supporting a di-
verse collection of more extensive
and detailed scenario-related exer-
cises, by multiple groups using a
wide range of models and ap-
proaches.  
•  Disseminate scenarios with associated
documentation, tools, and guidance
materials. This task includes mul-
tiple forms of support and pro-
gram-building for diverse groups
seeking to apply, modify, and extend
existing scenario-based informa-
tion at various regional and sectoral
scales, through providing data,
models, tools, resources, and asso-
ciated documentation and technical
support, in multiple forms and
through multiple media.
•  Commission various groups to eval-
uate scenarios and their applica-
tions and to develop improved
methods. This task includes defin-
ing and promulgating standards for
quality control – which, given the
need for diverse approaches, would
principally concern matters of
process such as transparency, doc-
umentation, evaluation, and dis-
semination of results and support-
ing information.  The task also in-
cludes broad efforts to develop sce-
nario-related skills, tools, and meth-
ods, e.g., by providing resources for
methods development and evalua-
tion projects; conducting and es-
tablishing procedures for evaluation
of particular activities and pro-
grams; and convening workshops,
203 Recommendations made in this report regarding pro-
grammatic and organizational changes, and the ade-
quacy of current budgets, reflect the judgment of the
report’s authors and the CPDAC and are not necessar-
ily the views of the U.S. Government.
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conferences, etc., to evaluate
progress overall, or in particular
methodological areas.
•  Archive results and documentation re-
lated to all these tasks, to provide
historical perspective and institu-
tional memory for future scenario-
related activities. This task in-
cludes preserving for retrospective
scrutiny a wide range of materials:
not just the methods, contents, and
results of scenario exercises, but also
the progressive evaluations of par-
ticular activities and approaches, and
of the entire program.  In its ongo-
ing development and evaluation of
methods, the program should not
draw rigid boundaries between sce-
nario development and application
and other related methods of as-
sessment and decision support for
long-term global change issues.
Several conditions in the design and
management of this new program
would be required to ensure its ef-
fectiveness. 
•  The program should build and main-
tain strong connections with out-
side relevant expertise, and analytic
and modeling capability. While
the program must develop enough
internal expertise to be a full par-
ticipant in debates over scenarios
and assessment methods, it cannot
and should not attempt to impose a
unilateral vision of preferred sce-
narios, methods, or approaches.
Rather, it must build and maintain
close collegial connections with
outside networks of researchers
and analysts in multiple fields of ex-
pertise, including emissions mod-
elers, climate scientists and mod-
elers, impacts researchers, and re-
source managers.  These relation-
ships would be facilitated by es-
tablishing governing mechanisms,
such as a senior advisory board,
drawn from the broad communities
of researchers, modelers, and ana-
lysts who are developing and using
scenarios and related methods.  Al-
though established as a US nation-
al program, it must also support, col-
laborate, and coordinate with par-
allel activities in other nations and
internationally, and with relevant
sub-national activities. 
• The program should integrate and bal-
ance goals and criteria related to
scientific and technical quality,
and those related to utility and rel-
evance to users. This balance is
needed for the program to support
promising but speculative activities,
to encourage creativity and diversity
of approach, to avoid being captured
by any particular discipline or mod-
eling approach, and to be willing to
make and explain judgments about
quality and promise that reflect
both scientific and practical con-
siderations.  To achieve this, the pro-
gram needs broad discretion over the
type of projects supported, includ-
ing sponsoring fairly sharply tar-
geted activities, supporting specu-
lative activities, and investing to de-
velop and assess capabilities that do
not yet exist. 
•  The program should be insulated from
political control. For the scenarios
and analyses based on them to be
perceived as credible by their diverse
users, the program needs enough in-
sulation from political control, at
both the national or international
level, to prevent scenarios from
becoming proxies for conflict over
near-term policies, and to allow
exploration of the implications of al-
ternative futures that represent plau-
sible risks but that some political ac-
tors would find objectionable.  
•  The program should strive for max-
imum transparency in its own ac-
tivities, in addition to demanding
it from activities it supports. The
program should strive for maximal
transparency regarding inputs, mod-
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els, assumptions, and reasoning
employed in developing scenarios,
as well as any significant disagree-
ments that arose and how they
were resolved and any remaining
weaknesses recognized by the de-
velopers.  The broader and more di-
verse the collection of intended
uses and users, the more crucial is
transparency of the scenario-pro-
duction process – because different
users may require scenarios pro-
duced using different underlying as-
sumptions, and they must be able to
track the underlying logic to exer-
cise this choice. This would enhance
credibility in the scenario-develop-
ment process.  While calls for such
transparency are widely made, ex-
perience suggests it is difficult to
achieve, particularly for such mat-
ters as disagreements or recognized
weaknesses that may risk profes-
sional embarrassment.  Still, achiev-
ing more transparency and more
widely informed debate on such mat-
ters is essential for advancing sce-
nario methods.
•  The program will require the authority
and resources  necessary to artic-
ulate and promulgate standards for
transparency, consistency (e.g., of
units and formats), and quality con-
trol. This task involves facilitating
discussions among the community
and formulating persuasive guide-
lines and supporting arguments.  It
also requires use of incentives such
as seals of approval, access to par-
ticipation in particular processes, ac-
cess to particular dissemination
outlets, and access to resources.  A
weak “clearinghouse” that solicits,
supports, or publicizes scenarios but
cannot exercise quality control,
propose and stimulate new direc-
tions, or convene critical reviews, of
the whole enterprise and of partic-
ular exercises, is not an adequate
model for the program.
•  The program will require an adequate
sustained resources. The program
must build and maintain a sophis-
ticated analytic capability, and de-
velop skills and institutional mem-
ory regarding prior experiences,
successes, and failures. This re-
quirement precludes the program
being a series of ad hoc one-time ac-
tivities or a part-time, unfunded bur-
den imposed on people and organ-
izations with other full-time re-
sponsibilities.
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A1, A2, B1, B2, A1FI
names of specific emissions scenarios 
published in the IPCC Special Report on 
Emissions Scenarios
CCSP Climate Change Science Program
CCTP Climate Change Technology Program 
CFCs chlorofluorocarbons
DDC Data Distribution Center (IPCC)
DOD Department of Defense (U.S.)
DWR Department of Water Resources 
(California)
EMF Energy Modeling Forum
ENSO El Ni o/Southern Oscillation
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
GBN Global Business Network
GCM general circulation model
GDP gross domestic product
GFDL Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, 
US National Oceanographic and Atmos
pheric Administration (NOAA), and 
climate model produced by this 
laboratory
GtC gigatonnes (billion metric tons) of carbon 
HadCM2 UK Hadley Centre climate model, 
Version 2
IIASA International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria
IPCC Inter-governmental Panel on 
Climate Change
IS92 series of emissions scenarios produced by 
the IPCC in 1992, including specific 
scenarios named IS92a through IS92f
LRTAP Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution
MEA Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
MEC Metropolitan East Coast assessment of 
US National Assessment
MER market exchange rates
NAPAP National Acid Precipitation 
Assessment Program
NAST National Assessment Synthesis Team
NRC National Research Council (U.S.)
NYCDEP New York City Department of 
Environmental Protection
NYCHP New York Climate and Health Project
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development
ONA Office of Net Assessments (Office of US 
Secretary of Defense)
OTA Office of Technology Assessment, 
United States Congress
PDO Pacific Decadal Oscillation
PPP purchasing-power parity
SRES Special Report on Emissions Scenarios 
(IPCC)
TGICA Task Group on Data and Scenario 
Support for Impact and Climate 
Analysis (IPCC)
UKCIP United Kingdom Climate Impacts 
Program
VEMAP Vegetation Ecosystem Mapping and 
Analysis Project 
VOC olatile organic compounds
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